

Institutionalism Reversed: Explaining Institutions (3 créditos)

Prof. José Antonio Cheibub

Horário: ver abaixo

Consultas: A combinar com o professor

As aulas da disciplina serão ministradas nos seguintes dias e horários:

11/3 – das 13 às 16 horas
13/3 – das 13 às 16 horas
15/3 – das 9 às 12 horas
18/3 – das 13 às 16 horas
20/3 – das 13 às 16 horas
22/3 – das 9 às 12 horas
27/5 – das 13 às 16 horas
29/5 – das 13 às 16 horas
31/5 – das 9 às 12 horas
3/6 – das 13 às 16 horas
5/6 – das 13 às 16 horas
7/6 – das 9 às 12 horas

Political Science has come a long way since the publication of *Bringing the State Back In* thirty years ago. Institutionalism is now recognized as one of the main “approaches” to studying politics and there are hundreds of articles and books developing, explaining, amending, or proposing an institutional approach to politics. What was asked thirty years ago – Do Institutions Matter? – is now mostly taken for granted. Yet, we now also know better about the problems involved in establishing causation in the social sciences. Determining the causal effect of institutions – the core of the institutionalist approach to politics – is complicated by a number of difficulties and not least among them is the problem of endogeneity: institutions are endogenous. They are themselves the product of many of the outcomes that we believe are the consequence of institutions. No account of institutional effects can be sustained without a good understanding of the conditions under which the institutions themselves emerged.

The goal of this course is to explore accounts of institutional emergence and variation keeping in mind how they may affect explanations of the consequences of institutions. The course will operate at two levels. First, we will focus on “general” theories about the emergence of institutions. Second, we will study theories about the emergence of or variation in specific institutions (e.g., separation of powers systems, parliamentarism, electoral formulas, political parties). The second level of analysis will probably dominate the discussions as the first – “general” theories of institutional origins – is considerably less developed. When discussing theories of specific institutions, we will try to follow a common pattern that involves three steps: (1) Establishing that the institution matters: why does it matter? What does it matter for? (2) Given the answers to the first question, can we come up with specific reasons to be concerned with endogeneity? Are there possible selection stories? (3) Formulate hypotheses about institutional origins and variation: What are the hypotheses? How do they connect with the consequences of institutions, our primary concern?

All papers will be provided in electronic format. Course evaluation will consist of one final paper, of approximately 5,000 words.

***** Todas as aulas serão ministradas em português *****

FIRST PART: MARCH

1. Introduction

- 2. The problem of institutions:** Origins of Institutionalism: opposition to pluralism; institutions as a cause; the difficulty of establishing institutional causality; "general" theories of institutional emergence

Read:

North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-72.

Shepsle, Kenneth. 2010. "The Rules of the Game." Prepared for presentation at the conference "The Legacy and Work of Douglass C. North: Understanding Institutions and Development Economics," Center for New Institutional Social Science, Washington University in St. Louis, November 4-5, 2010.

Przeworski, Adam. 2009. "Is the Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, eds. *Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 147-171.

Carr, Edward Hallett. 1967 [1961]. *What Is History?* New York: Vintage Books. pp. 113-143.

- 3. Institutions and economic development:** Do institutions matter for economic development? What is the relative importance of institutions, geography and policy? How convincingly are the facts established?

Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson and James A. Robinson. 2001. "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 91 (5): 1369-1401.

Glaeser, Edward L, Raphael La Porta, Florencio Lopez de Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer. 2004. "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth* 9:271-303.

Przeworski, Adam. 2004. "The Last Instance: Are Institutions the Primary Cause of Economic Development?" *European Journal of Sociology* 45 (2): 165-188.

Adam Przeworski. 2004. "Economic History and Political Science." *The Political Economist* 12: 3-11.

Daron Acemoglu, Simon Johnson, and James A. Robinson. 2005. "Economic History and Political Science: Clarifying the Questions, Methods, and Answers." *The Political Economist* 12: 4-13.

Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2010. "Why is Africa Poor?" *Economic History of Developing Regions* 25 (1): 21-50.

- 4. Constraints on the Executive:** there seems to be a consensus among economists and some political scientists that the institutions that are relevant for development are those that constraint the executive. What does this mean specifically? What are these institutions and how are they measured? How do these institutions emerge?

Dixit, Avinash K. and Barry J. Nalebuff. 1991. *Thinking Strategically: The Competitive Edge in Business, Politics, and Everyday Life*. New York: Norton. pp.142-167.

North, Douglass and Barry Weingast. 1989. "Constitutions and Commitment: Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice." *Journal of Economic History* 49 (4): 803-832.

Stasavage, David. 2002. "Private Investment and Political Institutions." *Economics and Politics* 14: 41-63.

Weingast, Barry R. 1997. "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law." *American Political Science Review* 91 (2): 245-263.

5. Democracy: Broad and narrow definitions of democracy; why does democracy emerge and remains in place?

Cheibub, José Antonio and James R. Vreeland. 2011. "Economic Development and Democratization," in Nathan J. Brown, ed. *The Dynamics of Democratization: Dictatorship, Development, and Diffusion*. Johns Hopkins University Press. pp. 145-182

Przeworski, Adam. 2006. "Self-Enforcing Democracy" in Barry R. Weingast and Donald A. Wittman, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Political Economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 313-328.

Boix, Carles. 2006. "The Roots of Democracy." *Policy Review* (February/March): 1-19.

6. Dictatorships: it is generally accepted now that elections and other "democratic" institutions matter in dictatorships. But why do dictators hold elections? Why do they create legislatures? Are those who do so more likely to be successful?

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way. 2002. "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism." *Journal of Democracy* 13(2):51-65, April.

Gandhi, Jennifer and Adam Przeworski. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." *Comparative Political Studies*, vol. 40, no. 11, pp. 1279-1301.

Cheibub, José Antonio, Jude C. Hays, Burcu Savun. 2012. "Elections and Civil War in Africa." Manuscript.

Blaydes, Lisa. 2011. *Elections and Distributive Politics in Mubarak's Egypt*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 48-63.

7. Presidentialism: Presidential institutions (separation-of-powers system) are said to influence the survival of governments, the type of public policy adopted, the nature of political parties, etc. Yet, is there anything about the societies that adopted such a system that might account for at least some of these effects? Why do we see presidential institutions in some democracies but not others?

Shugart, Matthew Soberg and John M. Carey. 1992. *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 1-17

Geddes, Barbara. 1995. "A Comparative Perspective on the Leninist Legacy in Eastern Europe." *Comparative Political Studies* 28 (2): 239-274.

Frye, Timothy. 1997. "A Politics of Institutional Choice: Post Communist Presidencies." *Comparative Political Studies* 30 (5): 523-552.

Easter, Gerald M. 1997. "Preference for Presidentialism: Postcommunist Regime Change in Russia and the NIS." *World Politics* 49 (2): 184-211.

Cheibub, José Antonio. 2007. *Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 136-164.

Greif, Avner and David Laitin. 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change" *American Political Science Review* 98 (4): 633-652. □

SECOND PART – MAY/JUNE

- 8. Parliamentarism:** Parliamentary regimes evolved rather than were explicitly adopted. Is this fact relevant for outcomes of parliamentarism? What is the origin of some of the institutions – restrictive legislative procedures – that are said to provide stability to, and increase capacity of, parliamentary governments?

Przeworski, Adam, Tamar Asadurian, and Anjali Thomas Bohlken. 2012. "The Origins of Parliamentary Responsibility" in Tom Ginsburg, ed. *Comparative Constitutional Design*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 101-137.

Bates, Robert H. and Da-Hsiang Donald Lien. 1985. "A Note on Taxation, Development, and Representative Government." *Politics & Society* 14 (1): 53-70.

Congleton, Roger. 2007. "From Royal to Parliamentary Rule without Revolution, the Economics of Constitutional Exchange within Divided Governments." *European Journal of Political Economy* 23: 261-284.

Congleton, Roger. 2006. "Constitutional Exchange in Japan: from Shogunate to Parliamentary Democracy." *Public Choice Studies* 47: 5-29.

- 9. Political Parties I:** What is it about political parties that we care about? There are many dimensions along which parties can be characterized; although they are all important, they do not always affect the same things, or similar things in the same way. In this first of two sessions on parties, we will discuss different accounts for the emergence of political parties in general? Is there a theory of political parties? Why do they emerge? Why parties of some types emerge in some systems, but not in others?

Schattschneider, E. E. 1942. *Party Government*. New York: Rinehart. pp. 1-64.

Cox, Cary W. 1987. *The Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 9-90.

Aldrich, John H. 1995. *Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pages 3-27.

Cox, Gary W. Matthew D. McCubbins. 2005. *Setting the Agenda: Responsible Party Government in the U.S. House of Representatives*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 17-36.

LaPalombara, Joseph and Myron Weiner. 1966. "The Origin and Development of Political Parties" in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds. *Political Parties and Political Development*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. pp. 3-42.

- 10. Political Parties II:** Why do we observe different types of political parties – socialists, religious, clientelist, programmatic - across political systems?

Lispet, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan (1967) "Cleavage Structures, Party Systems, and Voter Alignments: An Introduction." in Peter Mair (ed.) *The West European Party System*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

*** to be determined.

11. Electoral formulas I: Electoral rules matter; they are endogenous; how do we explain the adoption of one among several possible different electoral systems?

Cox, Gary W. 1997. *Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-36.

Bawn, Kathleen (1993). "The Logic of Institutional Preferences: The German Electoral Law as a Social Choice Outcome." *AJPS* 37(4) November: 965-989.

Olga Shvetsova, "Endogenous Selection of Institutions and Their Exogenous Effects," *Constitutional Political Economy* 14, 2003, 191-212.

Karen L. Remmer, "The Politics of Institutional Change: Electoral Reform in Latin America, 1978-2002," *Party Politics*, 14 (January 2008), 5-30.

Benoit, Kenneth and John W. Schiemann. 2001. "Institutional Choice in New Democracies: Bargaining over Hungary's 1989 Electoral Law" *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 13(2): 153-182.

Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions." *International Organization* 41 (2): 203-223.

12. Electoral Formulas II: The effect of electoral rules on political parties and the party system, as well as on the behavior of legislators (the "electoral connection") is often taken for granted. Although the endogeneity of electoral rules has been widely recognized, we still do not have a good account of how certain rules, e.g., proportional representation, emerged. There are purely sociological explanations (social diversity), strategic explanations, and purely historical explanations. What is the consequence of these explanations for our theories about the effects of electoral systems?

Carles Boix. 1999. "Setting the Rules of the Game: Choice of Electoral Systems in Advanced Democracies" *American Political Science Review* 93 (3): 609-614.

Andrews, Joseph. T and Robert W. Jackman. 2005. "Strategic Fools: Electoral Rule Choice under Extreme Uncertainty." *Electoral Studies* 24: 65-84.

Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2007. "Economic Interests and the Origins of Electoral Systems." *American Political Science Review* 101 (3): 337-91.

Calvo, Ernesto. 2009. "The Competitive Road to Proportional Representation," *World Politics* 61 (2): 254-295.

Kreuzer, Marcus. 2010. "Historical Knowledge and Quantitative Analysis: The Case of the Origins of Proportional Representation." *American Political Science Review* 104 (2): 369-392.

Cusack, Thomas, Torben Iversen, and David Soskice. 2010. "Coevolution of Capitalism and Political Representation: The Choice of Electoral Systems." *American Political Science Review* 104 (2): 393-403.

13. Legislative Organization: Some characteristics of legislatures, in particular their centralization, are supposed to affect their capacity to legislate, the nature of the legislation

they produce, and so on. What are the sources of differences in legislative organization? Why are some legislatures more centralized than others? Why are some legislatures centralized at one time and decentralized at others?

Shepsle, Kenneth A., and Barry R. Weingast. 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," *American Political Science Review*, 81:85-104.

Cox Gary and Mathew McCubbins. 1993. *Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. *Information and Legislative Organization*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Sin, Gisela. 2012. *Getting Out of the House: The Senate and the President in the Making of Congressional Rules*. Forthcoming Cambridge University Press.

Morgenstern, Scott. "Explaining Legislative Politics in Latin America" in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds. *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp 413-445.

Cox, Gary W. and Scott Morgenstern. "Epilogue: Latin America's Reactive Assemblies and Proactive Presidents" in Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, eds. *Legislative Politics in Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 446-468.

14.Wrap-up session