

Instituições Políticas e Estruturas de Governo em Perspectiva Comparada (3 créditos)

Prof^a: Argelina Cheibub Figueiredo

Horário: Terça-feira, das 13 às 16 horas

Consultas: A combinar com a professora

Objetivos:

Este curso visa introduzir os alunos no estudo das instituições políticas listadas a seguir e discutir o efeito de cada uma delas no funcionamento e desempenho dos sistemas políticos. Sendo assim, foram selecionados textos que permitem caracterizar as instituições, identificar os formatos que assumem em diferentes países, inclusive o Brasil, e analisar de forma comparada as instituições selecionadas.

As seções combinarão aulas expositivas e seminários, requerendo a leitura prévia dos textos obrigatórios indicados seguindo um cronograma a ser distribuído na primeira aula. A avaliação será feita de duas formas: 1) cada aluno ficará responsável pela apresentação de uma revisão crítica (2-3 páginas) de pelo menos dois textos ao longo do semestre, que circulará entre os colegas previamente à sua discussão em aula; 2) cada aluno deverá fazer um trabalho final a ser definido no decorrer do curso.

Programa:

1. Sistemas de Governo
2. Sistemas Eleitorais e Partidários
3. Organização do Estado: Federalismo
4. Organização do Legislativo
5. Poderes de Agenda
6. Tipos de Governos e Coalizões Políticas

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2. Sistemas Eleitorais e Partidários:

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3. Organização do Estado: Federalismo:

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