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
Laura Elizabeth Tulchin

**Brazil's New Footing on the International Stage: Roles, Recognition,
Status and Identity and the Case of the G-20**

Rio de Janeiro
2013

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Dissertação apresentada, como requisito parcial para obtenção do título de Mestre, ao Programa de Pós Graduação em Ciência Política da Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro.

Orientador: Prof. Dr Carlos R. S. Milani

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DEDICATÓRIA

A todo mundo que me apoia em meus estudos.

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Aos meus pais e meus irmãos, por me apoiar e me visitar aqui no Brasil.

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RESUMO

TULCHIN, Laura Elizabeth. *O novo lugar do Brasil no Palco Internacional: papéis , reconhecimento, status e identidade e o caso do G-20*. 2013. 173 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciência Política) – Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2013.

Esta dissertação analisa a política externa brasileira contemporânea pelo prisma do ingresso do Brasil no G-20, a mais importante estrutura de governança global a se confrontar com a crise financeira desde 2008. É antiga a busca por reconhecimento do país, como marca da identidade internacional brasileira. A pesquisa avalia se o papel do Brasil no G-20 sinaliza o status de *global player* pelo entendimento teórico das escalas nas relações internacionais, em que a política externa, ao alterar sua escala, pode afetar o comportamento do agente estatal em diferentes agendas. Usando os conceitos de papel, status, identidade e reconhecimento, são analisadas as diferentes identidades internacionais do Brasil nas escalas regionais, Sul Global e internacional. O G-20 é tratado como uma instituição social, em que processos de socialização podem afetar o comportamento do Brasil entre os membros do fórum e fora dele. No G-20, o Brasil já demonstrou que é susceptível aos processos de socialização por não confrontar agressivamente com as dinâmicas de poder do status quo, e por comprovar que o país valoriza seu lugar como um “insider” na mesa de negociações. Foi assim que o Brasil chegou a um marco nas projeções de poder e identidade no G-20. No sistema internacional, entretanto, o Brasil não alcançou o status de *global player*, devido aos conflituosos papéis que o país assume em sua região, no Sul Global e internacionalmente, além de suas capacidades moderadas de poder material.

Palavras-chave: Política externa brasileira. G-20. Identidade internacional. *Global Player*.

ABSTRACT

TULCHIN, Laura Elizabeth. *Brazil's New Footing on the International Stage: Roles, Recognition, Status and Identity and the Case of the G-20*. 2013. 173 f. Dissertação (Mestrado em Ciência Política) – Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Políticos, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, 2013.

The present research analyzes contemporary Brazilian foreign policy through the lens of the country's entrance in the G-20, the leading global governance structure since the 2008 Financial Crisis. Brazil's international identity has long been driven by a desire for recognition as a major actor in international affairs. The research evaluates whether Brazil's role in the G-20 signals global player status through a theoretical understanding of the scales of international relations, whereby a country's foreign policy on one scale may affect its behavior in another. Drawing on role theory, status, identity and recognition theory, Brazil's different international identities in the regional, Global South and international scales are analyzed. The G-20 is treated as a social institution whereby socializing processes may affect Brazil's behavior within the forum and outside of it. Within the G-20, Brazil has shown that has been susceptible to socialization processes by not aggressively challenging the status quo power dynamics and proving that it values its seat as an "insider" at the negotiating table. Thus, within the G-20, Brazil has reached a milestone in its power projections and international identity. In international affairs, in general, however, Brazil has not yet reached global player status, due to the country's conflicting roles, regionally, within the Global South and internationally, as well as its moderate power capacities.

Keywords: Brazilian foreign policy. G-20. International identity. Global Player status.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Alca – Área de Livre Comércio das Américas, Free Trade Area of the Americas

ASPA – Cúpula América do Sul-Países Árabes, South America-Arab Countries Summit

ASA – Cúpula América do Sul-Africa, South America-Africa Summit

BRICS – A group of five emerging countries, composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa

CELAC – Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

EU – European Union

IMF – International Monetary Fund

Focem – Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (Fundo de Convergência Estrutural de Mercosur)

FSB – Financial Stability Board

FSF – Financial Stability Forum

FTAA – Free Trade Area of the Americas (ALCA, in Portuguese)

G-7 – Group of 7

G-8 – Group of 8

G-20 – Group of 20

G-77 – Group of 77

GATT – General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

GSTP – Global System of Trade Preferences among Developing Countries

IBAS – India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum

MRE – Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations (“Itamaraty”)

NAFTA – North American Free Trade Area

NAM – Non-Aligned Movement

OECD – Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development

PT – Partido dos Trabalhadores, Workers' Party

SSC – South-South Cooperation

UN – United Nations

UNASUL – Union of South American Nations

UNSC – United Nations Security Council

WTO – World Trade Organization

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INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, Brazil has been finding its footing as a member of a group of countries whose ascension and growing economic strength have caused innumerable predictions and analyses of a changing world order (WALLERSTEIN, 2011; HURRELL, 2009; RODRIK, 2010). Brazil has been both an active member in championing the rise of this class of countries and a recipient of changing perceptions of the current geopolitical order. This class of countries is often labeled the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China) (NOLTE, 2010), the “new powers,” (NARLIKAR, 2010) the “emerging powers,” (HURRELL, 2010) the IBSA countries, (India, Brazil, South Africa) or the “rising powers” (TANK, 2012). In addition to the countries listed here, this class sometimes includes Turkey, Mexico and Indonesia (TANK, 2012). These countries represent a very heterogeneous group of interests, ethnicities, national histories, regional contexts, geopolitical situations and foreign policy historical traditions, but all have been traditionally seen as middle-income developing countries (TORNELL; WESTERMANN, 2002; RODRIK, 2010; HASS, 2008) that can potentially benefit greatly from a change in world order and a revision of current international rule-making institutions. The rise of all or some of these countries is typically seen as both a byproduct and a cause in the decline or fragmentation of American hegemony. The roots of this perceived decline are various, but usually involve the straining of resources, the effects of lengthy wars, the weakening of traditional allies, the Financial Crisis and the European debt crisis, and a growing international political platform for countries that have been traditionally seen as peripheral, rather than central, to world order. The growth of China’s economic and political strength is also an important factor in perceptions of a

changing world order, where it is seen as both a cause and an effect of the weakening of American geopolitical power.

Brazil's membership in this class of countries has brought about tensions and potential contradictions within its foreign policy and its roles in its regional context and in the international order. In this way, Brazil's traditional conceptions of its identity in the foreign context are subject to potential revisions and reevaluations, both in reaction to how it perceives itself and how others perceive it. For the purposes of this thesis, this period of transformation can be dated from the election of President Lula in 2002 and extend until the present. Domestic factors have been central to this transformation, including the various welfare and wealth redistribution programs initiated in the Lula government, but this project will focus exclusively on Brazil's foreign policy within its region and in the international order. Watershed moments in the course of the changing perceptions of Brazilian international identity have included the announcements of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics in the country, its poised position to overtake Great Britain to become the world's fifth largest economy, and President Obama's declaration in 2012 that Brazil is "the country of the future no more" (Bloomberg, 2011). In tandem with these events, Brazil has sought to create a larger role for itself within international organizations and institutions, whereby it receives recognition as a major global player. In these arenas, the country's desire to be granted more legitimacy as an important international actor has often interacted with its regional role and its role within the Global South (NOLTE, 2010). These international platforms include the UN, the FMI, and various informal groups of countries known as the G-groups. Since 2008, the "financial G-20" (termed that way to distinguish it from the commercial G-20) has taken on a central role in responding to changes in the international system,

especially since the onset of the 2008 Financial Crisis. In this way, Brazil's inclusion in the group may be seen as signaling a new international role for the country and an affirmation of its role as a global player. At the very least, it has afforded Brazil a new platform from which to put forth a certain international identity.

1.1. Objectives

The main objective of this research is to analyze contemporary Brazilian foreign policy and the country's role within the G-20 to understand whether the country has reached the status of global player within international affairs. In order to reach a conclusion, several other research points will be analyzed. The following chart illustrates the general and specific research questions:

Graphic 1: Research's Objectives

| SPECIFIC RESEARCH QUESTION | INDICATORS | ANALYSIS |
|--|---|---|
| Has recognition as a global player been a constant aspiration in Brazilian foreign policy? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Analyses by historians Past examples of role of "greatness" in Brazilian foreign policy | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Historical continuity |
| Does recognition as a global player contradict Brazil's identity as a leader of the Global South? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Current goals of Global South: Theoretical understanding of role of current global players | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Disparities in positions on large global issues between global players (the North) and Global South Brazil's role in the G-77, BRICS, IBSA |
| Is Brazil's membership in the G-20 due, in part, to its regional position? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Theoretical understanding of regional role in becoming world power | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regional powers' roles within G-20 Brazil as leader of South America |
| Does Brazil's membership and actions within the G-20 contradict its regional goals and regional position? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Role of Brazil in Mercosur Macro-political role of Brazil in South America Relationship with Argentina within G-20 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Brazil as regional superpower Hierarchy within region Consistency between supported financial policies in region and within G-20 Partnership versus rivalry with Argentina |
| Does Brazil accept the status quo rules of the global financial system that dominate the G-20 or does it advocate reform? Does this potential reform include ties to institutionalized and formal multilateralism? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Stated goals of G-20 Relationship with other emerging powers within G-20 Relationship with other major global players within G-20 Actions and policies advocated within G-20 Support for particular interests within G-20 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> "Boys club" of the global elite? Change of order versus change in the order |
| GENERAL RESEARCH QUESTION | INDICATORS | ANALYSIS |
| Does Brazil's role in the G-20 signal a new identity for the country as a global player? | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Tensions between regional, Global South, and major global player identities Influence of search for recognition | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Role taken within the G-20 Smart power, hard power and soft power analysis |

Source: author

1.2 Justification

The choice of the G-20 as the focus of the work is justified by: a) the growing importance of this informal group in tackling the macroeconomic questions since the 2008 Financial Crisis; b) expanded membership and country inclusion in comparison with the G-8; c) Brazil's vocal criticism of the current financial and macroeconomic status quo; d) Brazil's inclusion in a class of countries that is seen as "emerging" or "rising"; e) Brazil's tradition of active diplomacy and multilateralism in international institutions and, finally; f) the informality and ad-hoc nature of the G-20 organization, which affords it more flexibility in navigating a new international geopolitical system than more rigid institutions such as the UN. These last two justifications may seem to be contradictory in that Brazil's traditional participation in formal multilateral institutions could act as a delegitimizing force for its support for non-institutionalized groups like the G-20. In analyzing these potentially paradoxical justifications, however, the research project will seek to frame support of the G-20 as a necessary evolution in Brazil's traditional foreign policy activity while bringing attention to the tensions inherent in this process.

A lack of consensus on the role that the G-20 has (or may have in the future) in impeding or contributing to change in the international system (MILANI, 2012) does not weaken an analysis of Brazil's role in the group. Rather, this paper seeks to understand the relationship as dialectical, whereby Brazil's position within the G-20 can influence its global role and vice versa (IKENBERRY, 2010). Questions remain about whether the group's informal structure can help foster a platform for consensus, if its central position signals a new paradigm of cooperation that goes beyond the traditional North-South divide, and if it can eventually encompass the

more traditional political aspects of international organizations, including development, humanitarian issues and geopolitical conflicts. These doubts serve to enhance the analysis of Brazil's role within the G-20 by keeping open a variety of possible options for how the country behaves on the regional and global stages. It is clear, however, that the G-20 represents the next iteration of the international system's exclusive "clubs" of power. The club model (KEOHANE; NYE, 2001) represents an elite oligarchy of powers that set global rules and norms while maintaining legitimacy and multilateralism. Entry into these international clubs can have far reaching implications for a country's foreign policy and its global and regional positions.

1.3 Theory and Methodology

The paper takes a constructivist approach to the understanding of international relations and geopolitical power. Relations between states are understood to be influenced by social, ideational, and normative factors. Drawing on Alexander Wendt's understanding of constructivism, the analysis of Brazil's role within the G-20 brings special attention to the question of identity, performance, roles, self-conception and other conception (WEHNER, 2011). In this sense, the paper seeks to reconcile second-order questions of social theory (a constructivist ontology of the international order) with first-order questions of policy and domain (the structure and role of the G-20) (WENDT, 1999). Central to this is a reading of the international system where states are the main units of analysis, rather than individuals, corporations, transnational movements or subnational groups. This does not deny that non-state actors play key roles in the configuration and decision-making apparatuses of the international order, but rather suggests that the dominant mode of

international organization remains grounded in state action. Furthermore, this state-centric viewpoint does not assume that power is necessarily transferred from a state to its citizens (be it in the form of wealth, human capital, cultural dominance, linguistic hegemony, etc.), but understands the geopolitical pursuit of power as one that continues to be dominated by state relations and their respective economic status.

This paper's application of the constructivist understanding of international relations gives great emphasis to roles, role-playing and role-making within the international order. Through this lens, state behavior can change not only through "the carrot and the stick," but also through socialization processes that bring about new roles. Thus, this paper is founded on the theoretical premise that "the behavior of actors changes because of endogenous change in the normative characteristics and identities of the actors" (JOHNSTON, 2001, p. 488). In applying socialization theory to an institutional organization, we can better understand how interaction and the two-way street of role creation can change state identity and state behavior. In this sense, the internal workings of international institutions, and the role of Brazil within the G-20, can be seen as "the socialization of others to accept in an axiomatic way novel understandings about world politics" (JOHNSTON, 2001, p. 489). At the same time, however, the paper will also give attention to realist conceptions of international relations in which economic and material dimensions of state power are perceived as the driving impulse of state relations. Intrinsic to the analysis of the G-20 is recognition of the importance of negotiations and policies that affect material outcomes and the hard-power face of state power. Although this work seeks to focus on the symbolic questions of socialization, recognition, inclusion and status within the G-20, it will take into account the policy aspects of the group that affect economic and material power.

According to Stryker and Statham, "Socialization is the generic term used to refer to the processes by which the newcomer – the infant, rookie, or trainee, for example – becomes incorporated into organized patterns of interaction" (1985, p. 325). This process assumes that a new member of a group enters into a fixed set of values, norms and standards of behavior that it comes to support, practice and endorse. Constructivists have typically emphasized the process of persuasion in this process, but others have named further influences that can lead a newcomer to adapt to the group, such as identification, authority, mimicking, and voluntary membership (AXELROD, 1997a). Socialization, then, views the international order with a focus on the status quo, in that new members adhere and assimilate.

Roles and role-making theory can complement socialization theory, but tend to understand the process as a two-way street, whereby influence can be exerted both by newcomer and established member. Here, roles are a performance by states that is undertaken in conscious opposition to a counter-role (WEHNER, 2011). Role theory has traditionally been used in realist understandings of international relations (THIES, 2009) where a neat distribution of power brings about an international order marked by "friends and enemies," or "aggressors and defenders," just to name two examples. The constructivist understanding of role theory gives more flexibility to the role that a country may take on within an international organization, regional plane or in the international system at large. Norms, values, identities and ideational factors do not have to be seen as originating from the established members of a group. Role theory also allows for multiple roles and identities to actors and opens the possibility of "interrole conflict" in different situations or on different geopolitical planes (THIES, 2009). Furthermore, role theory understands identity as composed by status

(position in a social structure), value (how relevant one's participation is) and involvement (the idea of belonging to a bigger group and how deep one's involvement is).

My application of constructivism, socialization and role theory will be enhanced by the contribution of the theory of recognition to the study. A central line of argument will center on Brazil's century-long search for recognition on the international stage as a major global player. Applying the theory of recognition to international relations is not novel, but its traditional usage remains directed toward sociological and social movement questions. In the field of political theory, the theory of recognition has made important contributions, including those by Hegel, Benedict Anderson, Charles Taylor, Nancy Fraser and Alex Honneth. These authors give emphasis to the role of recognition in modern social organization, with particular weight given to questions of multiculturalism, subnational identities, ethnic conflict and the general study of identity politics. On the plane of international relations, and especially within the constructivist camp, recognition is a relatively underused concept. Its application in this paper is complemented by the concepts of respect, status, rank and clubs, which underscore questions of importance and worth on the international stage. This approach makes use of frameworks and insights drawn from social and moral philosophy, social psychology and sociology (WOLF, 2011) and includes the concept of emotions as central to understanding the IR camp. In this sense, an understanding of the dialectical use of the Other in international relations and social relations will be crucial, invoking questions of identity and representation. Representation and the possibility of achieving recognition via other actors will be especially important when comparing Brazil's regional role and its role in the Global South with its role as a member of the elite club of the G-20.

The methodology used in this research is based on historical analysis, literature analysis and role determination, guided by a methodological foundation of process tracing. Developed in full by George and Bennett's 2005 *Case Studies and Theory Development in Social Sciences*, process tracing is a qualitative method of analysis used in humanities research that generally focuses on a single case to test theory. Process tracing stresses a comprehensive and holistic analysis that mirrors many inter-disciplinary approaches that understand historical, archival and multi-source research as important to sound methodology (GEORGE; BENNETT, 2005). Process tracing has as its goal "bringing theory closer to what goes on in the world" (CHECKEL, 2005b, p. 1). Making connections between different areas of action and theory, then, is a principal area of concern for process tracing. "The process-tracing method attempts to identify the intervening causal process – the causal chain and causal mechanism – between an independent variable (or variables) and the outcome of the dependent variable..." (GEORGE; BENNETT, 2005, p. 206). As Checkel (2005b) points out, the mechanisms of creating a causal relationship are historical and qualitative. According to Collier (2011), description is a major tool of the process tracing methodology, whereby relationships and causality evaluations "inherently analyze trajectories of change" (p. 823).

In this research, Brazil's entrance in the G-20 will be analyzed to understand the possibility of a causal relationship with its status in the international system. In conjunction with a constructivist approach, a general examination will be given to the macroeconomic issues surrounding financial regulation and the G-20 policies, goals, and issues. A more detailed illustration of the methodological indicators that will be used in the paper is presented in the chart in section 1.2.

Chapter 2 of the research will provide a historical background of Brazil's search for recognition on the international stage, beginning with the era of Rio Branco at the beginning of the 20th century. The chapter will privilege the trajectory of dominating foreign policy currents in the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE), while seeking to analyze Brazil's experience with multilateralism and regionalism historically. The third chapter will provide the theoretical and methodological frameworks for the analysis. Here, attention will be given to a more profound understanding of constructivism, neorealism and liberalism as the pillars of IR theory. Moreover, the work will address in considerable detail the utility of the theory of recognition and the concepts of respect, identity and roles. Theoretical analysis of regional powers, superpowers, and "boys clubs" in international relations will also be important to the paper. The fourth chapter will undertake an evaluation of Brazil's geopolitical situation through the methodology listed above. This chapter and a following conclusion will provide the crux of the research performed, whereby theoretical understandings of IR intersect with empirical analysis to bring about certain conclusions about how Brazil's entrance into the G-20 has affected its regional and global roles. This analysis will understand international relations through a scaled approach, whereby action in one domain of foreign policy can interfere – diverge or converge – with behavior in another. It will also include an analysis of the workings of the G-20.

CHAPTER 2: UNDERSTANDING BRAZILIAN FOREIGN POLICY: BRAZILIAN GEOPOLITICAL ROLES

This chapter seeks to understand the historical currents of foreign policy thinking within the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE or Itamaraty) since the early 20th century, linking traditional currents of thought to the Lula era and Brazil's role within the G-20. It will be argued that the foreign policy strategies put forth by Rio Branco in the beginning of the 20th century, pragmatism and liberal realism, informed Lula's playbook for international insertion vis-à-vis the G-20, despite rhetorical attention to the current that has historically rivaled for dominance within Itamaraty, labeled universalism.

Both of these currents have sought to project Brazil onto the international realm and increase Brazil's global profile, aiming for recognition by the international community of Brazil's status as a global player.¹ While Lula embraced the rhetorical position of universalism and espoused many of its strategies in other forums, Brazil's role within the G-20 since 2008 has followed the strategic guidelines put forth by Rio Branco. In this way, then, the example of the G-20 serves to show how Brazil's desire to be granted recognition as a global player in the international arena has contradicted some of its other positions, as espoused in the universalist camp, which put more emphasis on the country as a leader of the Global South. The country's role within the club of the G-20, whereby Brazil has employed a pragmatism that stresses moderation in policy reform and a "wait and see" approach that avoids bold criticism,

¹ While the strategies for gaining recognition often differ, recognition is a basic foreign policy element of international relations generally.

suggests that it is more willing to play by the status quo rules of global governance than rhetoric would suggest.

The chapter will first give a historical and analytical account of Rio Branco's tenure at Itamaraty, highlighting the formation of a paradigm based on pragmatism and liberal realism. Next, an explanation of universalist thought will be provided, supplemented by an overview of Brazilian foreign policy in the 20th century and specific historical examples when universalism dominated policy formation. The third section of the chapter will briefly set forth the differing views of international insertion following the Cold War. The fourth part will give the foreign policy highlights of the Lula administration.

2.1 Informing a Century of Brazilian Foreign Policy: Rio Branco's Liberal Realism and Pragmatism

Historical precedents of Brazil's current geopolitical goals and its strategic role in the G-20 can be found in the era of Rio Branco, one of the great figures of Brazilian diplomacy. Rio Branco, whose given name was José Maria da Silva Paranhos, was a key actor in the first years of the Brazilian Republic, established in 1889 after a governmental takeover by the military (with support by many leading factions of civil society) forced the resignation of Emperor Dom Pedro II. During the first decade of the Republic, Rio Branco continued to serve at the Brazilian consulate in Liverpool, where he had been posted since 1876, gaining international respect and a position of prestige at home for his negotiation tactics in territorial disputes. In 1895, for example, Rio Branco tactfully navigated an agreement with Argentina to grant Brazil dominion over a tract of land in the western part of the state of Santa Catarina called

Palmas. In 1900, Rio Branco again made international headlines with his diplomatic victory over France in a quarrel over the region of Amapá in the Amazon (MUÑOZ, 2009).

While the settling of territorial disputes was an important accomplishment for the newly formed Brazilian republic, the decade following the resignation of Dom Pedro II lacked clear direction within the area of foreign policy²; the failure to orient the country by an abiding guiding international strategy was compounded by the frenetic succession of 11 different chancellors within the Ministry of Foreign Relations between 1889 and 1902 (SARAIVA, 2012). This changed dramatically in 1902 once Rio Branco was appointed chancellor of Itamaraty, where he would go on to serve for the next ten years. Immediately following his appointment, Rio Branco faced a diplomatic crisis involving another territorial dispute, this time with Bolivia over a large region in the Amazon. Despite simmering public opinion, Rio Branco managed to avoid military confrontation and secure an extremely favorable deal for his country, whereby Brazil gained 200,000 squared kilometers of the area in dispute and the Bolivians were left with barely 3,000 (MATTOS, 2002).³ This diplomatic success ushered in a period of foreign policy stability for the Brazil, with Rio Branco acting not only as the government's most important minister but as the leading architect of Brazilian foreign policy during a period when the country sought to take advantage of the changing global landscape that accompanied the rise of the United States and growing instability in Europe. As leader of Itamaraty, Rio Branco held an impressive

² As Spektor (2012) points out, during the decade prior to Rio Branco's leadership, Brazil had been confronted with a series tumultuous of revolts and hyperinflation, which were becoming quiet by the time he assumed office as the Minister of Foreign Relations.

³ The 1903 Treaty of Petrópolis stipulated that Brazil would gain the area known as Acre in exchange for Bolivian access to the ocean on Brazilian rivers, two million pounds and a rail link between the Bolivian city of Riberalta and the Brazilian city of Porto Velho.

degree of autonomy and independence in the formulation of Brazilian foreign policy, largely divorced from the succession of presidents (there were four from 1902 to 1912). The foreign policy articulated and executed during this period, then, can be almost exclusively attributed to Rio Branco himself, rather than existing as a product of converging political and bureaucratic forces (CERVO; BUENO, 2002). Indeed, by working within the political structure of the Old Republic, which cultivated the dual long-standing bureaucracies of the military and Itamaraty, Rio Branco can be said to have greatly influenced the legitimization of the Foreign Affairs Ministry and its corresponding bureaucratic entrenchment within the Brazilian government.

In writing about the evolution and aggregation of principles within the MRE throughout its history, Amado Cervo (2008, p. 27) points out eight consistent “standards of behavior” that have resisted changes in world order, regional relationships and domestic politics: auto-determination, non-interference and a belief in peaceful solutions; respect for international law; multilateralism; non-confrontation and cooperation; strategic partnerships; realism and pragmatism; cordiality with regional neighbors; and, development as a vector. Of these eight, almost all (with the possible exception of the last) can be traced in some way back to Rio Branco. But while these principles have remained relatively stable, the strategies used and the emphasis given to certain values have differed, in line with ideas about the country’s projected identity and the best way to achieve international insertion and recognition. Rio Branco’s brand of foreign policy has been marked by his belief in Brazilian greatness and his strategy for achieving recognition on the global stage by espousing a guiding policy of *liberal realism* and *pragmatism*. Integral to these concepts was a belief in the role of international institutions, a close relationship with the United

States and stability in the country's relations with its neighbors, especially Argentina.⁴ The precedents that Rio Branco set in these areas during his chancellorship at Itamaraty played a major role in the perceived consistency of Brazilian foreign policy throughout the twentieth century and up until today (BOERSNER, 2010).

Central to Rio Branco's worldview was a belief in the force of international organizations as vital to creating the regional and global stability necessary for a Brazilian rise in international prestige and power (MUÑOZ, 2009, CERVO; BUENO, 2002). The most high-profile opportunity for increasing Brazil's role in the international regime came at the Second Peace Conference at The Hague in 1907. Rui Barbosa, a well-known liberal politician, was sent as the head of the Brazilian delegation. A provisionary structure for the International Court of Justice was put forth by the major powers in which Brazil would occupy a position in the third category of states, below many smaller European states. This designation was humiliating for Rio Branco, but it gave Brazil an opportunity to make its vision of world politics known. Rui Barbosa defended a doctrine of equality between free and sovereign states within the new forums of global governance, setting a precedent for the young nation that fashioned it as a leader of disenfranchised nations (MUÑOZ, 2009). For Rio Branco, this worldview and the subsequent position of leadership could best be projected internationally through the most democratic pulpit available, that of the international, multilateral institution.

⁴ Rio Branco was wary of Argentina's size and growth; his desire for stability in the region can also be seen as an attempt to contain Argentina. This also meant opposing Argentina in a diplomatic standoff immediately following Rio Branco's assumption of the ministry. Six days after assuming the ministry, in a diplomatic crisis over Venezuelan unpaid debts, Rio Branco quickly backed the American position of neutrality against a German and English naval blockade, dramatically distinguishing him from his Argentine counterpart, Minister Drago, who had set forth the policy that no foreign power could use force to collect debts. Rio Branco publicly stood by the Americans, clarifying the terms of the Monroe Doctrine to hold that Latin American nations must be responsible for honorable international behavior. The Argentinian position would become to be known as the Drago Doctrine.

Throughout the 19th century, the UK had acted as the political center of Brazilian foreign policy, particularly after the country's independence from Portugal in 1822. Under the newly formed republic, however, Brazil's foreign policy began the transformation that would be completed by Rio Branco by the end of his tenure as chancellor of Itamaraty. Beginning in earnest with the 1889 Pan-American Conference in Washington, Brazil began to look at relations with the United States as the principal focal point in the formation of its foreign policy, a shift that directly impacted its ties with the United Kingdom. While much of this can be traced to the republican spirit that grew in Brazil prior to the end of the monarchy, Rio Branco's decision to put good relations with the United States at the center of his foreign policy was the product of a pragmatic calculation of global power dynamics. While the United States was not nearly the superpower it would become following the end of World War II, it represented a geopolitical alliance distinct from Europe. The imperialist threat of the aging European empires remained very real to most of Latin America (CONDURU, 1998). And although Brazil was not alone in shifting its attention away from Europe and towards the U.S., it strategically anticipated the process of geopolitical power concentration in the United States that would continue for the next half-century. For Rio Branco at the beginning of the 20th century, a close relationship with the United States represented the possibility of a form of protection from European power along with a political alignment that could bring more leverage in international affairs.

The “special relationship”⁵ that Rio Branco sought to cultivate with the rising North American superpower remained the most important relationship for Brazilian foreign policy throughout the 20th century (LESSA, 1998). Vital to Rio Branco’s vision of Brazilian greatness was a belief that strong ties with the United States would create a role for Brazil to act as a natural mediator between North America and the rest of South America, so that Brazil could partake in the responsibilities and the privileges of a regional hegemony (MUNÕZ, 2009). The U.S. also offered rapidly growing new markets: commercial and economic ties between the two countries boomed during the period. At the time, America was Brazil’s biggest commercial client; exports of coffee, rubber and chocolate, the staples of Brazil’s commodities-driven market at the time, flowed to the US (MUNÕZ, 2009). In the diplomatic standoff over a European naval blockade in Venezuela, Rio Branco supported the American position of neutrality, thereby aligning Brazil with the Roosevelt Corollary and the Monroe Doctrine.⁶ Ties between the two countries continued to strengthen: in 1905, Brazil opened its embassy in Washington, sending the ardent Americanist Joaquim Nabuco as the country’s first ambassador to the United States; in 1906, Secretary of State Elihu Root visited Rio de Janeiro to attend the third Pan-American conference. By all accounts, Rio Branco carefully calculated the costs and benefits of such a strong relationship with the United States. His policies tried to best take advantage of the geopolitical world scenario of the early 20th century, placing his bets on the republican North American country.

⁵ E. Bradford Burns famously called this the “unwritten alliance” in his 1966 book.

⁶ The Monroe Doctrine was first introduced in 1823 by President James Monroe in reaction to fears of continued European imperialism in the Americas. In 1904, President Teddy Roosevelt expanded on the doctrine with his famous addendum, which stated that the United States would intervene on behalf of European legitimate claims within Latin America. Rio Branco defended the Corollary and the Monroe Doctrine, stating, “A Doutrina de Monroe e o respeito misturado de temor, que pelos seus processos novos os Estados Unidos inspiram às grandes potências da Europa, tem servido para impedir, desde há muitos anos, que elas pensem em violências e conquistas no nosso continente.” (Cervo; Bueno, 2002: 178).

Within South America, Rio Branco postulated the foreign policy of cordiality: maintaining stable relationships with neighbors as a means of quelling fears of Brazilian expansion and to bring a measure of order to the continent that had previously been racked by territorial disputes (MUNÓZ, 2009). This meant tolerating Argentina's increased presence in international affairs and looking for common ground in regional disputes (SPEKTOR, 2012). Supported by his belief in the stabilizing power of international institutions, Rio Branco strove to base his vision of Brazil as a regional power on relationships of diplomacy and negotiation. In many ways, this policy was a way of reassuring Brazil's neighbors that its proximity to the United States was not under the auspices of regional imperialism (CERVO; BUENO, 2002), fears that were stoked when Brazil rearmed its navy in 1906. The country's relationship with Argentina, long seen as the continent's other potential great power, suffered from the strains of a traditional rivalry that were exacerbated by the declining hegemony of Argentina's traditional superpower ally, the United Kingdom. Moreover, Argentina resented the favorable trade arrangements between Brazil and the United States (MUNÓZ, 2009). Nevertheless, Rio Branco worked to keep relationships friendly with South America's largest nations, proposing a strategic partnership between Argentina and Chile known as ABC. Although some historians like Moniz Bandeira (2003) see the ABC pact as a way to create a South American bloc to safeguard against the growing influence of the United States, Rio Branco himself said that the potential agreement would align itself with Washington's interests (CONDURU, 1998). Questions of regional leadership, however, delayed an agreement under Rio Branco; it was signed only in 1915, after Rio Branco's death.

These three elements – a faith in institutionalism, a strategy of seeking to exploit world geopolitical divisions (which resulted in strong ties with the United States), and cordiality with its neighbors – come together to create a distinguished and durable vision of Brazilian foreign policy based on liberal realism and pragmatism. Consistently, Rio Branco's foreign policy was motivated by a desire to capitalize on a particular international scenario in order to elevate Brazilian prestige and achieve international recognition as a major global player and regional superpower. Although many of these same goals had been articulated by Dom Pedro II, Rio Branco took decisive steps to assure that Brazil would be catapulted into the international regime of the day, marked by an involvement in international institutions and an adherence to international norms and order that would become a staple of Brazilian foreign policy. Rio Branco's embrace of the international regime, however, did not originate from a moralist or idealist understanding of the international community. As a firm realist, he understood global politics to be dominated by anarchy; as a firm liberal pragmatist, he understood international institutions as the safest and most legitimate way of achieving recognition and greatness for Brazil within this anarchy (SARAIVA, 2012).

2.2 The Rise of a Competing Foreign Policy: Universalism

The focal points of Rio Branco's foreign policy strategy left an enduring legacy in setting tactical priorities for Brazil's international insertion and its search for recognition on the global stage, as well as contributing enormously to the privileged position of autonomy and prestige that the office of Itamaraty held throughout much

of the 20th century (SARAIVA, 2012; LIMA, 1994).⁷ The brand of foreign policy that he molded and developed based on liberal realism and pragmatism remained the leading current of thought within the Brazilian Ministry of Foreign Affairs until the 1950s,⁸ when a competing paradigm called universalism was developed. These two currents are what Lima (1994, p. 34) calls

Verdaderas teorías de acción diplomática, constituidas por un conjunto más o menos articulado de ideas base, que pueden o no estar respaldados en visiones o teorías ya existentes. Dada la naturaleza interpretativa de esos mapas cognoscitivos, que ayudan al diplomático a dar sentido a la complejidad del mundo que lo rodea, de donde se derivan alternativas distintas de acción, esos paradigmas son relativamente excluyentes entre sí y pasibles, por lo tanto, de polémica e sustitución.

Taken together, the currents of liberal realism/pragmatism and universalist thought have come to represent the gamut of strategies and worldviews that have accompanied Brazil's long search to increase its international standing. Before exploring how the conjunction of both currents affected Lula's foreign policy in general and his position toward the G-20, it is worth having a better understanding of universalism and how it shaped Brazil's foreign policy in the second half of the 20th century.

Stemming from a new conception of the world capitalist system, the universalist current sought to turn Brazil away from the "special relationship" with the United States and diversify its role in foreign policy to include deeper and stronger relationships with countries that it had otherwise paid little attention to. This stressed a global approach, whereby Brazil would be willing to strengthen ties with any

⁷ In this sense, there is a widespread belief that Brazilian foreign policy has shown remarkable consistency and coherence throughout the 20th century, despite enormous changes in domestic governance and world conditions.

⁸ The permanence of the Rio Branco model of diplomacy can also be attributed to its historical context. The deeply entrenched diplomatic style of Itamaraty is in part a reflection of Rio Branco's understanding of the need to establish the MRE's legitimacy within the newly established Old Republic. The institutionalization of his current of foreign policy certainly served to further this aim. See DE MOURA, 2007.

country, regardless of its reigning political ideology in the Cold War East/West divide or its geopolitical position. Central to this was the articulation of a class of countries designated as the Global South,⁹ i.e., those that were left out of the cycle of economic growth experienced by countries in the “North” that had benefited from the existing macroeconomic structures (LIMA, 1994). For Lessa (1998), this meant creating a more complex relationship with the United States, Western Europe and Japan, and opening new space for unexplored bilateral relationships with countries in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. While universalism is often seen as a strategy towards economic development, it is also integrally related to the identity that Brazil projects onto the global stage – an identity that seeks to be recognized as a major global player based on the country’s tradition of equality between nations, respect of sovereignty and diplomacy. Within Itamaraty, this current came to be associated with the concept of autonomy in international politics, whereby Brazil pursues interests and relationships that may not necessarily be sanctioned by any of the major world powers (SARAIVA, M., 2010a). This has historically meant a North-South divide in framing Brazil’s foreign policy, in which Brazil has sought to deepen ties with other countries of a similar profile and seeks to reform the structures of international organizations in order to reach a more just distribution of global power.

Throughout the 20th century, the universalist position benefited from clearer articulation about the goals and strategies that it engendered as the onset of the bipolarity in the world’s power system of the Cold War drew stark geopolitical divisions. Within Brazilian foreign policy, the period following Rio Branco’s death in

⁹ The Global South is a geopolitical concept that first arose following the bipolarity of the Cold War structure, whereby “Southern” countries referred not necessarily to geographic location, but to the group of nations that were neither communist nor central to the capitalist system. For more information, see REUVENY; THOMPSON, 2007. The term will be further explored in Chapter 3.

1912 up until the Cold War saw a relative consistency of strategies and policies based on the model of liberal realism and pragmatism. Leading up to World War I, trade with the U.S. continued to be vital to the country's economy and Americans began to invest in the country. Brazil was the only Latin American country to participate in World War I and sent a delegation to the Peace Conference at the end of Versailles, giving full support to the American position of the peace agreement and making known its desire for a permanent seat on the Executive Council of the League of Nations. Brazil viewed its position within the League of Nations as a question of international prestige and its push for recognition within the League became a primary objective of its foreign policy at the time (CERVO; BUENO, 2002). When this objective was frustrated by the European powers, Brazil resigned from the League in 1926,¹⁰ although it continued to respect the organs of the League and pay its annual membership fee. During this period, Itamaraty signed numerous border treaties and worked to strengthen regional ties while maintaining close ties with the United States. During the Vargas era (1930 – 1945), ties with the United States suffered briefly as Brazil tried to take advantage of growing geopolitical divisions, increasing trade with Germany and other European nations.¹¹ While this resulted in protests by Washington, the breaking out of war in 1939 led to increased economic ties between the US and Brazil. Brazil's entrance in World War II and its strategic shift of support to the Allies marked the continuance of a foreign policy based on a pragmatic view of the nature of the country's historic relationship with the U.S. While it was recognized that the Brazilian presence in the war would bring no real strategic

¹⁰ At the last moment of negotiations, Brazil tried to convince the League to accept its demand by positioning itself as the representative of Latin America. When that effort failed in 1926, Brazil announced its resignation, arguing that the American nations were in an unequal and inferior position within the League.

¹¹ In fact, Brazil used European and global antagonisms to its advantage, increasing trade with other powers besides Germany, including Italy, France, Great Britain, Japan and the Soviet Union.

benefit to the Allies, war was justified by the potential of political advantages of actively supporting the American position. Consistent with the goals of Itamaraty and the Brazilian government since the time of Rio Branco's chancellorship, Vargas sought to increase Brazilian international prestige and to have Brazil recognized for its role in the war (CERVO, BUENO, 2002).

Following the onset of the Cold War, frustrations within Brazil that the United States was neglecting the region and had failed to honor its promises led to the gradual development, and later dominance, of the universalist current within the MRE. American fears of the spread of communism diverted its attention to Asia and rebuilding in Europe, while Latin America declined on the list of the country's geopolitical priorities.¹² In 1951, under the new Vargas government, Brazil took advantage of a meeting of the Organization of American States to make a formal complaint about the lack of American economic cooperation in Brazilian development. Cervo and Bueno (2002) see this as a change in tone and direction in Brazilian foreign policy – away from a more passive alignment with the United States – that would grow in strength under the government of Juscelino Kubitschek. Indeed, both Fernandes (2008) and Lessa (1998) see a rupture in Brazilian foreign policy in 1958 with Kubitschek's formation of the Pan-American Operation,¹³ which coincided with the country coming off two decades of industrialization which affected internal class structures, the wide acceptance of Prebisch's theory of center and periphery countries¹⁴ and the wave of anti-American feeling that was sweeping Latin

¹² In first years of the Cold War, relations with the United States remained at least solid – the two countries signed a military accord and President Dutra made the first trip of a Brazilian head of state to the U.S. in 1949.

¹³ See MELLO E SILVA, 1992, for a better understanding of how the Pan-American Operation fit into Kubitschek's vision of foreign policy.

¹⁴ Prebisch, a major thinker of the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLAC or CEPAL), helped refashion notions of economic identities and formed a coherent academic argument for the

America and that would culminate in Cuba's 1959 revolution. The Pan-American Operation was an attempt to redesign relations between Latin America and the United States with a focus on underdevelopment as a global and political issue, rather than a mere result of economic conditions. Although the project stalled after the creation of the Inter-American Development Bank, it set off a new direction within Brazilian foreign policy that was defined in part by a new hostility with the American government and the signing of the Treaty of Montevideo by Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Brazil, which sought to increase cooperation and economic stability between the member-countries.

Universalism, then, fashioned a model of international insertion based on a leadership role in the Global South and strong regional integration. While there have been periods of interruption in this model, most notably in the years following the 1964 military coup, the universalist position offered Brazil a cohesive foreign policy that was able to combine an emphasis on national development with a position in the international order that avoided passive alignment with one of the two superpowers. In this sense, the Cold War represented a geopolitical situation in which Brazil could project an international image of itself as a country governed by the principles of non-interference and auto-determination, securing recognition for the country based on a role as the “voice for the voiceless” and as a leader in regional integration. In many ways, this was not a negation of the pragmatism that Rio Branco espoused – universalism, too, sought to pragmatically insert itself into world politics. Different, however, was a stress on ideology and morality that came out of a worldview based on Furtado's notions of a “center” and a “periphery.”

This strategy took on a coherent shape through the formation of an “Independent Foreign Policy” in 1961 within Jânio Quadros’ government, which sought to look for global partnerships to increase economic development without giving preference to a country’s political ideology. In practice, this meant emphasizing new relations with African and (Communist) Eastern European countries.¹⁵ Quadros’ presidency lasted only seven months but his successor, João Goulart, did little to change the direction of the country’s foreign policy. And although the aftermath of the military coup of 1964 resulted in an immediate adherence to American ideology and interests during the first years of the dictatorship under Castelo Branco, by 1967 the military government began to refashion its foreign policy towards a universalist approach (LESSA, 1998; LIMA, 1994; CERVO, BUENO, 2002). In 1972, Chancellor of Itamaraty Gilson Barbsosa articulated five goals of Brazilian foreign policy, which were meant to complement the domestic project called developmentalism to spur national modernization:¹⁶

a) provocar mudança nas regras de convivência, internacional e na cristalização do poder, b) usar o poder nacional decorrente do crescimento em favor dos povos que aspiram ao progresso, c) auxiliar a implantação da nova ordem econômica internacional, até mesmo com requisito da paz, que não resulta da manutenção do status quo e do equilíbrio do poder, d) manter ativa solidariedade com os povos em vias de desenvolvimento, e) ampliar em extensão e profundidade o universalismo da ação externa. (CERVO, BUENO, 2002, p. 384).

These goals were executed by what President Geisel, upon assuming the presidency of the military dictatorship in 1974, called “responsible pragmatism” defined by

¹⁵ “A Política Externa Independente é uma radicalização, pelo menos no nível do discurso, da ideia de que outros espaços se faziam necessários para afirmação da estratégia de obter insumos para o desenvolvimento brasileiro. A abertura para a África e para a Europa centro-oriental inscrevem-se neste movimento” (Lessa, 1998: 33).

¹⁶ The developmentalism of the military dictatorship focused on encouraging strong economic growth before focusing on social problems. The Brazilian economy grew steadily from 1967 to 1973, enough so that the government began using the slogan, “Brazil as a Great Power.”

“ethical” behavior that would increase Brazilian influence in global politics.¹⁷ In practice, this meant a policy of general non-alignment between the First and the Second Worlds and the North and the South; it translated into a foreign policy of ideological indifference and circumstantial decision-making (CERVO; BUENO, 2002). In 1975, Brazil broke from its policy of alignment with Portugal to be the first country to recognize the independence of Angola, which had been involved in a fourteen-year war against colonialism. The country strengthened relations with the Middle East and in 1977, broke off a military accord with the United States that had been in place since 1952.

The government of João Figueiredo (1979 – 1985) continued to espouse a foreign policy based on the doctrines of universalism, but the mounting economic crisis, including inflation and record-breaking debt, forced the government to ask for help from the FMI in 1982. The return to civilian rule in 1985 brought about instability within Itamaraty, augmented by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War in 1989. The defeat of communism and the end of the bipolar world order left the country without the structure that had guided its foreign policy since the 1960s; Brazil, like much of the Third World, took Fukuyama’s declaration that politics had reached “the end of history” in good faith and began to reassess its earlier antagonisms toward the neoliberalism and capitalist system of the 1970s. Beginning in the early 1990s, under the government of Fernando Collor de Mello, the government began implementing neoliberal policies in the name of a new globalized world, overriding the autonomist tendencies within Itamaraty (VIZENTINI, 2003).

17 The use of the term “pragmatism” and “ethics” in Geisel’s foreign policy can seem to be somewhat contradictory, but in fact perfectly engenders the universalist approach which sought to leverage Itamaraty “pragmatic” traditions into worldview dominated by the North-South divide.

This economic alignment with American policies naturally incurred a re-strengthening of political ties.

Collor resigned from the presidency in 1992 after an impeachment trial was announced on corruption grounds. The remaining two years of his term were completed by Itamar Franco, his vice president, who sought to reaffirm Brazil's presence in international affairs and multilateral organizations that Collor had downplayed. In 1992, Itamaraty Chancellor Celso Lafer developed the Agenda for Peace, which stressed the UN's role in a reformed world order that would bring about disarmament, peace, security, development and protection of the environment. Welcoming the new ex-socialist states to the UN, he began to press for reform within the organization, with particular emphasis on the distribution of power on the Security Council. As Almeida (2008) points out, the end of the Cold War also raised expectations that the countries of the North would direct more investment towards Latin America and Brazil. When that failed to materialize, continued feelings of neglect revived many of the principles of universalism, especially in regards to the distribution of power within global governance structures. At the same time, however, the government of Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995 – 2002) continued economic policies of liberalization. The creation of the Real Plan in 1994, in which the new currency was adopted as a means of stabilizing inflation, was seen as a way of overcoming the "shock" of the sudden entrance into the free market initiated by Franco and a way to systematically and responsibly insert Brazil into the new post-Cold War international scenario (VINZENTINI, 2003). Cardoso, in his "presidential diplomacy" policy, sought to leverage the results of several decades of cultivating new global partnerships, working to strengthen regional relationships and acting as an important voice for the Global South with a pragmatic understanding of a unipolar

and increasingly globalized world. The application of the legacy of universalism to the post-Cold War world led to the formulation of his “autonomy through participation” policy, which stressed commercial ties and the goal of becoming a “global trader.” Cardoso stressed that “receptivity” towards the United States and the international regime would best guarantee economic growth and potential increased international standing.¹⁸

Brazil’s post-Cold War approach to international insertion (and the traditional goals of recognition and greatness in the international arena) can be understood through the country’s roles within regional and global institutions in 1990s and through the Lula era. In this way, the legacies of pragmatic liberal realism and universalism have continued to inform the Brazilian international position.

2.3 Brazil’s Post-Cold War Approach to Regional and International Institutions

Integral to Brazil’s image of its foreign policy has been an emphasis on cooperation within multilateral institutions. Views about the best way to leverage the influence of international institutions are compounded by the belief that one of Brazil’s greatest strengths as a global player is its tradition of predictability and “good-behavior,” driven by the country’s belief in peace. An image of Brazil as an inherently pacific country has often gone hand in hand with the country’s historic emphasis on multilateralism.¹⁹ As former Itamaraty Chancellor Celso Lafer put it, Brazil sees its

¹⁸ See DE CASTRO NEVES, 2012.

¹⁹ “Desde o momento em que o país começou a se afirmar no plano internacional, procurou defender a transformação do ambiente internacional em um mundo regido por normas, em contraste com a alternativa plausível, a de um mundo regido pela força,” Pinheiro Guimarães, 2006, p. 99.

role in international institutions – which have set a standard of consistency and stability in its foreign policy in general – as traditionally driven by “the force of law and common sense” (ROCHA, 2006, p. 99).²⁰ According to Antonio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha (2006), this perception of Brazil’s role in international affairs has had a major role in the country’s perception of its foreign policy identity through its use of the “moral argument” in defense of an international regime guided by norms. This idea is central to understanding how Brazil’s role in multilateral institutions since 1988, and particularly in the G-20, sheds light on the tensions involved in its contemporary regional and global foreign policy identity.

For Pinheiro Guimarães (2006), Brazil’s traditional emphasis on adhering to international institutions comes from a need to be a “normal” foreign policy player, one that avoids any reputation for oscillation or unpredictability in international affairs that could damage Brazilian credibility, especially in its role as an intermediary. This view belongs to the traditional “diplomatic strategy” of Brazilian insertion into world affairs, one that stresses sovereignty, non-interference and equality among states. By working within international institutions, the country works against the freezing of a world order on unequal terms; this would continue until Brazil’s status within the organization reflects its economic and political position. These foreign policy principles are based foremost on respect for national sovereignty and represent a vital part of position of the Global South and the Non-Alignment Movement during the Cold War; they largely align with the universalist position within Itamaraty.

²⁰ According to Antônio Jorge Ramalho da Rocha, regimes give countries the chance to interfere in international events while creating a “personality” for itself. See ROCHA, 2006, p. 76.

Such a view of international institutions has been rivaled since the end of the Cold War by what Pinheiro Guimarães calls the “modern diplomacy” strategy of Brazilian insertion into global affairs within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this view, Brazil’s best bet for increasing its voice and gaining recognition as a major global player emphasizes the country’s cooperation and adherence to international norms. The United States’ assured role as the world’s only superpower and globalization’s guarantee of a relative loss of national sovereignty means that status in the international arena will come from economic power and a commitment to global issues like human rights, narcotrafficking, terrorism and stability in financial institutions. From this perspective, the resources of Brazilian diplomacy should be devoted to the country’s regional role and to strengthening ties with other countries in order to increase commerce and economic status. This position is a contemporary take on Rio Branco’s legacy of pragmatism and liberal realism.

According to João de Castro Neves (2012), these different ideas about Brazil’s role in the post-Cold war era were articulated by two of the period’s Foreign Ministers, Celso Amorim and Celso Lafer. The “dialogue between the Celsos” focused on how the country could best take advantage of a reformed world order; in this way, much attention was focused on the role of the United States in the process of globalization and the liberal economic policies of the day. For Lafer, who held the ministry for a brief stint in 1992 and then again from 2001 to 2002, the end of the Cold War gave the country a chance to find a new niche in international affairs by defending liberal norms while pushing for a more just reorganization of the international regime. “O processo de reorganização da ordem internacional, nesse sentido, abria espaço para uma atuação mais positiva e propositiva do Brasil” (DE CASTRO NEVES, 2012, p. 208). Celso Amorim, who led Itamaraty from 1993 to 1994 (under the presidency

of Itamar Franco) and then from 2003 to 2010 (under Lula), articulated a strategy of foreign policy and a push for global recognition that drew on Brazil's traditional role in the Global South. Globalization did not represent an inevitable condition of the period, but was rather the result of a political agenda led by the United States. The unipolarity of the United States was so unquestioned that its norms and goals came to encompass the whole of the international regime, with the rest of the major powers falling into line behind.²¹ In this way, the new global order represented a new type of normative imperialism, institutionalized by the UN and the G7.

Brazil's record with multilateralism since the 1990s attests to the competing differences between these two views, often mixing active participation with criticism. On the global stage, the country continued to play a strong role within the United Nations, holding a non-permanent seat on the Security Council during the 1993 to 1994 term. Yet Brazil also began to more aggressively and clearly articulate its demand for reform of the SC, prompted by three concerns about the functioning of the UN system of multilateralism: the growth in power of the Security Council since the end of the Cold War with a series of more aggressive peace operations, the justification of the abuse of power in other spheres by the permanent members of the Security Council based on their role within the UN, and the lack of transparency within the Security Council (DE CASTRO NEVES, 2012). These criticisms resulted in a vote of abstention of the 1994 UN Security Council Resolution 940, which authorized the U.S. led invasion of Haiti meant to restore democracy after a 1991 coup.

²¹ "Seus (os Estados Unidos) objetivos de política externa não só são alcançados, como chegam a confundir-se com o próprio conceito de ordem e justiça internacionais," De Castro Neves, 2012, p.209.

Within the economic multilateral institutions, Brazil participated actively in the GATT Uruguay Round from 1986 to 1993, which resulted in the creation of the World Trade Organization. The country played a more assertive role in the negotiation process, a fact seen by Lafer as an increase in Brazil's diplomatic leverage within multilateral negotiations and a new role in contributing to global governance. Celso Amorim, however, saw the outcome of the negotiations as another effort by the United States to mold the processes of global governance to best suit its interests (DE CASTRO NEVES, 2012). This position was reflected in Brazil's resistance in an American-led effort to expand NAFTA and create the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA or ALCA, in Portuguese).

Brazil's most notable institutional accomplishment following the end of the Cold War was the refocusing of energies on regional integration and the strengthening of ties with Argentina. The creation of Mercosur²² (the "Southern Common Market") with the treaty of Asunción in 1991 marked a watershed moment in South America's path towards regional integration, including Paraguay and Uruguay in the agreement. While Mercosur was the result of increased exchange between Brazil and Argentina during the 1980s, both under the paradigms of a foreign policy based on autonomy and national development, the economic policies of the new regional community were in line with the Washington Consensus (VIZENTINI, 2003). Following the resignation of Collor, Mercosur increased in importance within Itamaraty, where regional integration and an increase in commerce with neighboring countries were seen as integral to the agenda of Brazilian development asserted by Franco as a

²² While the Brazilian acronym for the "Southern Common Market" is Mercosul, the Spanish-language Mercosur will be used here, as is most common in the English-speaking press.

necessary reaction to the creation of NAFTA. In 1994, the Ouro Preto Protocol was signed, which institutionalized the intergovernmental characteristics of Mercosur.

Brazil's relations with Argentina suffered following the Brazilian debt crisis in 1999, during which President Cardoso liberalized the currency market. The move, which caused a major devaluation of the Real, was made without consulting the country's Argentine partners (SARAIVA, 2012). The decline in trade between the two countries in the following years and the Brazilian position of nonchalance in the face of Argentine unhappiness with the situation contributed to a weakening of the commitment to Mercosur in both governments. Ties strengthened again following the Argentine debt crisis at the end of 2001. During Cardoso's last year of government, Brazil actively worked to support its neighbor, focusing on short-term solutions. The United States' uncooperative stance caused Argentina to value Brazil as its partner (RUSSELL; TOKATLIAN, 2003a).

2.4 The Foreign Policy of Lula

Upon entering office in 2002, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula, inherited a decade of foreign policy that lacked a cohesive guiding strategy based on either the pragmatic, liberal realism model of Rio Branco or the universalist approach typically associated with the Global South (VIGEVANI; OLIVEIRA; CINTRA, 2004). Lula was a founder of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT, the Workers Party), a former labor leader and a traditional outsider candidate for president (Lula ran for president three times before being elected in 2002). As such, his rhetoric had been shaped by the criticisms toward global governance that came out of the formulation of the theory of dependency, the center-periphery view of international order and unbalanced power

distribution within global governance structures. Lula's government introduced new strains of thought within Itamaraty, beginning with the rise of a group of policymakers who had no previous diplomatic experience (SARAIVA, M. 2010a). Central to his government and his popularity was the message of "change"²³ (VIZENTINI, 2012).

His foreign policy is most notable for its emphasis on regional integration that builds on the belief of a regional identity (SANTOS, 2005). An emphasis on cultural, social and political "solidarity" drew the traditional autonomist camp within Itamaraty to expand its strategic thinking to foreign policy consequences on neighboring countries and an effort toward regional integration, which included an acceptance of regional regimes that did not fit neatly into the liberal model. While it is not within the scope of this paper to give a detailed analysis of all foreign policy issues, questions and debates within the Lula government, his presidency was marked by a deep commitment to regional integration and a rhetorical return to questions of the Global South. Integral to his government's strategy for international insertion was a leveraging of Brazil's role in these two areas to increase the country's role in multilateral institutions (LIMA; HIRST; PINHEIRO, 2010). But, as the case of the G-20 will show, Brazil proved to be more willing to act on the legacy of Rio Branco and follow a strategy of pragmatism and liberal realism within institutions of global governance than the promise of "change" would suggest. This can be seen in Lula's changing relationship with the FMI, a case that will be analyzed in the final section of this chapter in regard to the country's role in the G-20.

²³ The symbolic and political importance of Lula's election is fundamental to understanding the shift in tone of Brazil's political foreign policy, marked by a so-called "intense role in major world issues." See FREIXO et al., 2011, p. 7.

Regionally, Lula continued the process of strengthening the institutional aspects of Mercosur. In 2003, Mercosur signed a trade deal with India; competing member interests interrupted negotiations for a similar deal with the EU in 2004. (Brazil entered into a “strategic partnership” with the regional bloc in 2007.) A free trade treaty was signed between Mercosur and Israel in 2009 and with Egypt in 2010. Throughout the decade, the political dimensions of Mercosur continued to expand, with the creation of various new institutions, forum, secretaries and exchanges. The group also signed a treaty with the Andean Community of Nations in 2003; in 2008, Venezuela became an associate member of Mercosur. The Olivos Protocol went into effect in 2004, creating a Permanent Review Court to settle any disputes within the country, while the Mercosur Parliament opened in 2007. The Mercosur Structural Convergence Fund (Focem) was created in 2006, as the first financial arm of the organization, with the goal of reducing development inequalities within the region. By the end of Lula’s second term, Mercosur was seen as an integral piece of the country’s strategy of regional integration as “um projeto basicamente político que poderia reforçar a ideia do ‘destino manifesto de grandeza” (SARAIVA, 2012, p. 136). Lula also consolidated efforts to bring about the institutionalization of the Community of South American Nations in 2004, which sought to formalize an area of dialogue for heads-of-state to discuss integration, regional financial structures and regional relationships. In 2008, the Community was transformed into the Union of South American Nations and became the principal vehicle for integrated South American regional multilateralism (SARAIVA, 2010b). Through Brazilian leadership, the Council of South American Defense was formed within the Union of South American Nations in 2008 to better coordinate security and military concerns.

Globally, Lula pushed to create new international institutions, strengthen bilateral relations and give the country new forum to leverage its increased foreign policy presence (VIZENTINI, 2012; ALMEIDA, 2008). This included forging new ties with the fellow BRICS countries, which resulted in the declaration of the BRIC Summit in 2009 and the official entrance of South Africa into the group in 2010. Since 2009, the BRICS leaders have conducted four high-level meetings. In 2003, under the Brasília Declaration, the IBSA Dialogue Forum was formed, whereby India, Brazil and South Africa have sought to deepen dialogue and cooperation in areas as diverse as UN reform and trade, transport and education. Summit meetings have been held regularly since 2006. Brazil also moved to deepen ties with underdeveloped countries in Africa and Asia. In this sense, Lula's foreign policy was called "humanist" by Itamaraty Chancellor Celso Amorim, who described the government's foreign policy goals as going beyond the traditional development paradigm to "project international cooperation for development and peace" (FREIXO et al., 2011, p. 8).

This expansion of the scope of Brazil's foreign policy included the notable entrance of Brazil into the global standoff on Iran's nuclear program when, in 2010, it joined Turkey in making international headlines to try to broker a deal with Tehran. While it has been said that Brazil's participation came after a prodding by American president Barack Obama, the outcome led to general frustration among Europeans and Americans. Under Lula, Brazil's relations with the United States grew more aggressive without erupting into hostility or major diplomatic conflict.²⁴ Within the UN, Brazil continued to be an active member, serving two two-year mandates on the

²⁴ In an article published on October 22, 2012, Peter Hakim of the Inter-American Dialogue calls the US-Brazilian relationship "bruised" as a result of Brasília's position on the Iran nuclear program. "Although relations between the two countries are by no means adversarial or even unfriendly, they have featured more discord than cooperation." See, www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3115&s=

Security Council in 2004-2005 and 2010-2011,²⁵ while consolidating its push for reform by strengthening ties with other countries with the same goal (India, South Africa, Germany and Japan) and trying to gain support from the Security Council's current members. This effort has forcedly marked Brazil's engagement with the international community since Lula's presidency and proved to be a principal strategy to Brazil's global foreign policy, whereby participation within the UN is active and norms are both upheld and promoted, but calls for reform are consistent.

The Lula government's commitment to a proactive profile in international affairs sought to project an image of Brazil as strong and capable, both in terms of its hard power capabilities and its soft power ability to wield influence. Speaking in front of future diplomats, Celso Amorim puts forth a succinct assessment of Lula's vision of Brazil's place in the world: "a (visão) de que o Brasil não pode renunciar sua grandeza" (AMORIM, 2011, p. 31). He goes on to link the concept of greatness to power:

Entre as dimensões do poder, está o desejo de exercer o poder. Se não houver esse desejo – não é dominar; é você falar, ter influência, contribuir para a solução de questões -, todas as condições objetivas podem estar dadas, mas não valerão muito. Essa é também uma das características da atual política externa do presidente Lula: há um desejo de exercer poder. Poder é uma palavra muito pesada, dá a impressão de que você vai desembarcar com tropas ou impor sanções econômicas. Não é isso. Estou falando de exercer sua influência positivamente. Em geral, temos feito isso...(AMORIM, 2011, p. 34).

Brazil's stance toward the global governance structures underwent a reaction to the changes (however subtle) to geopolitical world power structures following the 2008 Financial Crisis in the U.S. and the crisis of the Euro. The growth of importance of the G-20 at this point magnified Lula and Brazil's position within the organization. The G-

²⁵ Brazil's historically active role in the UN is demonstrated by the fact that it is tied with Japan as the country with the most terms as a non-permanent member of the Security Council; since 1949, Brazil also has been given the symbolic privilege of opening the annual sessions of the General Assembly. See AMORIM NETO, 2011.

20 is only one institution in global politics, and its club structure, relative lack of transparency, and its recent prominence make it a prime target for criticism. The analysis of the G-20 in no way presupposes that it is exemplary of member countries' policy and status positions towards the whole of global geopolitics and global governance structures. Its informality and ad-hoc nature stand in firm contrast to the UN's legitimacy in world politics and may contribute to producing disparate policy positions. Yet the elevated position of the G-20 and the G groups in general can demonstrate Brazil's current foreign policy goals and policy stance, while its inclusion in the group may reveal role conflicts and illustrate whether the country has reached global player status. These questions will be discussed in Chapter 4.

CHAPTER 3: INTERNATIONAL PROJECTION AND CONSTRUCTIVISM AS A FRAMEWORK: ROLES, STATUS, RECOGNITION AND IDENTITY

The purpose of this chapter is to set forth the theoretical underpinnings of international relations that can help illuminate the policy decisions and contemporary geopolitical situation that Brazil faces vis-à-vis its role in the G-20. Drawing heavily from the approach of constructivism, I seek to reconcile a constructivist ontology of world order – whereby state identity and the social construction of norms and behavior standards play a leading role – with questions of policy domain. Central to this is a reading of the international system where states are the main units of analysis, rather than individuals, corporations, transnational movements or subnational groups, as posited in Alexander Wendt's famous claim that "states are people too" (WENDT, 1999). This does not deny that non-state actors play key roles in the configuration and decision-making apparatuses of the international order, but rather suggests that the dominant mode of international organization remains grounded in state action. Furthermore, this state-centric viewpoint does not assume that power is necessarily transferred from a state to its citizens (be it in the form of wealth, human capital, cultural dominance, linguistic hegemony, etc.), but understands the geopolitical pursuit of power as one that continues to be dominated by state relations and their respective status.

This analysis will be supplemented by the theoretical contributions of socialization theory, role theory and the theory of recognition. While many of these areas are dominant within the field of sociology and political theory, their inclusion in the analysis of Brazil's role within the G-20 can serve to bring attention to often overlooked sources of policy decisions. By stressing the dialectics of interaction and

social contact between states, socialization theory seeks to show that Brazil's current geopolitical position is the result of inter-state relations that interfere with and influence Brazilian understanding of its own role in world order. As seen in the previous chapter, the historical influences within the forming of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy draw from different and distinct interpretations of the country's desired role on the global stage. The idea of "interrole conflict," as Thies terms it, opens up the idea of competing visions of a country's role in different situations or in different geopolitical spheres. Role theory, then, contributes to constructivism's insertion of identity into geopolitics as a fundamental factor by involving the conceptual markers of status (position in a social structure) and involvement (commitment to the role). Role theory also lends itself to a discussion of the influence of respect, and its more-often studied counterpart, disrespect in international relations. Analyses of respectful treatment by individuals and state actors are linked to studies on humiliation, "losing face" and dignity.

The question of roles – which can change upon interaction – can enhance an understanding of the long-standing goal of recognition of the country's perceived rightful place within both the spheres of regional and global politics. Authors like Alex Honneth, Nancy Fraser and Charles Taylor have made important use of the theory of recognition in modern social organization in studies of questions like multiculturalism, nationalism and ethnic conflict; its use as a theoretical tool in international relations is a relatively underused concept. As Wolf (2011) posits, its application in this project can be complemented by the concepts of rank and clubs, which underscore questions of importance and worth on the international stage. This approach makes use of frameworks and insights drawn from social and moral philosophy, social psychology and sociology (WOLF, 2011) and includes the concept

of emotions as central to understanding the IR approach. In this sense, an understanding of the dialectical use of the Other in international relations and social relations will be crucial. It, of course, invokes questions of identity. The possibility of achieving recognition via other actors will be especially important when comparing Brazil's regional role and its role in the Global South with its role as a member of the elite club of the G-20.

3.1 Properties and Functions of Constructivism as a Lens onto Geopolitical Planes: Contributions from the Approach's Leading Thinkers

Constructivism, according to one of its leading scholars, Alexander Wendt (1999), has two basic tenets: that ideas have a leading role in human organization, in opposition to their material counterpart, and that identities of entities within these organizations cannot be determined by static natural forces but are rather fluid reactions shaped by these ideas. Constructivism began to garner active attention as a subfield of international relations studies in the 1990s by offering a "middle ground" between realism and liberalism (ADLER, 1997),²⁶ yet its diverse responses to the debates within international relations theory have often led to criticisms of incoherence within the approach, especially when viewed as a theoretical tool as opposed to an analytical approach (STEPHAN, 2004). According to Guzzini (2000), constructivist scholars react to this alleged incoherence within the field "either by emphasizing a particular view, by picking out particular approaches for discussion, or by providing typologies" (GUZZINI, 2000, p. 149).

²⁶ In traditional terms, the realism approach of IR tends to stress material relations as determinant to world order, which is inherently anarchic. For liberalists, on the other hand, institutions and their organizations capacity have the power to sway geopolitics and state relations.

In premise, constructivism hopes to “bridge a gap” between two ontological worldviews, the rational single-truth empiricism familiar to realist schools of thought and the postmodernist view of a relativist understanding of world order.²⁷ In 2001, Nicholas Onuf,²⁸ recognized as one of the founders of the constructivist movement within international relations, gave a speech entitled “The Strange Career of Constructivism in International Relations,” in which he sought to lay out the trajectory of the constructivist position within the academy. Although the text must be read with a wariness about his own involvement in the development and espousal of constructivism as a distinct academic approach (a premise that the work itself actively supports), it is useful in understanding how constructivism originated as an interdisciplinary epistemological debate and how it is has been reinvented and remodeled within international relations. At its core, constructivism (in its interdisciplinary origins) develops from a concern about the reliability of knowledge and the relationship between an agent and the world around him, ultimately concluding that this relationship cannot be known in full to any observer. Such a premise was the result of decades of “ennui” in the academy and amounted to a forceful thrust by proponents against the long-held foundations of positivist thought, associated with the Enlightenment and “modernity” (ONUF, 2001). Constructivism, then, grew from the same postmodern strains as much literature and art, where so-called “radicals” of the movement “doubted that we could know anything for sure” and invoked a basic tenet that all aspects of human relations and organizations are in fact deeply imbedded with particular political meanings. This view was pitted

²⁷ Sefano Guzzini (2000) is skeptical about constructivism's claim to the middle ground between these two schools of thought. “Although constructivist positions are part of this middle ground, not all theorizing on the middle ground is constructivist” (p. 148).

²⁸ Onuf's views differ greatly from Wendt's and the use of his “The Strange Career of Constructivism” is not meant to inflate all constructivist authors under the same umbrella, but rather to give a general outline of the development of the school of thought.

aggressively against the traditional positivist approach of epistemology, which saw it the declaration of an integral laden politicization of human life as “willfully destructive, even nihilistic” (ONUF, 2001, p. 3).

The evolution of this view into the constructivist approach of IR began with the work of Richard Ashley and culminated in the publishing of Onuf’s 1989 book, *World of Our Making*, which coins constructivism as an approach that seeks to “escape the impasse between positivist complacency over epistemological matters and the wholesale post-modern dismissal of methodical pursuits” (ONUF, 2001, p. 4). This meant designing a worldview within international relations that could take for granted the existence of reality without failing to acknowledge the social proprieties and political infusion of its features; Onuf’s clearest epistemological intermediary for demonstrating the function of this worldview is language, which he proclaims cannot be taken as a pure representation of the world around us but neither should be dismissed, as the post-modernists would have it, as incapable of bringing about true knowledge about reality. Within the international relations academy, the growth and maturation of constructivism as an alternate to traditional realism and liberalism (called the “twins” by Onuf) generated a flurry of activity and intellectual innovation. Onuf cites Friedrich Kratochwil’s 1989 “Rules, Norms and Decisions” as another paramount text that opened up the discipline to the possibilities of restructuring conventional modes of viewing geopolitical and inter-state relations based on a new model of how and why states act the way they do. In many ways, the rise of constructivism within the political science academy was as much a response to historical events as it was an outcome of internal developments within the “world” of international relations. The collapse of the Cold War – which had served not only as the historical context during the development and growth of the American IR

discipline, but was also implicitly involved in many of the intellectual explanations about the workings of world orders – failed to produce any seismic shifts within both the realist and the liberalist approaches of IR (KEGLEY; RAYMOND, 1994; LEBOW; RISSE-KAPPEN, 1995). Constructivism's attractiveness in offering an approach that could potentially provide a worldview that accounted for events and actions disregarded by the "twins" eventually led to the mainstreaming of the approach and a neglect of the epistemological debate, especially following the growing acceptance of the term. Yet the richness and depth of the academic response to this possibility has been large enough and varied enough in the past two decades that criticisms of constructivism have been directed towards the approach's intellectual diversity, alleged lack of coherence and descriptive vagueness. Nevertheless, constructivism, which is now routinely viewed as an alternative to liberalism and realism, is marked by distinctive emphases on various aspects of the world systems, with due stress on the effects of social interactions on state relations.

Alexander Wendt played a major role in mainstreaming the constructivist approach in his oft-cited 1992 article "Anarchy is what States Make of It"; he is best known for his emphasis on identity as a fundamental unit of inter-state relations, whereby "interaction at the state level changes state identities and interests" (WENDT, 1994, p. 384). This is seen to bring about a potential solution to the classical problem of anarchy within global order, whereby interaction and identity evolution can create new norms that emphasize international common goods, thereby minimizing conflict. Here, then, is a central tenet of most constructivist thought and particularly forceful within Wendt's body of work: the key to organization within the presupposed anarchic characteristic of the world politics, taken for granted by most scholars since the publication of Mancur Olson's 1965 *The Logic of Collective Action*, does not have to

be incurred through the “sticks and carrots” mechanisms of the realist, nor through the coercive governance of institutions as the liberalist would have it, but can be achieved through socialization processes between states that propagate standards of behavior that become part and proxy of state policy decisions. Wendt’s work, then, seeks to assert that interests are not formed solely within a vacuum of domestic and bureaucratic politics, but are influenced by state interactions that contribute to the development of a state’s collective identity and international collective identity (WENDT, 1994).²⁹

Nicholas Onuf has branded Wendt’s version of constructivism as “idealism” (2001) based on vague notions of how states interact. Onuf’s own contributions to the constructivist approach have tended to stress the potential for rules, norms and standards-of-behavior in socially constructed organizations and analyzed their presence within the international community and geopolitical relations. Rules and ruling standards offer a gamut of behavioral options for agents (who may or may not be individuals), which may contract or expand according to circumstances offered by nature and society.³⁰ While much of this may sound similar to the institutionalism put forth by many international relations liberalists, Onuf stresses the rule-making *process*. “Exercising choices, agents act on, and not just in, the context within which they operate, collectively changing its institutional features, and themselves, in the process” (ONUF, 1998, p. 61). These rules come together in institutions – the

²⁹ Much of Wendt’s work is predicated on an understanding of world order that sees “states as people,” to be discussed later in this chapter. Another area of Wendt’s interest, however, lays in what he has deemed an international community. “I argue that collective identification is an important condition for the emergence of ‘international states,’ which would constitute a structural transformation of the Westphalian states system,” (WENDT, 1994, p. 385). This is directly related to his work on recognition, also to be included in this chapter.

³⁰ Onuf stresses the rationality of agents in seeking to achieve their goals within the gamut of behavioral options available, exercised in the face of contextual constraints by the combined forces of nature and society. See ONUF, 1998.

consequences (intended or unintended) of which come together to form structure. Here Onuf introduces one of constructivism's main ontological concerns: the relation between structure and agency and the interjection of reality between the two. Onuf is clear that the ontological status of structures – i.e. “social arrangement” – is in perception only, different to different agents acting within different institutions. Rules, then, and the condition of rule, are vital to forming human experience and shaping the way that agents act, react and interact within institutions. This conception of agency is ultimately a reflection on the nature of reality, one that is grounded in the work of phenomenology and the modernist movement, which understands the world only through human social interaction (ONUF, 2001). For Onuf, the act of speech and speaking serves as a way for us to interact with one another, for us to share our own, ultimately distinct experience of the world and impose our own normative perception of how agents should react to that world. Speech, for Onuf, blurs the difference between facts and values, whereby the simple act of speaking converts an otherwise simple *fact* – which, up until then, was free from the imposition of value (which could easily be called “politicization”) – into a *value-laden fact*, by nature of the speaker's new agency within the “world” of that fact. The importance of speech, discourse, and speaking in the constructivist view and in Onuf's work will prove to be highly relevant in understanding the way that Brazil's international identity is affected by its role within the G-20. This understanding of speech is applicable to world of “standing and statecraft,” as Onuf terms it. Power, inter-state relations and world order, therefore, are subject to the nuances of social interaction.

Martha Finnemore's work with norms provides the fundamental building blocks for another main preoccupation for constructivism. “How do we know norms make a difference in politics?” Finnemore and Sikkink (1998, p. 888) ask. The linguistic

variety by which the concept of norm can be transformed – including “institution” or “behavior standard” – has confused the practice by which we understand where and how norms change behavior within international politics,³¹ often allowing us to clump together distinct spheres of human behavior. This is important because the formation of norms and their necessary component of “oughtness” is itself the function of “intersubjective and evaluative dimensions” (FINNEMORE; SIKKINK, 1998, p. 891) that arise from social interaction and lead to either approval or disapproval from a collective agency. This constitutes a process that is often seen as distinct from the condition of rule in both its informality and its emphasis on the social action of judgment. Here, a “sharedness” of opinion is paramount in understanding when and where a norm is at work: the breaking of a norm will produce offense to a collection of individuals, bound together by their shared belief (conscious or unconscious) in the need to uphold and promote the given norm. This understanding of the way that “appropriate” behavior on the international level is formed is vital to the constructivist understanding of inter-state relations, whereby norms serve to create or dissolve collectivity on the part of different actors. Norms within the international community are internalized through a “combination for conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state leaders to enhance their self-esteem” (FINNEMORE, SIKKINK, 1998, p. 895), culminating in the process that the authors call “norm cascading,” whereby the norm is taken as legitimate, natural and desirable.

A final attribute to the constructivist approach must be included here, with the provision that all of the characteristics described here are subject to intense debate

³¹ Katzenstein, Finnemore and Klotz all define norm as a “standard of appropriate behavior for a given actor,” but Finnemore concerns herself with the substitution of the term “institution” for norm, which she sees as a societal aggregate of norms.

within the group of scholars who carry the label of constructivist and act with agency and authority within the “world” of constructivism. Onuf (2001) calls this mark of constructivism “methodological openness,” which perhaps most fully differentiates the approach from its positivist detractors. While the methods of doing social science were never the central concern of the first international relations “dissidents” of the 1980s, constructivism makes the implicit claim that no *one way* of conducting scholarly research can be dismissed outright, while continuing to maintain the legitimacy and validity of the traditional positivist tools of quantitative analysis, rational choice, and so on. No one set of facts can be taken as superior, nor can knowledge and research be viewed as a linear process whereby certain world descriptions are taken a priori as natural, factual and commensurable. Here constructivism positions itself via the liberal and realist traditions of international relations scholarship, to be discussed in the next section.

3.2 Constructivism in regards to Realism and Liberalism: Materialism and Institutionalism

While neoliberalism (also known as neoliberal institutionalism) and neorealism are most often seen as theories of international relations, most constructivists (with an important exception being Wendt, who refers to constructivism as a “structural theory of international relations,” (WENDT, 1994, p. 385) restrict themselves to labeling constructivism as an approach, framework or “way” (ONUF, 2001; THIES, 2004). In this sense, constructivism allows itself the conceptual space to build from, borrow from and generally work with existing and traditional theories of how the world works, is structured and changes; constructivism does not necessitate a dismissal of the contributions of neoliberalism and neorealism as a way to include its generally

recognized respective emphases on institutions and material power into its conception of international relations. This point is particularly important in understanding the implementation of the constructivist approach in analyzing Brazil's international position with regards to its inclusion in the G-20. The application of the concept of "identity" to a state within a system of international affairs, both regionally and globally, and its use as an analytical lens with which to reach a conclusion about the course of foreign policy action, does not deny or ignore the theoretical contributions of materialism and institutionalism as central policy drivers, but rather seeks to enfold both of these views within the constructivist approach.

Neorealism begins with the assumptions that international order is dominated by anarchy and that the domination and distribution of material resources determine the degree to which states survive or flourish. States, which are individual sovereign units equal in nature, must compete for finite resources, resulting in power hierarchies that cause distinctions among states and encourage unfriendly relations. Only through changes in this distribution of resources can changes be made to the international order (THIES, 2004). In this view, Brazil's interest and involvement in the policy decisions and processes of the G-20 summits and other global governance mediums have explicitly concerned the question of the country's position vis-à-vis the international division of materials, be they organic, financial or commercial.³² The constructivist approach employed in this paper does not deny the centrality of materialism and resource distribution in the making and enacting of foreign policy and international affairs, it rather tries to understand the way that identity, roles and recognition are implicitly and intractably a part of these processes (ONUF 1998,

³² To cite an example discussed in the previous chapter, Brazil's role in the Uruguay Round of the WTO was ostensibly about increasing the material advantages and decreasing the material disadvantages that would result from a given proposal.

WENDT, 1999). Materials are the physical space in which the construction of identity takes place; norms and rules develop to treat material distribution as a recognizable part of international relations. Constructivism regards the social aspects of material distribution, the way that a certain set of material conditions is transformed into a socialized, intelligible and recognizable characteristics of a given agent. In this sense, the treatment of the G-20 process will seek to focus narrowly on Brazil's identity on the regional and global planes and how this identity is affected and influenced by its interaction, role, and perceived position (or manner of being recognized) within these planes; this approach does not ignore material conditions, but sees them as a theoretical base on which to expand analysis.

This same approach toward the theoretical contributions of neorealism can be applied to the neoliberal school of thought within international relations, which agrees with an anarchic description of international order but contends that states are most apt to view cooperative measures as most efficient and most conducive for survival and flourishing within the international system (THIES, 2004). This means that states are more likely to enter institutional relationships with one another, where the risk for conflict and hostility is diminished and systemized by rules, which can also be seen as rights (ONUF, 2001). Within this view, the concept of state capabilities is not restricted to relative gains, but can be accrued in absolute terms, especially when systemized by regulations and norms. Neoliberals, unlike neorealists, take a more inclusive view of domestic politics, reserving a place for interests and intentions in analyses. Neoliberalism was most canonically espoused in Keohane and Nye's 1977 *Power and Interdependence*, which laid out a view of "complex interdependence" in which states are increasingly in meaningful contact and the potential of military action and hostile relations is increasingly disregarded by state leaders.

Yet, neoliberalism incorporates many of the basic tenets of realism, even within its most foundational texts, and both theories agree on many starting principles, including the dominant role of the state in world affairs and a stress on resources and capabilities. Even Keohane has contended that resources and power must be viewed in a sliding, relative scale within the spheres of international order, a staple thought of neorealism. Increasingly, constructivists and scholars across the international relations discipline have begun to take note of the overlapping tenets of the two theories, so much so that the 50th anniversary issue of the journal *International Organization* was organized by Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner, three scholars who cover the gamut of neoliberalism and neorealism. The rationalist foundation of both neorealism and neoliberalism allows for constructivism to develop from the principles of both theories, postulating a lens or tool of viewing international order that does not deny the importance of institutions, the possibility of cooperation or the role of the material capabilities, but rather stresses their social construction and implementation in world affairs (STERLING-FOKER, 2000; BARKIN, 2003).

3.3 Contributions from Socialization Theory

Socialization theory has been a central focal point of study in many social sciences, including linguistics, anthropology, sociology and social psychology, but it has only recently made large strides in becoming an object of scholarly research within international relations, a change deeply related to the “sociological turn” that has taken place within the discipline since the acceptance of constructivism as a mainstream approach (JOHNSTON, 2001). Yet the degree to which socialization processes are seen as integral to the behavior and policy decisions by agents within

an international structure vary greatly, a range which hinges on the way “socialization” is understood by political science and IR scholars. While even the most neorealist of scholars accept the basic premise of the idea of socialization,³³ i.e. that interaction within a social structure has the potential to affect an agent’s behavior, many constructivists choose to position socialization as a process that may drastically influence the norms and identities of agents within the structure, acting as a way to induce, change, modify or interfere with behavior. Constructivism, then, sees socialization as a process that can and should be added to the toolbox that realists most often cite as instrumental within international affairs to exert influence and change behavior – the “carrots and sticks” mechanism (whereby behavior that is deemed “good” and desirable by norm or hegemon is rewarded and behavior that is deemed “bad” or undesirable is punished) and changes in the distribution of domestic power which privilege particular interests in the international order. The addition of the socialization process to these means, especially within a determined international “social” structure, has led to a rise in literature about the “microprocesses,” as Alistair Johnston terms them, of how exactly influence is exerted, how and when behavior is changed and in what kind of social environments these processes are most likely to produce results. The microprocesses of socialization within international institutions borrow from literature within sociological social psychology, which seeks to bridge the psychological idea of the self and the sociological interest in the means, channels, effects and capacity of interaction mechanisms (STRYKER, 1977; STRYKER, 1989).³⁴

³³ Ikenberry and Kupchan cite Keohane’s admission that scholars need to study “why secondary states defer to the leadership of the hegemon” in the absence of explicit carrot and stick mechanisms as indicative of neorealism’s willingness to include “social” explanations in its theories of international relations. See IKENBERRY, KUPCHAN, 1990.

³⁴ Stryker explicitly notes that, “social psychological processes are critically impacted by the social structural settings in which they occur” (1989, p. 47), an observation that is critical for an analysis of

Socialization is defined as “a process of learning in which norms and values are transmitted from one party to another” (IKENBERRY, KUPCHAN, 1990, p. 289), “the generic term used to refer to the processes by which the newcomer – the infant, rookie, or trainee, for example – becomes incorporated into organized patterns of interaction” (STRYKER, STATHAM, 1985, p. 325), and a process which seeks to create “membership in a society where the intersubjective understandings of the society become taken for granted” (JOHNSTON, 2001). These definitions share an idea of a transmission of values, norms, beliefs and standards of behavior that are emitted from an existing group structure and target a new member or newly-included agent within that group structure, resulting in some degree of change in preexisting values, norms, beliefs and standards of behavior and the potential of an “internalization” of these values that fails to recognize the effects of socialization.

It is important to point out that the central application of the “values/norms/beliefs/standards of behavior” concept in socialization is often glossed over under the assumption that these ideas have been thoroughly knitted through in other literature; Johnston includes a footnote which urges readers to understand that the effects of socialization are “changes in fairly fundamental beliefs, not relatively shallow, transient, or low-level attitudes about the efficacy of certain political choices and strategies” (JOHNSTON, 2001). In his article “Treating International Institutions as Social Environments,” Johnston seeks to give a more thorough understanding of the specific mechanisms through which these changes are undertaken. Johnston sees a traditional neglect within constructivism of how, when and why socialization

what kinds of international institution structural mechanisms are most conducive for a maximized process of socialization.

takes place, a dearth that he says can be accounted for by a “macrohistoric” explanation which tends to view inclusion into an institution (or social structure) as an automatic, predictable and consistent process that results always in some degree or another of socialization; the ins and outs of how behavior is influenced and how norms, values and beliefs are transferred, then, is both overlooked and taken for granted. When it is the subject of scholarly analysis, the channels of socialization that are seen as most prevalent are explicit persuasion and “social influence,” which together encompass mechanisms of back-patting (explicit markers of approval) or opprobrium (explicit markers of disapproval) by a group that serves, in some degree, as a reference of identity for the agent or actor in question.

Axelrod (1997a) expounds on the process of social influence to include authority, mimicking and voluntary membership. These are termed “pro-norm” processes because of the lack of endogenous or material incentives; the psychological, social and “self” rewards or punishments are both institutionalized and forceful enough to induce change. Persuasion works through active channels to change minds, rearrange priorities and induce interest shifts to bring about a desired behavior by the novice agent on the part of the group or hegemon. Johnston breaks this active process down, whereby agents first process, reflect and continue to internally debate the “pros and cons” until reaching a conclusion; persuasion is generally more effective when there is a strong personal relationship between persuader and persuadee. The degree of willingness on behalf of the persuadee to avoid being perceived as a dissenter is also central. Social influence mechanisms include a range of markers that replace material punishment and reward with psychological and social punishment and reward (a sense of belonging, on one end of the spectrum and shunning on the other, for example). Within international relations and

diplomacy, these mechanisms have a dominating effect on world orders that value and explicitly recognize social markers such as status, reputation, inclusion and exclusion and hierarchical formations within particular institutions.³⁵ That an agent's socialization is restricted to an external desire to join a consensus and fails to bring about an internalization of the norms and values espoused and materialized through a certain line of behavior or singular action is plausible and does not mean that no effects of socialization are visible; the willingness to be publicly perceived as a member of the bandwagon denotes some degree of social interaction with marked effects.

When and why does socialization happen? Ikenberry and Kupchan's contribution to the theory of socialization has been in the area of hegemonic studies. Their 1990 article, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power" focuses on why "secondary nations" follow the standards of behavior set forth by hegemonic powers (or, it may be added, a hegemonic set of norms). Ikenberry and Kupchan understand socialization as less narrowly restricted to the institutionalized social structures of world governance and international affairs; the role of the elite in secondary nations is instrumental in bringing about acceptance of and acquiescence to hegemonic rule. Through the use of elites and the processes of persuasion and direct contact, national leaders internalize the world order and its corresponding values as defined by the hegemon and are passive recipients of an "ideological transference." Problematically, the term "secondary nations" is not defined by the authors, but the assumption can be reasonably drawn that this refers to the classes of nations that are often referred to as "middle" or "lower" powers in the distribution of political and economic power

³⁵ Here, contributions from the psychological study of "positive affects" can be helpful, which analyzes how positive reinforcement and support during decision-making can influence outcomes. See ISEN, 2001.

within world order. Ikenberry and Kupchan propose that socialization plays a more central role following wars and political crises and normally is the follow-up mechanism of material, coercive action. While most authors see socialization as a potentially behavior-changing force that goes beyond situations of war or crisis (AXELROD, 1997a; JOHNSTON, 2001; CHECKEL, 2005b), the authors' relating of the theory to hegemonic studies can be instructive. An understanding of the microprocesses of socialization, while necessary in analyzing how and why behaviors change, can require an analysis of intricate social mechanisms that risks overlooking macro structures that seek to reinforce the role and rule of the hegemonic values, norms, beliefs and standards of behavior.

Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink address norm diffusion in their 1998 article, "International norms dynamics and political change," breaking down norm transference into three stages: emergence, cascade and internationalization. The following graph characterizes each stage.

Graphic 2: Norm Transference

| | <i>Stage 1:</i> | <i>Stage 2:</i> | <i>Stage 3:</i> |
|----------------------------|--|--|-------------------------------|
| <i>Actors</i> | Norm entrepreneurs with organizational platforms | States, international organizations, networks | Law, professions, bureaucracy |
| <i>Motives</i> | Altruism, empathy, ideational, commitment | Legitimacy, reputation, esteem | Conformity |
| <i>Dominant Mechanisms</i> | Persuasion | Socialization, institutionalization, demonstration | Habit, institutionalization |

Source: FINNEMORE, SKINNIK 1998

Here, then, we see that socialization primarily concerns what the authors term “cascading” – the descent of the norm into international law. Yet cascading can occur without any large-scale domestic approval or movement in favor of the norm. Jeffrey Checkel (1999) looks at the domestic diffusion of norms, criticizing a lack of scholarship that deals with norm construction within states. While my concern with the treatment of socialization is restricted to the social structures of international institutions, Checkel makes a point similar to Johnston’s: constructivism and its lack of attention on internal processes fails to take into account dissimilarities in regard to norm adoption and behavior modification, stressing the positive spread of norms but not the failure to do so. Johnston’s response to this perceived weakness is to bring scholarship back to characteristics of institutions and their effects on socialization. What kind of institutions best diffuse (or rather, transfer, transmit, translate, spread, cause the internalization of) norms? Johnston cites the importance of studying the intricacies of institutions because they are, increasingly, “the one area of inter-state activity where the effects of ‘anarchy’ are likely to be checked”³⁶ (JOHNSTON, 2001, p. 507). Central to Johnston’s and constructivists’ assertions about the need to treat institutions as environments of socialization, however, is that the forms and features of how the institution is run matters. Persuasion and social influence may be more salient in some institutional (social) structures than others. This rather banal statement reveals a dearth in the literature on institutions and norm diffusion, one that can be partly compensated for with an understanding of how much legitimacy members bestow on the particular social structure. While no such typology exists in ranking institutions, the degree of members’ identification with the institution, the number of members involved, the level of transparency, how decisions are reached,

³⁶ This is a claim that neoliberals and neorealists agree on, for different reasons.

the mission of the institution and the autonomy of members are all cited as characteristics for a potential classification system of institutions. Thus, the socialization effects within an institution like the BRICS summits – a social structure that is recently established, small, relatively high in members' self-identification, moderately transparent, and allows for relatively high autonomy in its actors – can be contrasted to the effect within a much larger, much more established and but much lower in members' self-identification social structure, like the UN. These metrics are useful in analyzing the case of Brazil and the G-20

3.4 Contributions from Role Theory

Some scholars see a conversation about roles within institutions and social environments as an effect or a part of the general process of socialization (CHECKEL, 2005b), while other international relations scholars and constructivists understand role theory as pertaining to separate, though related, mechanisms of interaction (THIES, 2003). Generally, the development of role theory in the social sciences originated in the work of George H. Mead in the early 20th century and his contributions to the study of social psychology and social interactionism. Mead's 1934 *Mind, Self and Society* laid the foundations for the use of role theory in international affair, positing that the space between an agent's conception of himself ("self-conceptions") and others' conceptions (the "alter") offer an area rich for the study of behavior, interests and motivations (BENES, 2011). Mead introduced new terminology into the study of interactionism, including adjustment, adaptation, roles and identity; the conceptual flexibility put forth in the idea of identity, for example, as hinged upon multiple roles that agents assume in different societal contexts, is the basis for much of the pioneering studies in behavioral, social psychological, and

political science studies in the past half-century that seek to take into full account the various layers of complexity involved of interactionism in contemporary society (STRYKER; BURKE, 2000). The theoretical framework put forth by Mead – that structural social forces influence identity (or self) which in turn influence behavioral choices – is at the heart of much of the later developments in role theory in political science and international affairs analysis.

The integration of the basic tenets of symbolic interactionism into constructivism and its study of international affairs reveals the inherent ontological variations of the constructivist approach and sheds light on one of the theoretical areas of the approach that has traditionally been most vulnerable to external criticism and internal confusion (ONUF, 2001). The agent-structure debate within constructivism is clearly at work in the implementation and adoption of many of Mead's contributions; while it has not done much to build a strong consensus within IR constructivists, symbolic interactionism and role theory can be used to bridge the two ontological viewpoints. Hollis and Smith (1990) acknowledge that most international relations theories follow one of two central ontological viewpoints: holism and individualism. Holism follows a structuralism approach, which claims that social structures exist autonomously from interpretations and behavioral reactions by agents or individuals. According to Wendt (1999, p. 26), "holism holds that the effects of social structures cannot be reduced to independently existing agents and their interactions, and that these effects include the construction of agents in both causal and constitutive senses." Following Wendt's declaration that "states are people too," the constructivist structural approach tends to look at state-actors as "black boxes," whereby domestic and internal conflicts of interest, power struggles, and hierarchical dimensions are intentionally overlooked and deemed moot for international relations analysis.

Individualists, on the other side of the continuum, believe that all social, structural and collective phenomena can be broken down to parts, the most indivisible being that of the individual actor. Within the application of role theory in international relations, this division can extend itself to include levels of analysis, with the individualist ontological approach traditionally using roles in foreign policy analysis, while constructivism within IR has been more inclined to adopt the holist, structural ontology (BENES, 2011). While the agent-structure debate, then, is often reduced to a question of the often blurred and superficial division between foreign policy analysis and international relations, the analytical utility of role theory does not necessarily acknowledge any distinction between the two academic areas. According to Stryker (1987), in its derivation, social interactionism distinguished itself from a long line of political and social thought (“from Durkheim to contemporary Marxism”) which has seen society as a self-producing and self-replicating independent mechanism. Social interactionism – and role theory – do not posit a logical opposition of this viewpoint, but rather seek to locate activity in agency within existing social structures in such a way that they can construct and/or re-construct these structures.

The emergence of role theory in political science can be attributed to the 1970 publication of “National Role Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy,” by KJ Holsti. Holsti’s work introduced a typology of roles within international relations, adopting an “agentic, role-taking side of the equation” (WENDT, 1999, p. 227). Holsti’s roles are restricted to the subjective creation of a national role and national identity by a country’s leader or its elite, which he termed a “national role conception,” defined by Holsti as, “the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state...It is their ‘image’ of

the appropriate orientations or functions of their state toward, or in, the external environment” (HOLSTI, 1970, p. 245). Developed and put forth by individuals who act on behalf of the state, national role conceptions lay out standards of behavior that are desired or appropriate within a structure of interactionism, which is shaped, influenced and driven by sub-processes of “families of theories” (THIES, 2009) that tie together national identity and role theory in international relations. Since Holsti, several scholars have contributed to bringing role theory from the subjective to the intersubjective levels of analysis, expanding and contributing to Holsti’s original designation of these sub-processes and typology of national roles within international relations. These concepts include role enactment, which refers to the degree to which an agent fulfills the expectations involved in a certain role after it has been designated; Sabin and Allen (1968) break this down to address how many roles an agent holds, how much time an agent dedicates to the role in comparison to others and how much effort is expended on realizing the role. The recognition of a multiplicity of roles for agents resulted in some of the most dynamic contributions of the theory to international relations and will prove to be paramount to my analysis of Brazil’s role(s) within the G-20. Thies (2009) traces the development of the concept of interrole conflict within the area of role theory, analyzing how the potential of incompatibility between or among two or more different roles held by an agent has been pervasive within international relations, leading to the development of state mechanisms that seek to avoid such conflict, such as the reformulation or reinterpretation of a national role. Goode (1960) called the scarcity of resources to address all the requirements of multiples roles “role strain.” Rosenau (1987), a major contributor of foreign policy analyses under role theory, looks at the different sources of expectation for individuals involved in the decision-making processes that create, react and develop roles and national identity, including their position with social

system, the larger domestic society, governmental institutions and their interaction with other units of policy making (THIES, 2009, p. 7). In order to sort through varying layers of expectations, agents create “role scenarios,” which provide a basic script of expectations and behavior depending upon the scene or context. Here, too, scholars (THIES, 2009; SARBIN, ALLEN, 1968; LE PESTRE, 1997) distinguish between ascribed roles, which have a dimension of temporality, and achieved roles, which are fully and integrally integrated into all actions of an actor’s identity at all levels of behavioral analysis.

The intersubjectivity of role theory focuses on the imposition, action and reaction of roles between different actors. “Altercasting,” described by Thies (1999), Stryker and Statham (1985) and Biddle (1986), refers to the process of the stamping of a role upon a novice member of a group in order to make explicit the deemed appropriate behavior, a process similar to the mechanisms of socialization that were described earlier. Analyses that employ these terminologies traditionally treat role expectations as a variable, a theoretical tool that seeks to supersede the agent-structure division by focusing on “interbehavioral” mechanisms that speak to both the structural dimensions of the particular social context as well as the agent’s conception of its own behavior and the behaviors of other agents within the social context. In this sense, role expectations bring to the forefront the implicit interactionism and intersocialiability inherent to any question of roles, where the concept of “counterrole” must accompany any analysis of role (STRYKER; STATHAM, 1985). As Thies (2009), points out, role expectations are rarely made explicit by actors and they vary in their clarity, consensus among other actors and formality. All of these may contribute to the need for role adjustment, a shift in behavior in terms of the expectations of the social situation and a “function of the accuracy with which (an

agent) can take the role of the other(s) implicated with him in some social situation” (STRYKER, 1957, p. 287). Role expectations are integral to understanding the particularities of the social environment (institution) in which roles are being enacted.

The meaning of “roles,” then, for most proponents of role theory and its advocates within international relations, reconciles the different planes where we normally talk about roles – i.e. both “positions” within a group and “categories” of groups within society as a whole (THIES, 2009). Holsti’s 1970 study identified 17 such roles within international relations, creating the first role typology within political science, on which subsequent scholars have either mimicked or expanded. The national roles identified by Holsti between 1965 and 1967 were bastion of revolution-liberator, regional leader, regional protector, active independent, liberation supporter, anti-imperialist agent, defender of the faith, mediator-integrator, regional-subsystem collaborator, developer, bridge, faithful ally, independent, example, internal development, isolate, and protectee. At the time, Holsti concluded that the United States enacted eight of these expressed roles, while the Ivory Coast enacted zero of them. Walker (1987a), in his analysis of the Cold War dimensions of aid and security, develops a simpler typology of basic roles in the international system: consumer, producer, belligerent, facilitator and provocateur. Walker and Simon use these roles to study cold war dynamics in Southeast Asia (1987), ultimately arguing that they can be employed to understand power relations between states. In her analysis of the use of roles in the foreign policy of developing countries, Sofiane Sekhri (2009) expands upon Holsti’s typology to include the roles peacemaker, policeman and anti-terrorism agent. Sekhri highlights the particular situation of third

world countries,³⁷ drawing attention to their propensity to “play a range of roles” (SEKHRI, 2009, p. 430). Indeed, Sarbin and Allen (1968) posit that novice states’ difficulties in the international system is derived from their scarcity of roles, while deft and successful states have a larger and more versatile range of roles available to them. Sekhri (2009) elaborates on this idea, claiming that third world countries are constantly seeking to increase their repertoire. Briefly, she draws on Brazil’s position in its regional and international system to determine that it is a “key player”, with the roles of “Leader” in South America and the “rest of the Third World,” and “Mediator” between the North-South and South-South.

Wish (1980) cites Brecher, Steinberg and Stein (1969) in creating a role typology according to thematic areas of domestic and international relations that shape geopolitics, seeking to go beyond the type of state-to-state relationship roles described by Holsti. Brecher et. al’s categorization includes territorial/defense (nations that are either defending their own territorial sovereignty or invading or helping to invade others nations’), ideological (nations that espouse a moral or ideological worldview, the most common examples being communism, capitalism, socialism or democratic), political/diplomatic (nations that influence inter-state relations), universal values (nations that defend what are typically seen as human rights or peace movements),³⁸ and economic (nations that seek to develop its own or other country’s economic capabilities) (WISH, 1980). Creating a typology of thematic or problem areas can help role theorists better analyze how countries can or are apt

³⁷ While the term “Third World” generally fell out of favor following the end of the Cold War, it is assumed that here Sekhri is referring to “developing” countries, Ikenberry and Kupchan’s “secondary countries,” or the “Global South,” the term preferred in this paper.

³⁸ Although the deployment of universal values and human rights issues in a state’s international rhetoric is often subject to extreme politicization, the role of “defender of universal values or human rights,” along with the issue of human rights itself, is accepted in the mainstream, status quo international order. For more on the politicization of human rights, see BELLI, 2009.

to hold several different roles at once, depending on dimensions and area on which it is acting.

The typologies listed above by no means encompass the full range of possibilities of international relations identities. The roles of revisionists, deviators and rogue states, for example – which are often claimed to be central to any change in the international order (GELDENHUYS, 1990; SCHWELLER, 1994) – do not seem to fit these neat typologies. Geldenhuys (1990) gives a detailed explanation of the role of “isolated states” in the international system, a classification that Holsti also includes, in which states seek to cut off ties with a given country based on political and diplomatic, economic, military or socio-cultural dimensions. “Isolation,” however, may include such concepts as deviators and rogue states. Rogue states are those whose behavior is conceived as a radical denial or de-legitimation of international behavioral norms, prompting diplomatic and economic sanctions that seek to bring about deleterious isolation (HOYT, 2000). Rogue states typically seek to act in brash national self-interest and are often motivated by perceived threats in the status-quo order (HOYT, 2000), yet their isolation and hostile tone toward major powers translates into a minimal role within the international system. Rogue states thus differ greatly from revisionist states, which work within the system. Revisionist states “want to increase, not just preserve, their core values and improve their position in the system” (SCHWELLER, 1994, p. 87). This is an implicit challenge to the status quo, stressing that revisionist states must make relative gains in world power distribution. Schweller points out that bandwagoning is an effective international relations strategy for revisionist states, allowing them to increase strength and “move

the system in the direction of change” (p. 92).³⁹ Revisionist states tend to be much less openly hostile to great powers than rogue states (HOYT, 2000).

Closely related to role theory is identity theory in international relations. Identity theorists understand identities to be conceptualized roles, whereby individuals and agents can hold many at one time and be a number of different “selves” depending on the context (GHOSE; JAMES, 2005). Salience, then, is fundamental to the strength and implementation of an identity; this concept corresponds well with the variables of “time allocated” and “energy spent” within the conceptual framework of role expectations. In other words, “commitment shapes identity salience shapes role choice behavior” (STRYKER; BURKE, 2000, p. 286). While identity politics have recently become a focal point in multiculturalism studies, with most research focusing on religion, ethnicity or race in a domestic setting, the analysis of the salience of the force of identity in international relations has been integrated into role theory, often as a “sidekick” concept, rather than the frontrunner. In many ways, it is not surprising that identity has often taken the backseat: its conceptual use requires parsing out the relationship between “self” and “society,” in a way similar to the debate between agency and structure. Stryker and Burke (2000) seek to create a conceptual bridge between the self (internal) processes of identity formation and the society (structural) mechanisms of identity expression. For these authors, society informs identity by “arriv(ing) at behavior by moving from social structures to commitment to relationships through the consequent salience of the identity of the behavior.” Internally, the self “moves from internalized identity standards and perceptions of

³⁹ As Schweller (1994) points out, bandwagoning contrasts with balancing because it generates positive feedback and creates a process in which success (and international respect and status) generates success. Balancing typically refers to a mechanism of negative feedback, in which a balance of power has to be restored after deterrence fails.

self-relevant meanings, through a comparison of the two that identifies or indicates a discrepancy, to behavior that repairs the discrepancy by altering the situation or creating a new situation” (STRYKER; BURKE, 2000, p. 288).

Roles are not necessarily identities; rather, the amount of time and effort expended on a given role will contribute to the degree to which that role is incorporated into an identity. This is a definition of identity, one that sees a “self” as the whole that results from the parts of multiple roles, shared by Stryker and Burke, who cite Mead as its intellectual heir (STRYKER; BURKE, 2000). At one end, a role can constitute the identity of an agent, a situation in which large amounts of time and effort are spent on the given role without necessarily neglecting all other roles completely. Countries that spend no time or energy on any role at all would constitute an identity of “isolate” within the international system (HOLSTI, 1970).

3.5 Contributions from Studies on Status, Respect and the Theory of Recognition

Central to role theory is a clear reliance on the theories and concepts of status, respect and recognition. These three concepts will provide the clearest reference markers for my analysis of Brazil’s national identity in the international system within the social environment of the G-20. While they are interrelated and directly linked to the processes of socialization, role theory and identity described above, distinct conceptual clarity for each term will make analysis of Brazil’s current position within the G-20 more fruitful.

Sarbin and Allen (1968) call status "a location in the social structure defined by expectations for performance by an incumbent...The status dimension is correlated with legitimate power and social esteem" (p. 551). Wish (1980) stresses the domains of status: status can be held in a range of different domains, the largest and most important for international relations being the global domain of politics. Roles can give a general idea of how status is translated into behavior expectations: leadership roles are often the most embedded with high status; "cooperative" and "helping" roles are also deemed to be high in status. Wish differentiates between these two types of status, however, by drawing a typology of roles that are "dominant" in status and roles in which agents are "equal" in status. Cooperative and partnership actions, in which agents work together, is distinguished from following roles, where a dominant agents leads and holds higher status. Wish (1980) creates a measurement of status that seeks to take into account domain and degree of influence. Influence domains can be categorized following Brecher et al.'s model of domestic, bilateral, dominant bilateral, subordinate, subordinate other and global. "Bilateral domains" denote relations in which a state agent interacts with a non-superpower, while "dominant bilateral domains" speak to relations with a superpower. "Subordinate" domains signify regional groups; "subordinate others" are relations with nonglobal international organizations; "global" domains signify relations with a superpower bloc, a global international organization or the world system as a whole. Wish uses this typology to interact with national role conceptions, whereby leaders conceptualize in which domains they have a role, denoting a value of 1 to the domestic domain and 6 to the global domain. Accumulations of interacted domains amounts to a measurement of "domain of influence" (WISH, 1980).

Within the limited scholarship on status in international relations, the concept is very often succeeded by a discussion of respect between states and within the social environment of international institutions. Wolf (2011) laments the lack of mainstream inclusion of the concept of respect in behavior motivations of states within foreign policy analysis; for him, respect is potentially as central a foreign policy driver as social rituals, institutionalized norms and material interests. Its absence in (Anglo-Saxon) international relations scholarship comes at the risk of ignoring a central force in world politics.⁴⁰

Analysis of respect markers is often analyzed in dialectical opposition to disrespect, humiliation and “losing face” within foreign policy and international relations. Recently, these concepts have gained greater exposure in journalism and popular media (for example, see Thomas Friedman’s November 9, 2003 column in the *New York Times* titled “The Humiliation Factor”), especially following the public exposure of torture at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq, the rhetorical recognition of respect in both Palestinian and Israeli leaders’ official discourse, and Pakistan’s reaction at the invasion of its sovereign borders during the strike to kill Osama Bin Laden. Feelings of (dis)respect, then, can serve as an expression of discontent with roles, whereby a nation thinks that its role as conceived by Other agents (and its complementary standards of behavior and status markers) does not “match” its own national role

⁴⁰ Wolf hints at a cause for the absence of respect scholarship in English-speaking international relations as part of American and British arrogance of holding high-status, high-respect world system positions. Recently, the Obama administration seems to have incorporated respect into its official foreign policy doctrine. Upon assuming office in 2008, Obama sought to distinguish his worldview from that of his predecessor by promising to improve relations with the Muslim world through “mutual interest and mutual respect” (Obama’s Inauguration Speech, January 20, 2009. See <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/20/us/politics/20text-obama.html?pagewanted=all>, accessed February 2013) and spoke of “engagement that is honest and grounded in mutual respect” in easing tensions with Iran (Speech on March 20, 2009. See http://articles.cnn.com/2009-03-20/world/obama.iran.video_1_mutual-respect-iaea-official-nuclear-weapons?s=PM:WORLD, accessed February 2013).

conception. This “mismatch” can provoke uncooperative behavior (WOLF, 2011), which may be against the nation’s interests (ROSEN, 2005). Moreover, humiliation and disrespect often result from what Wolf calls “non-evaluative” behavior, whereby one agent or a group of agents is simply ignored, producing the humiliation associated with “being looked through.” Here, then, respect and disrespect are closely related to the concept of human and agent dignity. Disrespect is easier to measure and recognize than respect, and for that reason has made more headway into the studies of group cooperation and conflict. The type of behavior associated with disrespect is often anger that results in rash decision-making (ROSEN, 2005). Wolf focuses his 2011 article “Respect and Disrespect in International Politics: The Significance of Status Recognition” on the presence of disrespect in small groups of state decision-makers, categorizing the ways that they can feel disrespect: personal disrespect in interactions with foreign leaders; disrespect as representatives of their state; disrespect in their role as citizens; and politically engaging in the disrespect felt by influential domestic groups. While Wolf points out that very little academic study has been given to the question of respect between and across groups, rather than internal group dynamics, the article illuminates the potential role of disrespect among state leaders in institutionalized social environments of inter-state decision-making.

Wolf defines respect as “due consideration to another object, be it natural, human or institutional” (WOLF, 2011, p. 109) and social respect as “an attitude we expect others to show by the way they treat us,” (p. 112) manifested through behavior. Colin Bird (2004) argues that respect is a more appropriate term for analysis than a quantifiable marker of status or identity because the accepted integration of respect actually speaks to two separate concepts: hierarchical identities and an egalitarianism based on Kantian notions of treating all people as means unto

themselves. By disabusing the popular notion that these two ideas are in natural contrast to one another, Bird claims that the concept of respect in political science can (if properly understood in its dual connotations) allow for recognition of differences of identity while ensuring a basic equal treatment without the risk of “identities themselves becom(ing) the objects of respect” and “converting identities into privileges” (BIRD, 2004, p. 226).

Understanding the dual nature of the common use of the concept of “respect” is useful for evaluating how and when agents are treated (and treat others) with respect. Wolf (2011, p. 112) pinpoints the areas in which agents seek to be given their “due consideration”: physical presence; social importance; ideals and values; physical needs and interest; achievements, efforts, qualities and virtues, and; rights. “Consideration” for these areas does not denote agreement, just acceptance as factual and authentic in their manner of expression. As Bird (2004) points out, respect, in its Kantian sense, is expressed through Wolf’s idea of an “attitude,” while respect in the hierarchical difference sense involves rituals and performances that normally speak to high-status others.⁴¹ In this sense, respect can be directly linked to the theory of recognition, whereby recognition denotes a basic consideration of an Other, without implying that both agents are equal in status or hierarchical identity differences. Stephen Darwall, in his essay “Two Kinds of Respect” (1977) makes the distinction between “recognition respect,” which treats all as equals and recognizes the basic human dignity of all people, and “appraisal respect,” which calls attention to specific characteristics that are seen as to warrant respect. Recognition respect, according to Darwall, can exist autonomously from appraisal respect. According to

⁴¹ We commonly use both meanings of respect in our daily lives. We say that one must show “respect for your elders” by certain actions and forms of expressions, while we also have adopted the an ideal of equality through respect for all.

Wolf (2011), respect speaks more extensively and more narrowly to human relations than the concept of recognition – more extensively in that it takes into account non-evaluative concepts of self-image and more narrowly because it does not involve a moral code of conduct involved in the idea of recognition. The theory of recognition within international relations is traditionally attributed to Hegel's understanding of recognition, while the works of Charles Taylor and Alexander Honneth have been paramount in re-introducing recognition in contemporary international relations studies.

Recognition studies draw from Hegel's master-slave dialectic (HAACKE, 2005), where the intersubjectivity of identity has hinged on recognition from the Other,⁴² making dependency on self-image as conceived by an Other central to human relationships. In his 2002 article "Hegel's Reluctant Realism and the Transnationalisation of Civil Society," Hans-Martin Jaeger argues that Hegel's theoretical conception of the role of recognition in human society can be applied to the international realm.⁴³ By removing the often-impenetrable conceptual barriers between the organization of domestic society and anarchy of the international community, Jaeger (2002) argues that Hegel's vision of international relations built upon an idea of dialectic relations and mutual recognition among state units that is capable of transcending the divide between civil society and international relations.

⁴² Haacke points out that Alexandre Kojève's interpretation of the master-slave dialectic (1996) has been more "fascinating" for scholars than Hegel's original work, as he refashioned recognition into a life-death struggle.

⁴³ Hegel's formulation of international realisms has been subject to various interpretations, the most common of which fits comfortably in the realist paradigm of IR, whereby states react to the intrinsic anarchy of the international community with conflict. See JAEGER, 2002.

Taylor and Honneth have both created a critical theory⁴⁴ by building off Hegel's original consideration for recognition, but their respective takes on the centrality of the concept in political science are distinct from one another. Taylor's work, termed the "politics of recognition" (HEIDEGREN, 2004), has made the question and analysis of multiculturalism and regional identities central, whereby different groups with different identities seek recognition for their position within a federal or national landscape. In this way, Taylor's ideas are closely related to studies on nationalism where the theory of recognition has garnered more attention in recent years.

Honneth's work, however, works in more direct dialogue with Habermas and his theory of communicative action, differing from the leader of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory by framing social relationships within the state apparatus as contingent upon the struggle and conflict over creation and development of institutions (HAACKE, 2005), a conceptual theory deemed the "struggle for recognition" (HEIDEGREN, 2004). Recognition, for Honneth, can be boiled down to groups in conflict for legitimacy and social action, conflict which is often the result of feelings of disrespect that lead to anger which manifests itself in collective action. Honneth views the formation and solidification of identity and self through much the same intersubjective process of recognition and acceptance by an Other as Hegel, yet he frames this struggle as the foundation of a moral conception of life,⁴⁵ in which our everyday use of language and our everyday interactions seek "integrity" from the "receipt of approval or recognition from other persons" (HONNETH, 1992, p. 188).

⁴⁴ Critical theory, according to Heidegren means, "establishing a relation between theory and social reality in such a way that theory relates to experiences, interests, discourses or practices to be found in social reality at a particular time and place (immanence), while at the same time pointing beyond the existing social order (transcendence)" (Heidegren 2004, p. 366).

⁴⁵ Both Habermas and Honneth interpret Hegel's master-slave dialectic as an illustration of the way that recognition shapes societal organization, rather than as an ethical blueprint for society that speaks to questions of human worth, respect and dignity.

Honneth draws heavily on Mead's psychology for analyzing the interaction between societal norms and individualization of identity. Transformation, according to Honneth, is based on "the individual claim to recognition...anchored in every subject" which continually drives humans toward action and historical change (HONNETH, 1995). Thus, recognition is the force that connects the individual will to the collective and societal, regardless of norms, culture, historical time period or identity. Recognition, for Honneth, is ingrained in the human experience and engenders a continuous, interminable struggle.⁴⁶ The form in which recognition comes to the surface of societal organization is in interpersonal relationships (Hegel's "love"), state relationships ("law") and moral fabrics ("ethical life"). These are the markers of reciprocal recognition and engender emotional support, cognitive respect and social esteem. Emotional support is limited to familial relationships, where cognitive respect within societies is contemporarily expressed through guaranteed rights. Social esteem means much what "hierarchical identities" mean to Bird. Honneth's struggle for recognition hinges on his analysis of what happens when recognition is not fulfilled: a struggle ensues, he says, that originates in the emotional response of the experience of disrespect. The struggles that ensue mark the constant fabric of change and transformation in human organization.

A third author, Nancy Fraser, has made important contributions to the theory of recognition, working in dialogue with Honneth to draw attention to the material aspects of recognition and thereby elevating the material foundation of status within the international system. Fraser understands recognition to mean "distribution," whereby a "two-dimensional" concept of justice equates material status with

⁴⁶ Honneth, here, can be seen in the work of William Connolly and his contribution to theory of recognition through the concept of "winter identities". See CONNOLLY, 1999.

ideational status, thereby reintroducing the material aspects of identity, roles and status as equally important to the studies of equality and justice as the moral category of recognition. “Maldistribution is entwined with misrecognition but cannot be reduced to the latter” (HONNETH; FRASER, 2003, p. 3). Fraser’s contribution thus acknowledges the basic Marxian foundation of studies on recognition and the role of status, in which materialism is indispensable. “By treating recognition as a matter of status (...) the model (...) avoid(s) mortgaging normative claims to matters of psychological fact” (p. 32). Under Fraser, recognition is contingent on the presence of materialism; symbolic and material power must go hand-in-hand. Status and recognition cannot just be granted or achieved under any conditions, but preclude a system of moral justice of equal opportunity that may be lacking for particular agents and require a system of redistribution to ensure the pursuit of recognition. Thus, Fraser also draws on the Weberian idea of status, whereby non-recognition entails the social subordination of a group in a particular social setting (MENDOÇA, 2006).

Wendt’s take on recognition in international relations builds on Honneth’s theory and bypasses the question of materialism, choosing instead to understand the struggle of recognition in terms of its resolution; for Wendt, the possibility of states that endow one another with mutual recognition lends itself to the potential of a “World State,” whereby integration would accompany a global diffusion of international norms, beliefs and standards of behavior and bring about about an alignment of interests among states. Wendt sees recognition as a way to solidify national “self” identity as well as serving to bring the self and the Other under one, unified identity. This process can repeat itself, whereby groups are treated as “selves” and go on to recognize the otherness of fellow groups, eventually creating commonality between groups. Greenhill (2008) rebuts Wendt’s claim that groups can (and will) behave

similarly to individuals within a group: he claims, “a theory of recognition that is more consistent with empirically grounded psychological research ought to acknowledge the importance of recognition to international politics without requiring it to play such a deeply transformative role” (GREENHILL, 2008, p. 346).

Whether Greenhill’s criticism of Wendt’s conception of a “World State” is accepted here is not necessary for making the theory of recognition a central component to the analysis of Brazil’s identity within the G-20. Recognition is a concept that is regularly employed in discussions of domestic and international politics. The flurry of feedback that accompanies a formal or official recognition of a cause, as Obama did for gay marriage in his second inauguration address, is testament to how recognition has become a political tool that lends itself to questions of respect and dignity. In international relations, intuition, everyday language and the media indicate that recognition is a potent force in deterring foreign policy and shaping relations between states within the social environment of an institution either toward or away from cooperation. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, can be seen as a laboratory for the dangers of mis-recognition. On theoretical grounds, it is here posited that the search for recognition and the micro-processes involved in socialization, role theory, identity theory and theory of recognition are fundamental to understand Brazil’s position within the G-20 and its corresponding foreign policy and international standing in regards to global governance and global power hierarchy, as well as its regional position.

3.6 Final Theoretical Considerations from the Club Model

Status, respect and the theory of recognition all contribute neatly to the club model of international relations, as developed by Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye in their 2001 paper “Between Centralization and Fragmentation: The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy.” The club model, which traces contemporary institutions of global governance back to a concept of a private, exclusive, members-only, relatively non-transparent club, serves to enhance the historical analysis of the formation and solidification of the G-20 as traced in chapter 1 of this work.

Keohane and Nye (2001) date the club model back to the creation of rules between cabinet level ministers of “rich countries” who “negotiated in secret” and only made public the details of their meetings after rules had been agreed upon (p. 4). These clubs are inherently built upon a hierarchical understanding of world politics, whereby certain members of the international regime are delegated and legitimized to create rules for certain “issue areas.” For Keohane and Nye (2001), this model was dominant throughout the 20th century and has only very recently been subject to objections based on its exclusionary, non-democratic and relatively non-transparent qualities, allowing members’ policy positions to be cloaked by the resulting consensus. The club model, then, “has a political logic of its own,” (KEOHANE; NYE, 2001, p. 5) that stresses results and conflict-avoidance while putting in place mechanisms that served the interests of the representatives that would be held accountable domestically.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ Keohane and Nye (2001) stress the Uruguay Round of negotiations for the WTO as a prime example of groups who derailed liberalizing measures until they were compensated with subsidies of some kind.

Increasingly, non-rich countries are demanding participation in the club models and, increasingly, their demands are being met, especially in the areas of trade and commerce. This participation includes the creation and building of their own private clubs (BRICS, IBAS, and NAM and the G-77 from the Cold War period, just to name a few), as well as entrance in existing clubs. Here it is necessary to distinguish between clubs and coalitions: clubs are private “invitation-only” institutions that address private and public goods from a standpoint in which “nonmembers can be excluded” (ROSECRANCE; STEIN, 2001, p. 223). Coalitions, in contrast, are typically seen as open to membership, such as in George Bush’s famous phrase, “the coalition of the willing.” This is an important distinction when analyzing the transformation of the G model; although the expansion of the G-8 to the G-20 (originated in an ad-hoc decision-making process as shown in the previous chapter) was heralded as a new era of participatory politics in global governance, the G groups continue to function decidedly as clubs and not yet as coalitions. Indeed, the very informality of the G groups and their ensuing lack of transparency speak to a continuing dominance of the club pattern, one that draws simplified analogies to children that are persuaded to open their club doors to a few more outsiders rather than risk their club being shut down by some interfering adults. It is in this sense, then, that Brazil’s inclusion into the G-20 brings about the symbolic, interactionary and emotional elements of international relations theory and constructivism, including questions of status, respect, and recognition.

CHAPTER 4: BRAZIL IN THE G-20: A STATUS QUO GLOBAL PLAYER?

In this chapter, the theoretical underpinnings examined in Chapter 2 and the historical background provided in Chapter 1 will be applied to understand Brazil's role within the G-20, how (and if) it has affected its other international identities (regionally and within the Global South) and ultimately seek to answer whether the country's presence in the G-20 signifies global player status. These are complicated questions that can be approached from a variety of angles; the analysis presented here will understand all of these concepts from a constructivist point of view, which favors the influence of social elements in the formation and evolution of national identities in international relations.

This chapter will be broken down into five main sections, which together seek to answer the main objectives of my research. The first section will give a general history of the G-20. The following section will focus on Brazil's search for recognition, as well as understanding the way the country's roles within the Global South and regionally have interacted with its position in the G-20. The third section will use the theoretical idea of interrole conflict to analyze if Brazil's membership in the G-20 causes conflict with its position regionally and within the Global South. The fourth section will evaluate Brazil's policy positions within the G-20 to get a more detailed understanding of potential contradictions. Finally, the fifth section will formally address the general research objective of analyzing if Brazil's role in the G-20 signals a new identity for the country as a global player.

Understanding different "national role conceptions" and projections of international identity is predicated on an understanding of the scales of international relations.

This is a conceptual framing of geopolitics as composed of various planes of behavior, which encompass a relational interdependence in which interests can converge or diverge, with positive or negative consequences (MILANI, 2012). Thus, foreign policy on the regional, global and Global South planes is the product of distinct strategic policy implementations that can reverberate – intentionally or unintentionally – onto other planes. Scales are an important foreign policy analysis tool that allows an understanding of international relations as a space where countries vie for increased geopolitical power in different forums simultaneously. The concept of scales locates a focal point of action – in this case, the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MRE) in the Brazilian government and its ensuing foreign policy – and organizes its effects on other points of action. In this sense, convergences and divergences are more clearly viewed, while the relationship between scales is viewed as dialectic and interdependent. As Milani puts it, “O conceito de escala é instrumental para analisar os efeitos que uma ação multilateral ou global pode ter sobre negociações regionais e vice versa” (2012, p. 2). Here, we can add the importance of the Global South scale, which permeates different regional and global identities.

4.1 History of the G Groups and Creation of the G-20

The formation of what are known as “G” groups began in 1975, as a way for the world’s most powerful countries to convene in a setting that would provide for more informality and flexibility, and thus enable a more effective system of international governance freed from the unwieldy and cumbersome bureaucracy inherent in more traditional international institutions. That year, Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Japan and the United States formed the Group of Six, which became known as the G-7

when Canada was invited to join the following year. The idea for the group grew out of the 1973 Petroleum Shocks and the series of informal meetings between financial representatives from the governments of the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, and France to discuss a common response to the oil crisis and the turbulence in the world economy.⁴⁸ At the time of the first official summit, the meeting was hailed by the *New York Times* as a “landmark conclave in modern times aimed at developing a better economic and social order” (MULLANEY, 1975). At the first meeting in France, the delegates decided not to formalize the summit and add to the large number of international financial institutions. This initial resistance to an institutionalization of the G-7 set the tone for what would eventually be seen as the ad-hoc nature of the G-groups (although the G-7 eventually regularized its meetings to an annual schedule) (POSTEL-VINAY, 2007).

The Group of Seven met in 1976 in San Juan, Puerto Rico where they emphasized a new world order based on a globalized financial market largely controlled by the world’s largest (democratic) economies. The Joint Declaration from San Juan stated: “The interdependence of our destinies makes it necessary for us to approach common economic problems with a sense of common purpose and to work toward mutually consistent economic strategies through better cooperation.”⁴⁹ This emphasis on “worldwide management” (MULLANEY, 1975) would contribute to the group’s reputation as a private, members only club with unmerited power over global economic policy. Following the end of the Cold War, Russia became a member, first

⁴⁸ The first summit grew out of an informal series of 1973 meetings between the US, UK, France and Germany, which met at the White House library and became known as the “Library Group.” The following year, Japanese finance minister Kiichi Aichi invited the four finance ministers to another meeting. See BAKER, 2008.

⁴⁹ See the University of Toronto’s site on the G-8: <http://www.G-8.utoronto.ca/summit/1976sanjuan/communique.html>, accessed February 2013. In keeping with its nature as an “informal” institution, the G-20 does not have its own website. Many documents and transcripts are made public through the University of Toronto.

unofficially in economic negotiations in 1991 and as an official member in 1998, and the group came to be known as the G-7+1, eventually turning into the G-8. Since that year, the EU has also acted as a member.

According to John Kirton (2004a) of the University of Toronto, the organizational structure of the G-7/8 has gone through several phases since its inception, adding separate meetings for foreign ministers and finance ministers and eventually seeking to expand its governance role to regional and global issues. While its most high-profile meetings involve the annual heads-of-state summits, the G-8 works on smaller scales, often through task forces or issue-specific ministerial meetings. While its initial purpose was purely economic, its policies have always involved political questions; the annual heads-of-state meetings quickly took on a broader agenda, while questions limited to financial regulation have been more directly addressed at the G-7 finance ministers' forum. The G-8's scope has grown to involve a close working relationship with the WTO, the UN, the OECD, the World Bank and the IMF; as Kirton (2004a) says, "This striking growth in the regularity, membership, attendees and agenda of the G-7/G-8 summits suggests strongly that the G7/G-8 is now recognized as an effective centre of global governance." For Kirton, the G-8 functions as the contemporary take on the old Concert of Europe, a "modern democratic concert, providing effective global governance where the older system based on the multilateralism of the United Nations has failed."⁵⁰ Many others, however, take a more critical view of the G-8, framing it as a plutocracy whereby the largest and most powerful countries are given a legitimacy to fashion world order so that it benefits their governments and their large multinational corporations (GILL, 1999; HELLEINER, 2000). The limited scale of representation, coupled with the far-

⁵⁰ See <http://www.G-8.utoronto.ca/G-8online/2004/english/lectures/lecture01.html>

reaching impact of its policies, has led to frequent public questionings about the G-7/8's legitimacy as a major actor in global governance (HAJNAL, 2007).


The G-20 began as an off-shoot of the G-8; following the financial crises that rocked the Asian markets at the end of the 1990s, the group expanded its set of taskforces, working groups and ad hoc meetings, which Hajnal (2007) calls the "G-8+" entities. At a G-8 meeting of financial ministers and central bank governors, the delegates announced that they intended to "broaden the dialogue on key economic and financial issues" (VESTERGAARD, 2011). Representatives were called in order to establish new mechanisms "within the Bretton Woods System." The countries that sent delegations to the first G-20 conference in Berlin in December 1999 were chosen almost at-whim by Timothy Geithner at the US Treasury and his German counterpart, Minister Koch-Weser: "Geithner and Koch-Weser went down the list of countries saying, Canada in, Spain out, South Africa in, Nigeria and Egypt out, and so on; they sent their list to the other G-7 finance ministries; and the invitations to the first meeting went out" (WADE, 2009).⁵¹ In this way, the nineteen countries invited (plus the EU) - Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, the Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the UK and the USA – were not necessarily elected for representing a greater degree of legitimacy or global inclusion. Argentina, a country whose inclusion would prove to be fundamental to Brazil's position within the G-20, was invited because of a personal friendship: "In the case of Argentina, its inclusion was allegedly related to the friendship between Secretary of the US

⁵¹ This insight into the creation of the G-20 brings important questions about legitimacy and sheds light on the G groups functioning as "clubs," whereby power is distributed based on status or those who are considered to be "systemically significant" (Vestergaard, 2011, p. 13).

Treasury, Larry Summers, and Argentine Finance Minister, Domingo Cavallo, who had shared accommodation as Harvard graduate students” (PATRICK, 2010).⁵²


The maps below illustrate the members of the G-7 and the members of the G-20.

Graphic 3: Members of the G-7



⁵² The inclusion of Argentina in the G-20 would prove to be quite significant for Brazil, allowing the two countries to maintain a relationship of coordination and support on the global stage.

Graphic 4: Members of the G-20



Sources: BBC. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/in_depth/business/2009/g20/7897719.stm

The G-20's role in global financial governance shifted dramatically from a low-profile offshoot of the G-8 to the center of global attention following the 2008 Financial Crisis. The ascension of the G-20 at that moment is largely explained simply because it was the best – and most representative – leadership choice available. The IMF was disliked by many world leaders, and the G-8+5 (Brazil, China, India, South Africa and Mexico) was never very well integrated. Moreover, the idea of expanding the G-20 to include a heads-of-state summit had been encouraged by the Canadian Prime Minister since the early 2000s.

Although the G-8 continues to exist, the global media quickly fixed its attention on the G-20 as the “premier forum” for reform of global economic institutions. The role of the G-20 in molding an effective response to the crisis was enhanced by a perceived increase in legitimacy, through its oft-repeated declaration of representing more than 90% of the world's GDP, 80% of world commerce, and two-thirds of world population, as well as its claim of “broad membership.”⁵³ Yet the group's claim to be the most legitimate and fair of the global governance bodies is often subject to strong criticism. The group does not represent the world's largest 20 economies, as myth would have. The lack of a systemized and official membership criteria has become more problematic as the profiles of the member-countries have changed since the first meeting in 1999. Moreover, as Vestergaard (2011) points out, the inclusion of the EU creates a “double-membership” for many European countries while begging the question of why other regional institutions were excluded. In addition, the EU – whose claim of representing the entire population of the European Union is itself problematic – helps inflate the legitimacy percentages of world GDP, commerce and

⁵³ See the website of the Global Partnership for Financial Inclusion at <http://www.gpfi.org/about-gpfi/countries/about-g-20>

population: without the EU, the G-20 accounts for 77% of GDP, 60% of world trade and 62% of world population. Furthermore, South Africa is the only African country represented within the G-20. No low-income countries are members. At the same time, the G-20's record on institutional reform has been largely ineffective. Although it has created strong ties with other multilateral organizations like the IMF and World Bank, worked to reform the Bretton Woods representational system, especially within the World Bank, and implemented the Basel-III reforms for international banking, these reforms have been muted and not as bold as many financial experts hoped for.

4.2 Historical continuity: recognition of global player status and Brazil's regional and Global South Roles

The importance of being recognized in international politics as a global player on the global scale of international relations has – with greater and lesser salience – shaped Brazil's history of foreign policy. This long-standing goal has both complicated and influenced the country's goals in the two major remaining scales of international relations, its region and the Global South. The interaction between these three scales is particularly important in examining potential changes in Brazil's projected identity in international affairs. The strength or weakness of the Brazilian position regionally and within the Global South – and the subsequent recognition afforded to those positions – is therefore significant to understanding the involvement of Brazil within the G-20, as well as informing an examination of whether that involvement is representative of power in other scales.

In this section, then, the question of regional and Global South recognition scales will be examined, based on a theoretical understanding of the debate of a need for

“other-scale” hegemony and leadership before reaching global player status. In other words, Brazil’s entrance in the G-20 may be a reflection of its regional and Southern power. These questions ultimately seek to create a cohesive understanding of the way that the scales of international affairs do, or do not, affect one another. Foreign policy analysis using scales builds on an understanding of international relations put forth by authors like Marie-Francoise Durand, Jacques Levy, Denis Retaille (1993), Neil Brenner (1998) and Laura Sjoberg (2008). Scales differ from “levels” or even “planes” by their dialectical nature; it is an iteration of “where” international relations take place that bridges questions of structure and agency to “address() both physical and socio-spatial cause” and “bring the study of context squarely into the mainstream of IR” (SJOBERG, 2008, p.473).⁵⁴ Scales make central the claim that regions, states, organizations and international activity are products of social, constructed human activity (BRENNER, 1998). Sociality and interactivity, then, became key concepts to a scaled approach.

4.2.1 Recognition through scales

Although the methods with which to achieve recognition on the international scale have differed through the history of Brazilian foreign policy, oscillating generally between the strategies proposed by the universalist camps and the pragmatist camps, the salience of the concept has remained relatively dominant since the era of

⁵⁴ As Sjoberg (2008) points out, a scaled approach is a rejection of a “levels-of-analysis” understanding of international relations, most well known through the work of Waltz’s three levels (man, the state and the system) put forth in his 1959, *Man, the State, and War*. A levels approach has been criticized for its inability to take into account behavior and action on more than one level simultaneously. Buzan, Weaver and de Wilde (1998) called for an expansion to include five different levels that would widen the conception of agency in the international system to include subinternational organizations and substate actors. For Sjoberg, levels fail to represent the reality of international relations partly because they are single-frames that understand behavior and roles as static, rather than interactionary and fluid.

Rio Branco and his declared goal of “greatness.” As discussed in chapter 2, the search for recognition is an often unrecognized but pervasive influence on foreign policy. In the case of Brazil, the goal of recognition of the country’s role as a global player is naturally and clearly delegated to the “world affairs” scale of international relations. Yet, as shown in chapter 1, this does not necessarily mean that policy strategy for recognition privileges the global scale of international affairs; many policy makers have understood the regional and Southern scales as potential routes toward achieving recognition as a global player.⁵⁵ Such a foreign policy strategy has naturally complicated the Brazilian regional and Southern role. As Saraiva puts it, for example, regional tensions have been stoked by fears that Brazil’s emphasis on integration “seria vista como um projeto basicamente politico que poderia reforçar a ideia do ‘destino manifesto de grandeza,’ presente na dimensão cognitiva da sociedade brasileira desde o século XIX” (2012, p. 136). Similar fears about the underlying goals toward recognition of global player status can be found within Southern institutions like the G-77, concerns that have grown since the rise of an identity based on membership in the BRICS, IBSA and BASIC⁵⁶ groups, all of which have been strengthened by recent institutional means.

Global player status involves influence in world affairs, being taken into account during global governance decisions and exerting influence over other nations in global governance structures. It is a general term that connotes holding direct

⁵⁵ The question has often manifested in which scale of international relations should be *prioritized* within Itamaraty.

⁵⁶ The BASIC group, composed of Brazil, South Africa, India and China, emerged out of the G-77 as a coalition to tackle climate change. The four countries signed an agreement in November 2009 to act jointly at the Copenhagen Climate Change Summit in December of that year.

influence over the international agenda (SARAIVA, 2007).⁵⁷ Within the world affairs scale of international relations, certain historical examples demonstrate a policy continuity that aims at achieving this status, particularly strategies that seek to raise Brazil's participation in major world events. This has been manifested differently in the autonomist and the liberal pragmatist camps – the former of which has stressed international insertion vis-à-vis a critical stance of the North-South divide, and the latter standing for active participation and pragmatic alliances with great powers (GIACALONE, 2012; SARAIVA, M. 2010a; LIMA; HIRST, 2009). The historical salience of the global player status in the last half-century of Brazilian political thought has been detailed in the first chapter of the present research. Since Lula's presidency, the rise of a “confrontational autonomy” current within foreign policy formulation has stressed diverse methods of achieving “a central role in the global arena” (GIACALONE, 2012, p. 338). As Giacalone succinctly puts its,

Members of the (foreign policy) community share consensus regarding Brazil's aspiration to play an influential international role but are divided about the means to reach that goal: one group considers that Brazil should increase its capacity by cooperating in the creation of global rules and institutions; the other emphasizes the search for autonomy by collaborating with similar countries of the region” (2012, p. 339).

The country's role and policies on the regional and Global South scales make up for much of the difference in means toward reaching the goal of recognition as a global player.

Regardless of scale, the Brazilian search for recognition has favored certain methods, particularly institutionalism. The history of a privileged position of institutions within the Brazilian concept of international insertion was elaborated upon during chapter 1. Here it can be pointed out that institutions can be limited to one

⁵⁷ Although some theorists and international relations scholars prefer to use the term “world powers” or “major global stakeholders,” here the term “global player” is used to denote an elevated status of influence on international affairs.

specific scale of international relations or address more than one simultaneously. Brazil's active participation in institutions has been upheld by a belief that institutional forums provide an opportunity to address national interests and raise a country's profile, be it internationally, regionally or within the Global South. Institutions, as Andrew Hurrell points out,

are not just concerned with liberal purposes of solving common problems or promoting shared values. They are also sites of power and reflect and entrench power hierarchies and interest of power states. Indeed sovereignty may be increasingly defined not by power to insulate one's state from external influence but by the power to participate effectively in international institutions of all kinds" (2000, p. 3).

This faith in the power of institutions to serve as springboards has generally transcended party or ideological lines within the country. Within the scale of global affairs, attitudes toward reform are telling about the country's desired role. Within the regional and Southern scales, degrees to which Brazil has sought to actively strengthen a given institution can give clues to prioritizing the respective scale in the country's overall foreign policy approach.

An important example of this point is Brazil's history of active participation within the United Nations. Brazilian governments have traditionally prioritized the country's position within the UN as a fundamental element of a global projection. Brazil's oscillating strategy between active, endorsing participation in the UN and a critical reformist position (which, while not mutually exclusive, signal the dominance of different foreign policy paradigms) has positioned the UN as a forum where various projections of international identity may interact. Despite an active history of constructive participation in the UN, several governments have voiced bold criticisms of the UN's democratic failings, particularly in regard to the Security Council. During the governments of Cardoso, for example, Brazil waged a delicate "non-campaign" for reform and a permanent seat on the Security Council. While these reform

projects may incorporate a whole host of Brazilian foreign policy goals, a reform campaign within the UN has generally signaled a prioritization of Southern or regional foreign policy strategies, whereby Brazil has stressed either the need for a more equitable distribution of power for developing countries within global governance or presented itself as a leader of its region, or some combination of both. In this sense, the example of UN reform serves to illustrate how global governance structures may depend on (or incorporate) the identities and roles cultivated in regional and Global South scales. Here, then, we see the potential for intersection between international relations scales.

4.2.2 Brazil in South America: Leader?

Recognition, then, can be granted through various means; “greatness” and “global player status” must be based on something. This fairly banal observation is the root of different foreign policy strategies. Leveraging a hegemonic or leadership position within Brazil’s region has long been the central policy for one of the dominating foreign policy routes within Itamaraty. Brazil’s role within South America, then, becomes relevant for its position within world affairs. Despite Brazil’s geographic size, its large population and its wealth of natural resources, the achievement of regional power status, however, has not been an *a priori* assumption.

Here, it is important to raise the issue of *typologies of power*: the military, population and resource characteristics associated with hard-power capabilities do not encompass all possibilities and variability of exercising power. Civil, soft, normative and “smart” power are, perhaps, increasingly important aspects of power capabilities in the 21st century. Civil power became a leading concept in international relations in

the 1970s to describe Europe's role in the world system (DUCHENE, 1972), when military capabilities no longer amounted to a justification of European nations' elevated positions in global governance structures and economic power became more paramount to international influence.⁵⁸ Civil power stresses responsible economic strength and "sustainable global development" (PRODI, 2000, p. 3) enforced by binding international law and a vibrant trust in public diplomacy (MANNERS, 2002). François Duchene, who was largely responsible for the diffusion of the concept of civilian power in Europe in the 1970s, understood that these elements required a normative element founded on an "*idée force*" – power built on ideological beliefs and generally transmitted through culture and the projection of an international identity. According to Manners (2002), normative power can be reduced to the "ability to shape conceptions of normal" (p. 29). These two concepts, civil and normative power, taken together are what is loosely called "soft power" in international relations, which Nye defines as "the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment" which depends on "culture, values, and policies" (2008, p. 94). Recently, a new concept has been added to the international relations power typology: smart power. Termed as a combination of hard and soft power (NYE, 2008), smart power stresses how, when, where, and through exactly what channels influence is exerted. Smart power focuses on the strategic employment of public diplomacy instruments but underscores the need to have material capabilities to back up the normative or civil tools of the international system, as well as a strong image and identity of the civil society from which power is generated. Smart power understands the source, form, and means of power to be all-important for establishing credibility and thereby

⁵⁸ For a more contemporary take on Europe's role in the international system, see LAIDI, 2005.

wielding influence (NOSSEL, 2004; NYE, 2009). Brazil's place in the expanded typology of power will be discussed in the last section of this chapter, but the concepts are important for understanding its regional and Global South positions.

Endorsing a view of recognition as “greatness based on something” is contingent on a theoretical understanding of regional and world powers to analyze the relationship between power in different scales of international relations. For many scholars, regions are the essential unit for understanding international relations (FAWN, 2009), although it is clear that in many cases regions display idiosyncratic or singular characteristics that impede regional comparison of power and leadership (often cited is the example of Asia, where India, Japan and China have a complicated and historically complex relationship to regional leadership roles). For non-global players, nevertheless, regions are the most important area of inter-state action. “Save for the few powers with capacity for global power projection, the region generates the principle for conflict and peace” (FAWN, 2009, p. 14). The concept of regional powers (empires, leadership or hegemony) has recently been tied to the rise of the BRICS, which have said to stand out in international affairs in part due to their respective powerful regional positions (NOLTE, 2010; DESTRADE, 2010). Despite a relative lack of scholarship on the defining qualities of regional powers, Destradi specifies shared qualities of countries that hold an elevated position in their region. These qualities are relatively basic: that the country belongs to the region in question, that it holds the most power within the region compared to neighboring countries, and that it exerts some influence within the region (2010, p. 905). That these last two qualifications are relative speaks to the scholarly difficulty in quantifying regional powers and comparing them to one another (BUZAN, 1998). The difficulty in defining regions further complicates the study of regionalism and regionalization. In Brazil's

case, its region is either identified as Latin America or South America. For the purposes of this paper, Brazil's regional position is understood as dominantly pertaining to South America, where the great majority of regional institutionalism efforts have taken place. This is also a reflection of Brazil's own emphasis on South America rather than Latin America, which became increasingly salient during the Lula administration. (Minister Amorim put it quite clearly: ““O conceito de ‘América do Sul’ foi recuperado, desta vez, do ponto de vista político. Antes, era ‘América Latina’” (AMORIM, 2011, p. 21). While there were certainly political interest calculations involved in this shift, the narrowing of the region came in part as a reaction to other, more general trends in Latin America in the past two decades. This is best exemplified by Mexico's involvement in NAFTA, signaling a turn “North” for the country and, by extension, much of Central America. This perception of Mexico as a quasi-Northern country has contributed to a renewed focus on South America for Brazil, but has also added an extra layer of geopolitical complexity to Brazil and Mexico's common self-perceptions as leaders of Latin America. While the relationship between Mexico and Brazil bears much weight on regional geopolitical considerations and the transition from regional leader to global player, it is not within the scope of this paper to develop such an analysis.

For Destradi (2010), regional powers can be understood through an agent-based approach that focuses on differentiation between strategies, depending on a country's given modes of legitimation and representation in regards to its neighboring states. This is an understanding of regional orders that seeks to reconcile the notions of “regional powers” and “emerging world powers,” as many of the BRICS are often dually designated. In this way, Destradi's typology of regional foreign policy goes beyond the typical conception “of states pursuing exclusively benevolent,

leading, integrating strategies” to understanding the complexities of “contested nature of leadership” (2010, p. 907). These strategies sit on a continuum between leadership, hegemony and empire. An imperial strategy bases itself on military power, while leadership policies focus on cooperative methods on integration based on common goals. Hegemonic strategies fall somewhere between these two poles and can be understood as either coercive or benevolent, differing from leadership strategies in that countries ultimately seek to realize self-interests by drawing on commonalities. Leadership strategies seek to fulfill objectives that are held in common by the region.

In analyzing the characteristics of regional powers and analyzing their effects on world order, Nolte (2010) points out that regional analyses normally depend on a combination of IR viewpoints, one that takes into account material power (a realist perspective), power bases (liberal perspective) and roles and interactions (constructivist perspective). However, the understanding of regional power employed in this research greatly stresses the concept of “leadership” and “followership.” As Nabers (2010) makes clear, there is an overlying and principal distinction between power (material and resource capabilities) and leadership (the use of power). Followers, then, are necessary for leadership – an element of inter-state relations that understands how materialism is translated into relationalism. Without followers, material capabilities may not be enough to assure regional power status. Leadership involves a constructive element of international relations; it “depends on the ability of a regional power (or its leaders) to present its own particular worldview as *compatible* with the aims of regional followers” (NOLTE, p. 899, emphasis mine). This involves transfers of norms and values, as well as common identity that reinforces the interests of the regional leader as collective.

What is the relationship between a regional power and global player status? The transition from regional power status – in any of its policy manifestations – to global player status is particularly relevant for Brazil's goals. International relations theorists differ greatly on terminology and power status, distinguishing between “regional great powers,” “middle powers,” “superpowers,” “great powers,” and so on (WIGHT, 1978; BUZAN; WEAVER, 2003). Some of these terminological preferences reflect real differences about the interaction between regional and global scales, and the relation between countries in elevated regional positions and their respective roles on the global scale. Lemke, for example, has created a hierarchy of regional and international power structures that overlap, whereby great powers can interfere in regional structures. Regional great powers may also fail to act as middle powers (NOLTE, 2010). The analysis of Brazil's regional and global roles put forth here is based on an understanding of regions and world systems put forth by Barry Buzan and Ole Weaver in their regional security complex framework. Buzan and Weaver (2003) make a more rigid distinction between superpowers/great powers and regional powers: regional powers, while holding a high level of influence with their neighbors, have a minimal effect on international order and “higher-level powers from outside the region don't take them into account in their global power calculations” (Nolte, 2010, p. 887). Regional powers, then, are not necessarily global players and vice-versa. Yet, it is clear that recognition as a regional player increases global profile visibility and increases recognition for global player status. Power shifts occur when regional powers begin to appear on the radar of great powers within the global scale.

Has recognition, then, of Brazil's position within its region contributed to its inclusion in the G-20 and a new role on the global stage? Sean Burges (2008) outlines a

framework of Brazilian regional foreign policy since the Cold War based on “consensual hegemony,” in which the country, while nominally a superior to its neighbors, has embarked upon a regional strategy of consensus building. Indeed, as Fawn (2009) points out, the very project of regional integration (a long-standing South American goal) requires leadership – and thus, followership. Integration is an *identity project* that necessitates the “presence of an undisputed leader among the group of countries seeking closer ties” (MATTLI, 1999, p. 56). In the case of South American integration, Brazil has been typically hesitant to take the role of “undisputed ruler,” instead seeking to be cast as an “understated” regional power. This is especially true on the global scale, where Brazil has struggled with followership and leadership (SCHIRM, 2008),⁵⁹ two concepts that have been difficult for Brazil to chase because of its rhetorical and ideological commitment to non-intervention, sovereignty and cooperation, especially since the end of the Cold War. This means that Brazil has to navigate rocky terrain in the overlap between its regional and global scales of foreign policy. As Gratius puts it, “if Brazil acts too discretely or with understatement, it will not be recognized as a leader; and, if it exerts its power too visibly, its leadership will be rejected by its neighbors” (2007, p. 25).

Thus, Brazil’s tendency towards “consensual, cooperative policy” has held the country back from a more confrontational regional role that would signal clear and unambiguous regional hegemony (GRATIUS, 2007).⁶⁰ This strategy of cooperation is first and foremost marked by the country’s alliance with Argentina, which Gratius calls “power-sharing capacity,” which is directly contrasted to the American model of

⁵⁹ Schirm (2008) here defines leadership as, “the ability to make others follow positions which these others did not previously share and/or to make others support an increase in status and power of the emerging power” (p. 6).

⁶⁰ Here, Gratius cites Brazil’s reluctance to get involved in Columbia’s dispute with FARC as an example of the country’s inability or unwillingness to take undisputed regional leadership roles.

uni-hegemony. This can be seen through Brazil's regional approach outside of the G-20, whereby it has acted as a power broker for its neighbors, organizing and putting its weight behind the ASA Summits (between South America and Africa) and the ASPA Summits (between South America and Arab countries).⁶¹

Brazil's inclusion in the G-20, therefore, is a reflection and recognition of its role of, at the minimal regional level, the country's elevated regional position. While it may not yet classify as an undisputed regional power (the question of followership remains unresolved, especially by Argentina), the country's role in the newest club of global governance is a tacit acknowledgment of its representation of South America.⁶²

4.2.3 Brazil in the Global South: Leader?

Brazil's regional strategy of "understatement"⁶³ has been influenced by the adoption of an autonomous paradigm of foreign policy, which stresses its role as a leader of the Global South and respect for sovereignty and non-intervention. This is a role that has influenced the development of Brazilian power dimensions, causing a preference for soft, civil power which stresses peace and symmetrical power representation within global governance (GRATIUS, 2007; SARAIVA, M. 2010b; GIACALONE, 2012). Brazil's identity as a spokesperson for the Global South has long been part

⁶¹ The first ASA summit took place in Nigeria. Since then, a second summit was held in Venezuela in 2009 and Equatorial Guinea in 2013. The first APSA summit took place in Brasília in 2005; a second was held in Qatar in 2009. The third summit, scheduled for February 2011, was postponed due to the uprisings associated with the Arab Spring.

⁶² The disputed notion of Latin American regional leadership is not unique to its region and may reflect a need to further develop the concept. For example, the African regional representation in the G-20 is also not without nuances. While South Africa is the only African country included in the G-20, it is not assured a role of African regional leadership. Nigeria's resource-rich economy is fueling the country's economic rise and its political rivalry with South Africa. See the World Bank's "Africa's Pulse" Brochure, October 2012, volume 6.

⁶³ Understatement here refers to hard power and implies a foreign policy that stresses cooperation rather than material domination.

of a central current of Brazilian foreign policy and was given particular rhetorical centrality during Lula's administration. Besides his active foreign policy, Vizentini (2012) finds an analogous relationship between Lula's domestic efforts to decrease inequality and his foreign policy worldview, which "signal(ed) the construction of an alternative socio-economic model" (p. 25).

The term "Global South" is relatively recent in international relations, coming off the heels of the terms "Third World" (which was effectively retired following the end of the Cold War) and "developing nations" or "countries in development." According to Reveuny and Thompson (2007), the political etymology of the term can be found in a reevaluation of the East-West Cold War global geopolitical divide following the fall of the Berlin Wall. As this categorization became moot, political scientists, journalists and politicians reframed the international system into a new North-South divide that continued to allow for a neat and tidy break-down of global politics into "the rich countries of the center" and the "poor nations of the periphery." Although the geographic logic requires a great deal of generosity to be understood (New Zealand and Australia, "Northern" countries, are in the Southern hemisphere, for example), the "dichotomy works as long as no one assumes a high degree of homogeneity between the two zones" (REUVENY; THOMPSON, 2007, p. 557). Why use the word "global" in these terms? One explanation may originate in a simple need to distinguish between the regular geographic use of "North" and "South." But by calling the traditional set of countries that composed the "Third World" the "Global South," there is an implicit acknowledgement of the powerful interconnections of a newly globalized world economy that emerged with force in the 1990s. This, in part, delegitimizes the term "periphery" – in a globalized world, almost all countries will be integrated (to some degree) in world trade and political systems; the "global" of the

“Global South” means that developments in one part of the world are increasingly unlikely to be limited to the particular country or region in question. One need only to look to such recent events as the French invasion of Mali to understand how regional problems increasingly take on global attention. This interpretation of the “Global South” to denote a globalized world, however, does not necessarily support a line of argumentation that calls for the discarding of the terms based on their growing obsolescence - an argument that essentially claims that the North-South divide has no place in an international system so connected that all countries play some role in the “center.” While the terms may indeed fall out of use and become moot, their use here is a tacit acceptance of the basic economic and political inequalities in the world system.

Brazil’s current role in the Global South is most visible in its campaign to increase ties with Africa, which combines “ethics principles and national interests” (VIZENTINI, 2012, p. 25). This description succinctly merges Brazil’s normative power dimensions and its hard power ambitions in such that the two are mutually beneficial: such a strategy seems to suggest that Brazil can stand in a firm leadership position for the marginalized countries and work to increase development, economic strength and political autonomy (and thereby serving as a normative power) while also augmenting its trade and commercial capabilities and markets. This is especially true in the country’s new venture into Africa, where it has remarkably increased its on-the-ground presence (in both commercial and development aspects) and signed a number of trade pacts. During his presidency, Lula made 11 trips to Africa, visiting 29 countries. In 2003, Brazil hosted the Brazil-Africa Forum in Fortaleza, heralded as a landmark event to strengthen ties, an effort that would continue throughout Lula’s government. The Forum was followed by a trip to Angola, Mozambique, South

Africa, Namibia and São Tomé and Príncipe, where Lula brought with him a huge delegation of ministers, business representatives and social entrepreneurs. Brazil has also stressed in recent years a new mode of foreign aid based on South-South cooperation. While national interests are surely involved in the push for SSC, the expansion and attention given to this paradigm of aid, especially in Africa, is cohesive to the goals of the Global South and a desire to break free from the ideological and development constraints of the North-South paradigm. For Lula, the pomp and ceremony brought to his relations with African countries – which were often accompanied by a celebrity-like reception – was a way to signal a new prioritization of Africa, one that encompassed the goal of dignity and respect central to the Global South rhetoric. It is the rhetoric of the rising of a revived Global South, one of “anti-hegemonic coalitions in which Brazil and a number of African countries have been taking part in ” (SARAIVA, J., 2010, p. 181).

At the same time, however, there has been a growing ambiguity about Brazil's role in the Global South and its role as a member of the BRICS and IBSA country. The country's inclusion in the G-20, then, may have more to do with its large population and large GDP than recognition of the need to bring reform to global governance. This is seen in the common criticism of the G-20 as nearly an expansion of the private elite club, rather than a transformation for more inclusion. Despite Brazil's strong foreign policy attention on Africa, for example, there is only one African nation included in the G-20.

This is a critical ambiguity in Brazil's recent foreign policy, especially visible in the dual goals of United Nations Security Council reform and a permanent seat for the country on the SC. Does reform mean reform that favors Brazilian power projections

or is reform an end in and of itself? Speaking of the country's "non-campaign" for UNSC reform in the mid 1990s, João de Castro Neves points out, "O Brasil parecia oscilar entre o desejo de alterar significativamente a arrumação da mesa...e o anseio de apenas ganhar um assento na mesa principal" (2012, p. 249). Brazil's commitment to the Global South reforms, then, has not been a consistent driver of its foreign policy. It's fair to say, then, that its inclusion in the G-20 was based more on recognition of its status as an "emerging power" or BRICS country, rather than a historic leader of the Global South.

This growing vagueness between Brazil's role in the Global South and its BRICS and IBAS status sheds light on a crucial area of potential conflict in the country's quest for global player status. The goal of recognition for greatness has remained a steady influence on Brazilian foreign policy, but there remain various interpretations about a projection of national identity that reflects greatness. "It may be necessary to differentiate between asking for recognition for oneself...and asking for recognition in representation of others" (NOLTE, 2010, p. 900). This is a critical distinction that will be developed in the next section.

4.3 Interrole conflicts: the regional, South and global meet

The potential for interrole conflict is ripe for countries in transition and for countries that are seeking a larger role on the global scale. In this section, I will seek to analyze whether Brazil's regional and Global South roles contradict its stated goals and position within the G-20. Brazil's regional role will be represented by the country's activity in its various regional institutions, including Mercosur and UNASUL. Brazil's role in the Global South will be presented through its position in the WTO, the G-77

and the IMF, as well as its bilateral diplomatic relations.

4.3.1 The Regional and the Global: Conflict in the G-20?

The potential for interrole conflict is ripe between Brazil's global role and its regional role, as shown in the illuminating example of Brazil's bid for UN reform and Argentina's ensuing lack of support. While Brazil has maintained a role of "anti-hegemonic consensus builder" regionally, its neighbors have raised objections to its power projections on the global scale. In 2005, Argentinian President Nelson Kirchner summed up his dissatisfaction with Brazil's global ambitions: "There is a place in the WTO, Brazil wants it. There is a place in the UN, Brazil wants it. There is a place in the FAO, Brazil wants it. They even want to elect the pope" (SCHIRM, 2008, p. 8). Indeed, Brazil's goals on the international stage have been frustrated by impediments put forth by potential followers in its region, in particular Argentina. Argentina failed to support Brazil's bid to lead the WTO, a failure attributed by Schirm to an "amateur leadership" claim by Brazil, exacerbated by Argentinian mistrust about Brazil's intention to protect and represent its southern neighbor.

Here, then, we see a central ambiguity to the potential leveraging of the Brazilian regional position within international affairs and in its membership in the G-20. While Argentina has been shown to be quite reluctant to support a greater Brazilian position in the international sphere, its own inclusion in the G-20 has proved to be essential to Brazil's active role in the forum. By including Argentina, which had the lowest trade volume in 2012 of all member countries of the G-20, Brazil has been able to continue its role as a consensus hegemon, working in nominal partnership with Argentina in order to maintain strong ties with its southern neighbor. Despite Argentina's

demonstrations of a lack of support for Brazil's international ambitions, then, the G-20 has allowed the two neighboring countries to keep the spirit of the Copacabana Act alive, in which the countries pledged to consult one another within multilateral institutions, allowing the nations' history of rivalry to remain in the past and reaffirming its present partnership. Yet, Brazil's clear ambitions of recognition as a global player have complicated its ideational role and its policy goals within the G-20, increasing the potential for contradictions and conflicts with regional counterparts, as seen through the country's position and activity in the regional institutions of Mercosur and UNASUL.

Since 2008, Brazil's ideational role in regional integration has continued to stress consensus building, institutional strength, and common regional identity as necessary tools for Brazilian growth and the bloc's ability to ward off the negative effects of the Financial Crisis and globalization in general. The country has long been recognized as a driving force for the consistent strengthening of Mercosur capabilities. In 2012, President Dilma stressed the need to "perfect" the Structural Convergent Fund of Mercosur (Focem), recognizing the asymmetries within the region and asserting that the goal to eradicate developmental inequalities among Mercosur countries a function of the institution itself. This role goes hand in hand with the country's continued emphasis on a common South American identity and regional culture that can offset the negative cultural and commercial effects of both globalization and American influences in the region. While this rhetoric can be seen as a masking of Brazilian power ambitions, whereby integration becomes hijacked by a Brazilian project for international power, the strengthening of regional institutional powers, the heavy emphases on common goals and a common regional fate, and the prevalence of Mercosur, despite recent challenges, speaks to a regional role of consensus

builder. Central to this role has been a strong normative approach based on liberal ideals of democracy and a regional consolidation of resources to off-set negative influences of globalization (BURGES, 2008). Since the Lula government, Brazil has also sought to strengthen its role as cooperative leader by acting as a mediator and pacifier in regional disputes (GRATIUS, 2007). This is also contingent on an understated regional role, which allows for power-sharing. In 2008, UNASUL (Union of South American Nations) was created, with the objective of founding a new forum for dialogue between the twelve South American nations.

The goals of these foreign policy objectives can be described as attempts to further Brazil's project of regional consolidation that stresses cooperation while allowing Brazil to minimize its military weaknesses and maximize its ideational role. In 2008, Brazil proposed the creation of the Council of South American Defense, which seeks to bring about integration and exchange among the armed forces of the South American nations. These are policy goals that seek to strengthen South America as a "political and social forum," as Rubens Barbosa, the former Brazilian diplomat, termed it, rather than a bloc that singularly stresses free trade (*The Economist*, July 14, 2012). Largely, the economic and commercial policy goals have been replaced. In all member countries of the bloc, Mercosul trade has fallen in recent years relative to total trade. Recently, both Argentina and Brazil have reacted to slowing growth by imposing protectionist trade barriers, increasing the Mercosul slow-down.⁶⁴ Argentina's trade deterioration has resulted in a deficit of \$5.2 billion to Brazil and the country's import restrictions have affected various Brazilian industries, from footwear to pharmaceutical products (Inter-American Development Bank, Monthly Newsletter,

⁶⁴ Brazil's first-half 2012 exports to Argentina were down 15% on the same period in 2011.

April 2012). Trade, then, becomes minimized, a single tool towards furthering the overriding social and political Bolivarian goal of a united South America with the political strength to offset American influence and dependence (*The Economist*, July 14, 2012). See Graphic 5 below, which demonstrates falling trade within Mercosur relative to total:

Graphic 5: Mercosur Exports



Source: *The Economist*, "Mercosur RIP?," July 14, 2012.

The growing political purpose of Mercosur can be seen in the 2012 suspension of Paraguay and the subsequent inclusion of Venezuela in the bloc. Venezuela's full membership had long been held up by objections from Paraguay, whose 2012 constitutional coup was deemed incompatible with the bloc's commitment to democracy. Today, the economic benefits of full Venezuelan Mercosur participation have been decreased by the country's commitments to China and Russia (Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2012). Both Venezuela and Paraguay (expected to be reinstated to the bloc sometime in 2013) have presented Mercosur with political challenges, contributing to the transformation of the regional organization away from

its original commercial goals. The decision to invite Venezuela as a full member of the bloc – despite some members’ protests about the state of Chavista democracy – was a tacit approval of Chavez’s rhetoric of South America liberation through integration.⁶⁵ In this sense, Brazil’s policy goals that seek to strengthen the union have converged with its overall regional strategy and the goals of UNASUL. Because of the shift from economic to political goals, Brazil has been able to distance itself from Mercosur – and Argentina – in its bilateral, multilateral and institutional engagements with the rest of the world. In this way, the goal of a strong, integrated and institutionalized South American bloc can continue to be endorsed without the economic and political asymmetries with Brazil’s neighbors causing disruptive or conflict-driven regional relationships. Saraiva says, speaking about Brazil’s bilateral global trading partnerships, “De certa forma, os parceiros do Mercosul foram deixando de ter um peso relevante em negociações brasileiras com o exterior” (2012, p. 134).

In 2004, Celso Amorim, the Minister of Itamaraty at the time, declared,

“O fortalecimento de nossa coesão regional permite que nos façamos melhor ouvir nas negociações comerciais multilaterais, e que tenhamos maior impacto sobre o ordenamento internacional, com vistas a torná-lo mais democrático e equitativo. Nosso crescente entendimento com os parceiros do Mercosul e, em particular, com a Argentina – sócio estratégico privilegiado – tem tornado possível avançar nessa direção” (2004, p. 2).

While touching on the Southern goal of a more equitable system of global governance (to be discussed in the following section), Amorim explicitly acknowledges Brazil’s goal to use Mercosur as a springboard to increase its global profile. While rhetoric and policy stresses coordination and cooperation, then, it is not a regional secret that Brazil harbors greater global ambitions and that these

⁶⁵ The political fanfare that followed Chavez’s death in March 2013 included many of Latin America’s heads-of-state, among them Dilma and Cristina Kirchner.

ambitions are a central part of its regional strategy. Brazil's regional ideational role and policy goals has increasingly stressed the political power projection of a united South America with a common identity that increases the Brazilian profile on the world stage. While the country has not achieved unequivocal regional great power status, the inclusion of Argentina in the G-20 has permitted an exit for strong interrole conflict. Much of has been made of Argentina's lack of membership criteria in the G-20 due to its weak economy. Its continued inclusion in the forum, therefore, may be ensured only by Brazil's reaffirming of the value of Argentina as a confidant and ally in the international order. In this way, the clash between Brazil's continued emphasis on a South American *partnership* and its position in the G-20 escapes major interrole conflict. (This clash bubbled to the surface in Brazil's UNSC campaign and Kirchner's sarcastic "(Brazil) even wants to elect the pope" comment). While it may hurt its greater ambitions toward maximal global participation, the invitation of Argentina in the G-20 has avoided a major interrole conflict for Brazil within the forum.

4.3.2 The Southern and the Global: Conflict in the G-20?

While Brazil's regional delicacy has allowed it to avoid interrole conflict between its regional position and its role in the G-20, the country's historical endorsement of Global South policies are more explicitly paradoxical to the G-20. Brazil's traditional role as an outspoken member of the Global South dates back to the intellectual dominance of dependency theory and the center-peripheral description of world structure. While Brazil in recent years has pursued policies in conflict with the general goals of the Global South (again, the example of the recent campaign for a seat on the UNSC is illustrative: eventually, a group of over 40 countries objected to the G4 reform plan that would have given a seat to Japan, Germany, Brazil and India

by claiming that would increase the SC's "representativity" and "legitimacy" only marginally), roles and policies have often strongly emphasized the country's dedication to improving the social, political and economic conditions of the world's poorest countries while also embarking on high profile conditions of support for countries out of favor in the North (including Iran and Venezuela).

Thus, the ideational role of Brazil since 2008 within the Global South – represented through various institutional means (the commercial G-20, the G-77 and the G-24), as well as diplomatic actions – has drawn on the country's history of confrontational leadership. This has been bolstered by the country's actions during the World Trade Organization's 2003 negotiations in Cancun, where Brazil aggressively proposed new agriculture norms that would counteract the "autocratic international trade system" (as the Minister of Itamaraty at the time, Celso Amorim, termed it) and push toward a more equitable distribution of wealth globally. The resulting failure in negotiations cemented Brazil's leadership role in the Global South through "the inclusion of the economic interest of potential followers in a liberalization of the agricultural markets of the industrialized countries" and a "definition of the international situation shared by many potential followers by criticizing the asymmetrical international distribution of power" (SCHIRM, 2008, p. 11). In his *Conversas com jovens diplomatas*, Amorim prides himself on the enlarging of the negotiating table: "O reconhecimento de que uma mudança no tabuleiro das negociações havia ocorrido foi o mais importante de tudo o que aconteceu em Cancún" (2011, p. 160). At Cancun, Brazil saw itself as a shaker-and-mover. The old order "foi substituído...por um novo G-4, cujos núcleo passou a ser integrado por Estados Unidos, União Europeia, Brasil e Índia. Essa mudança não se deu somente

em virtude de o G-20⁶⁶ barrar um acordo negative, mas também da capacidade propositiva dos países em desenvolvimento” (p. 161). Brazil’s involvement, then, is termed as a gain for the developing country bloc. And while Brazil itself routinely implemented many of the trade liberalization practices that it campaigned against on behalf of the developing countries, Schirm (2008) points out how Brazil was able to avoid a interrole conflict during the Cancun round by remaining vague in its policy proposals on questions like tariffs, where its own policies diverged from other members of the commercial G-20. This was augmented by modest policy changes that subordinated the national goal of market access to the bloc’s collective goal of lower export subsidies by developed countries.

Within the G-77, Brazil continues to act as a leader for advancing policy goals. At the 40th anniversary of the group held in São Paulo in 2004, Minister Celso Amorim identified the basic principles of the group as,

the defense of multilateralism in the political and economic fields; the necessity to grant countries enough space to implement national policies vis-à-vis international commitments which are so often not established by ourselves; the search for more equitable rules in the international trading system; the reference to the importance of cooperation among developing countries (to be illustrated here by the launching of a new round of trade negotiations in the GSTP); and the treatment of questions of interest to a large number of countries, especially the least developed ones, such as the issue of cotton (AMORIM, 2004).

This role as “spokesperson for the interests of the South vis-a-vis the North and promoter of South-South alliances” is critically based on Brazil’s historical self-conception as mediator (GRATIUS, 2008, p. 7). Recently, this has been manifested in Brazil’s active participation in the subset G-77 groups, such as IBSA, BASIC and BRICS. While the relationship between the G-77 and these groups – which

⁶⁶ Here, the G-20 refers to the commercial G-20, not the financial G-20. The commercial G-20 is a sub-group within the World Trade Organization, established in August 2003 prior to the Cancun WTO Conference, that includes 23 developing nations, including Brazil. It emerged following a declaration signed by Brazil, India and South Africa lamenting trade inequalities and protectionist policies by developed nations.

represent a new group of emerging powers – may not be mutually beneficial (to be discussed further in this section), Hallding et al. identify these groups as generally furthering the goals of the Global South by making heard “the growing demands for a stronger say in world politics” (HALLDING et al., 2010, p. 4).⁶⁷

Within the IMF, Brazil has recently increased its profile by paying off its debts and acting as a spokesperson for smaller nations. In October 2012, Brazilian Minister of Finance Guido Mantega issued a statement on behalf of Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guyana, Haiti, Panama, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago where he strongly criticized measures taken in developing countries to offset the effects of the financial crisis, including austerity and protectionist measures. “It seems the harsh lessons of the financial crisis have gone unheeded,” Mantega declared, in a “shame on you” speech that rounded out Brazil’s role as defender of the poorer and more marginalized countries (MANTEGA, 2012). This same attitude has been reflected in the currency goals of the G-77 and the G-24 (a subset of the G-77, focused on development and finance issues, and composed of nine African countries, five Asian countries and eight Latin American countries), which has stressed the need to diversify currency reserves so “that the international currency better reflects current changes in the world economic geography” (G-24, April 2011). Concern about food and energy shortages is also a major policy area for developing countries.

⁶⁷ The overlapping between these groups can border on diplomatic theater that reflects on the not-quite stable institutionalization of emerging powers. As Hallding et al. say, “The amorphous and potentially overlapping nature of these groupings was illustrated in April 2010, when the IBSA and BRIC summits were scheduled back to back. First the IBSA leaders met and agreed to launch micro satellites for education, agriculture and weather. Then South Africa left the meeting, and China and Russia joined Brazil and India as BRIC to call for reform of the International Monetary Fund and World Bank and for G20 to assume leadership of the global economic order. After this, the meeting morphed into BASIC as Russia left, South Africa returned, and the discussions turned to climate change” (2010, p. 4).

Since the 2008 Financial Crisis, Global South policy goals have increasingly focused on regulation and reform of global economic and financial mechanisms. Brazil, whose own objectives in this area may be divergent, has also focused on the strengthening of South-South Cooperation models, institutionalizing new Southern multilateral forums, and finding a channel in major international affairs for new players. This last goal was most ostensibly visible during Brazil's joint effort with Turkey to negotiate a deal with Iran over its nuclear program. Diplomatic insertions like this one, however, beg a central question about Brazil's role within the Global South: do recent aggressions by BRICS countries, new multilateral forums like IBAS and plans to create a new BRICS development fund to rival the IMF and World Bank speak to a commitment to Southern policy goals or do they amount to a divergent model of international insertion that is exclusive to the new "emerging" economies? The example of Brazil's interference on the Iran issue is striking: while receiving a sharp scolding from the United States for meddling, the decision to act as a mediator between a maligned, rogue state in international order and the North was a logical next step in international insertion for Lula's government. Here, then, was a form of foreign policy continuity that stemmed from Brazil's decision never to become a full member of the Non-Aligned Movement – while it has seen itself as a spokesperson for the Global South, this has usually meant an intention to form a dialogued channel with the North and gaining recognition as a mediator between the two. As Vieira says, this is in line with "Brazil's longstanding goal of being recognized by the West, especially by the US, as a key country and a bridge between the North-South/East-West divides" (ALDEN et al., 2010, p. 19).

Within the G-20, Brazil's traditional role on Global South issues is confronted and

faces a potentially explosive interrole conflict. While its inclusion in the group does not *a priori* signal global player status, the G-20 as a club model of global governance in and of itself diverges from the primary Southern talking points of equitable representation and global governance legitimacy. Indeed, the risks of Brazil facing a major credibility failure with other members of the Global South were exacerbated by the country's acceptance of the G-20 as the premier international forum. The country's participation in the G-20 may be construed as an implicit acceptance of the club model of global governance structures, which would directly contradict the country's long campaign toward transparency, greater representation and democracy in global institutions. In this sense, Brazil's role in the G-20 is contrasted with its active position in the UN and traditional role of reformist. Brazil seems cognizant of potentially being construed as hypocritical; the country has begun a habit of reporting the discussions within the G-20 to the UN General Assembly to better increase the group's transparency and give access to the content of summits to non-member countries (MILANI, 2012). And while Minister Mantega's leadership of the IMF has involved much criticism of American and European fiscal policy, within the G-20 Brazil has been an active upholder of the IMF, pledging more than \$10 billion in aid.

Moreover, although the G-20 has expressed a rhetorical commitment to correcting market inequalities and tightening regulation, the minimal progress that has been achieved reflects on Brazil's active role within the institution. Regardless of Brazil's posture toward specific financial policies (to be discussed in the following section), the country's inclusion in the G-20 brings to the forefront a role conflict not dissimilar to the diplomatic firestorm set-off by the country's latest campaign for a permanent seat on the UNSC. These actions work to undermine the country's legitimacy as a

leader or spokesperson of under-franchised nations – a grievance that brings coherence to the Global South and the G-77 as a group. This is an interrole conflict that can either be smoothed over or exacerbated by the new institutional forums of the rising economies. Do the new BRICS institutions and bilateral agreements between BRICS countries serve as a springboard for structural global governance reform or are they self-serving power projections that signal status quo global players to make room at the table? In a paradoxical way, then, recognition as an emerging player may force a violent bubbling to the surface of the country's role conflicts. Again, the De Castro Neves quote is pertinent enough to warrant a repetition: “O Brasil parecia oscilar entre o desejo de alterar significativamente a arrumação da mesa...e o anseio de apenas ganhar um assento na mesa principal” (2012, p. 249). Brazil's conflict between its role as a member of the G-20 and its historic role as a spokesperson of the Global South shows the lasting ambivalence between these two objectives.

4.4 Brazil at the table: G-20 Policy Agenda

Questions of legitimacy add to the conceptual perception of the G-20 as just the newest version of the club model of global governance, whereby a privileged and private membership system continues to exert an oligarchic control over non-represented peoples and governments, a claim that was reverberated in French scholar Bertrand Badie's assessment that, “Le G20 est un club de nouveaux riches qu'on invite pour le café du G-8” (BADIE, 2011). In this sense, no matter what degree of legitimacy is afforded to the group, it continues to represent an “entrance” by the member countries to an elite group of power within global governance. It is in this context that Brazil's role within the G-20 gains a symbolic importance. The country's

inclusion in this club, then, can be seen as a long-awaited gesture of recognition, even if a muted and understated one. This was enhanced by the country's elevated status in the group and its inflated leadership role following the Financial Crisis, leading to an increase in its global profile and the claims of having (finally) reached "global player" status.

While the original goals of the G-20 were limited to financial reform, the importance of the group within Brazil's greater foreign policy goes well beyond a strict definition of monetary and banking policies. Starting in 1999, Brazil's relationship with the G-20 was placed under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance in light of the MRE's more limited role in financial foreign policy following the country's economic turbulence at the end of the decade. Yet, with the transformation of the group into a heads-of-state summit institution, the G-20 and its policies took on a more principal role within the country's overall strategy for global insertion and foreign policy. This was, of course, augmented by the global importance of the 2008 Financial Crisis; the shocks caused to the global financial system, combined with fears of a deeper global recession, resulted in a period of strong governmental focus on financial policies. At this same time, the G-20's decision to take on a larger role in global governance has already expanded its role beyond the financial forum.⁶⁸

Brazil's current of pragmatism within Itamaraty – a model based on Rio Branco's paradigm for achieving recognition as a global player – has stressed a belief that reform can be best be achieved by gaining a seat at the table, to echo the De Castro

⁶⁸ At the G-20 Summit in Seoul in November 2011, the G-20 began to officially discuss questions of development, which covered a large range of the issues involved, including infrastructure, climate change, poverty reduction, water availability, labor conditions, agriculture and increasing the efficacy of aid. See KUMAR, 2010.

Neves quote, which succinctly describes the conflict over international insertion strategy between the MRE's brand of pragmatists and autonomists. In his November 2008 speech to the finance ministers of the G-20, Lula stressed a Rio Branco pragmatism, speaking to the North's responsibility of reform and fair global governance while emphasizing that Brazil be recognized for its capabilities and its willingness to sit down at the negotiating table. During this speech, Lula makes an unambiguous call for change, targeting the arrogance of developed countries:

A crise nasceu nas economias avançadas. Ela é consequência da crença cega na capacidade de auto-regulação dos mercados e, em grande medida, na falta de controle sobre as atividades de agentes financeiros. Por muitos anos especuladores tiveram lucros excessivos, investindo o dinheiro que não tinham em negócios mirabolantes. Todos estamos pagando por essa aventura. Esse sistema ruiu como um castelo de cartas... (SILVA, 2008).

Lula's framing of the Financial Crisis as an opportunity for transformation in the system of global governance was topped off by his declaration that the inclusion of emerging markets at the table would serve to assure stability and lay the groundwork for a return of financial prosperity:

A contribuição dos países emergentes é também essencial. Precisamos de uma nova governança, mais aberta e participativa. O Brasil está pronto a assumir sua responsabilidade. Esta não é a hora de nacionalismos estreitos, de soluções individuais. É hora de um pacto entre governos para a criação de uma nova arquitetura financeira mundial, capaz de promover segurança e desenvolvimento em bases equitativas para todos (SILVA, 2008).

Later, Lula pleads for transparency: "É imperioso aumentar a transparência com novos mecanismos universais de revisão de políticas domésticas para os mercados financeiros. Afinal, é a vida de seres humanos que está em jogo!" (SILVA, 2008). Thus, in rhetoric, the ascension of the G-20 in global governance and Brazil's participation in the forum was framed as the overdue fulfillment of a structural change in the economic rules set by an elite group of countries – a change that Brazil signaled it would fight for at the table.

Yet Brazil's policy goals and policy achievements within the G-20 since 2008 may be a better measure of whether Brazil's historic quest for recognition as a global player encompasses recognition on behalf of others, too. As Nolte says, the G-20 provides a channel for understanding if Brazil is "really interested in changing the hierarchical norms and practices of international society, or whether (it's) just interested in joining the hierarchical top" (2012, p. 900). In other words, now that Brazil is at the table, has policy shifted to indicate an acceptance of status quo rules or does reform of the status quo remain a central policy goal? Policy can help clear up the "juxtaposition between active participant in the globalization of the world economy, and, at the same time, vocal critic of the established international hierarchy" (ALDEN et al., 2010, p. 129). The decisions made in the G-20 and role of Brazil in forming them is a clear indicator of how – and if – Brazil will choose to resolve its interrole conflict. Valladão (2012) points out,

On one hand, (Brazil is) pushing for being recognized as equal partners at the highest levels of the present international decision-making apparatus. On the other hand, (it) reject(s) the idea of being constrained by this same apparatus since it could become a drag on (its) 'national' rise to power – the argument being that they cannot be committed by rules or an order created by others before they got involved. This tension is clearly apparent in the G-20 process (2012, p. 4).

The policies that have come out of the G-20 do not necessarily reflect international identity. As analyzed in chapter 2, identity involves a social process of norms, beliefs and roles that may not align completely with specific policy or foreign policy behavior. Within a given institution, however, policy endorsements and preferences are a compelling indication of priorities (priorities that, at times, may reveal role conflicts or contradictions). It is not surprising, then, given the potential for a disruptive interrole conflict between its role as leader of the Global South and its political rise, that – in policy – Brazil has followed an ambivalent, non-committal, "wait and see" strategy based on a concept of pragmatism modeled after the Rio Branco ideal of

international insertion. In this way, as Lins and Silva (2011) point out, Brazil has avoided overt identification with the BRICS' or traditional Global South demands. These authors identify Brazil's position within the G-20 as "neither antagonistic, nor that protagonist," drawing on Brazil's policy of staking out a middle ground. This does not mean that Brazil has taken a backseat in negotiations. Indeed, it has been an active participant in all G-20 summits since 2008, with specific policy proposals and demands. During the Washington, November 2008 G-20 summit, where heads-of-state gathered as the Financial Crisis continued to unfold, Brazil made a stubborn push for reform of the Bretton Woods institutions without necessarily employing the divisive North-South language or rancorous calls of power grabbing on behalf of developed countries. This position, however, was subordinated to the overall tone of crisis and financial panic that forced all member countries to make forceful pledges to "enhance cooperation and work together to restore growth and achieve needed reforms in the world's financial systems." The official communiqué also included a clause asserting that, "emerging and developing countries, including the poorest countries, should have greater voice and representation" (G-20 COMMUNIQUE, November 2008). During the April 2009 London Summit Conference, Lins and Silva (2011) identify the Brazilian position as "cooperative," with commitments to the IMF and insertion of language referring to emerging markets that complemented the communiqué's declarations of the need for greater financial institutional strength. This Summit resulted in the creation of new institutionalized bodies to ensure financial stability, including the Financial Stability Board (an expansion of the Financial Stability Forum) and the Basel-III regulations. During the three summits that followed, Brazil began to take more specific policy positions, especially on exchange rate and regulation questions. During the Pittsburgh September 2009 Summit, the official communiqué stated a need to not "resort to financial protectionism or any

measure constraining international capital flows” (G-20 COMMUNIQUE, September 2009), a declaration that came at least partly of a result of Brazil’s expression of concern of exchange rate imbalances, a sensitive area of financial regulation that would come to be a principal aspect of the Brazilian position within the G-20.

The June 2010 Summit in Toronto gave greater momentum to a united BRICS position against further banking taxes, while Brazil again raised concerns about currency and the Chinese position. This rhetoric came to the surface with Brazilian Minister of Finance Mantega warning of “currency wars” between emerging and developed countries, a warning that was reiterated during the Seoul November 2010 Summit meeting. In 2011, the heads-of-state summit meetings shifted from being held twice yearly to annually. The follow-up to Seoul was held a full year later, in November 2011 in Cannes, France. The Cannes meeting sought to continue broadening the G-20 agenda from “crisis committee” to “steering committee,” including measures like anti-corruption and food security in its official communiqué. The 2011 meeting also put the issue of a financial tax on the table. As Cooper (2012) points out, however, the momentum toward becoming a broadened forum for different issues of global governance began to stall as financial questions, specifically related to the Euro crisis, continued to hold precedence.⁶⁹ Brazil continued to stress its own macroeconomic stability by pledging to keep its interest rates low and maintain stabilizing macro-financial policies. Brazil decided that it would not support the EU by buying EU bonds, and would contribute only through the IMF, a decision later repeated by Russia and India (PEREIRA, 2011). Brazil also sought to put a

⁶⁹ Cooper cites the wide expansion of the G-20 agenda during the Cannes summit as contributing to the group’s lack of credibility and efficiency. “So many items were on the agenda that very little was accomplished.” These included food security, IMF reform, assistance to the poor, anti-corruption, among others. See COOPER, 2012.

more ambitious social agenda on the G-20 negotiating table, based on its domestic program of Bolsa Família, and warned Europe and America against turning its back on their countries' poorest. The 2012 Summit was held in Los Cabos, Mexico – the first time that the G-20 was hosted by a developing country. The EU Crisis, and specifically Greece, remained the center of attention and pledges were made to strengthen banking and financial architecture in Europe, including further commitments to the IMF (PREYMA, 2012). The 2012 summit was held on the heels of the Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, emboldening Brazil's presence. As they did for the first time in Cannes, the BRICS countries held a private summit prior to the G-20 heads-of-state meeting, this time delivering a press statement which pledged solidarity with Europe while finding common ground between the five countries, including exploring options for currency reserve pooling and declaring that the "process of informal consultations on the sidelines of multilateral events was valuable and contributed to closer coordination on issues of mutual interest to BRICS economies" (KIRTON; BRACHT, 2012).

These policy analyses illustrate Brazil's commitment to several areas of concern. The basic starting point of Bretton Woods reform was addressed by the creation of the Basel regulations and the Financial Stability Board. Yet, the fact that many countries have yet to implement the Basel-II regulations⁷⁰ reveal these reforms as modest and shallow changes that have failed to bring about any fundamental transformation of the way the international financial system is run and held accountable. Moreover, Brazil's reiteration of support, in policy and rhetoric, for the IMF served to steady a major financial pillar of the Bretton Woods regime (one that

⁷⁰ By the spring 2012, Argentina, Mexico, Russia, Indonesia, Turkey and the United States had yet to include Basel-II regulations in their banking systems. Basel-III went into effect on January 1, 2013. See PREYMA, 2012.

had long been cast as antagonistic to Brazilian interests, as elaborated upon in the first chapter of this thesis). The Brazilian financial system was highly regulated prior to the crisis (a result of years of confidence-building measures); it has typically pushed for regulations similar to its own to be adopted as the international norm, without leveraging further taxes or restrictive regulations on its own banks. Lins and Silva (2011) pinpoint Brazil's main national interest as exchange rate reform, specifically a modest depreciation of the dollar, one that would allow for it to "diversify opportunities for gains" without severely damaging international reserves. On the issue of currency, Brazil continues to play a middle ground between its BRICS status, its commitment to reform and its own interests. After its warning of "currency wars," Brazil gained a small victory in the Seoul Communiqué that declared that developing countries had the right to adopt policies to impede the effects of "competitive devaluations." China has objected to implications that its undervalued currency has been a culprit in financial instability and, while Brazil backed the Chinese position for greater regulation in developed countries, the currency issues has revealed a major rift between the two countries.⁷¹

The sparring over currency has shown the differences between the BRICS countries, as well as the divide between developing and developed countries. A 2010 CINDES (Centro de Estudos de Integração e Desenvolvimento) study claims that Brazil, China and India are united in their "common platform for increased participation in

⁷¹ China has sought to leverage criticism about its overvalued currency to bring attention to the use of the dollar as international currency, an issue that Brazil agrees with. Both countries, as well as Russia, have recently indicated that they would like to develop the use of Single Drawing Rights (SDRs) as countries' reserve currency, which is a basket currency composed of the dollar, the euro, the yen and the pound. Many steps would have to be taken, however, before the SDRs can be used as reserve currency. The coordination between Brazil and China on currency remains for the most part rhetorical. While the two countries announced that they would like to find ways to avoid using the dollar in bilateral trade, Eichengreen (2009) points out that "the statement was mainly a way to advertise the extent of their trade. What use would most Brazilian firms have for renminbi when these cannot be converted into reais?" See EICHENGREEN, 2009.

international decision-making, and in the construction of a new international architecture, with more democratic, representative, and legitimate structures of global governance” (p. 18). Yet within the five main issue areas that the study identifies as central to the G-20 agenda, Brazil, China and India hold divergent positions on three of them. See Graphic 6 below.

Graphic 6: BRAZIL, INDIA AND CHINA'S POSITIONS ON KEY G-20 ISSUES

| ISSUE | SUMARIZED POSITION |
|--|--|
| Recovery and Global Imbalances | Divergent interests: Brazil and India have been negatively affected by the Yuan appreciation, but they have avoided putting pressure on China overtly. |
| Reform of the International Financial Sector | Moderately convergent: the BICs are united in calling for reform of the international financial system, but there are important differences in the details, reflecting differences in their national financial systems. |
| Reform of International Financial Institutions | Convergent: they are united in demanding quota, voice and governance reforms. |
| Climate Change | Divergent interests, but convergent positions in the G-20: they have very different energy matrix, divergent interests, but the three have been trying to present common positions. Brazil has recently moved to a more “progressive” approach. They prefer to hold climate change negotiations at the UN forum, instead of moving this agenda to the G-20. |
| Global Trade | Divergent interests, attempts to coordinate positions: they have been trying to coordinate at the G-20 for trade, but they blew the coalition when they faced the Lamy Package (July, 2008). |

Source: CINDES

Thus, despite efforts like the BRICS meetings prior to the G-20 summits, the only issue on which the BRICS countries converge naturally (without negotiation to come to a common position) is the need to increase their own “slice of the pie” within global governance institutions. As this happens, and this point of convergence becomes obsolete, it will become more probable that the commitment to the bloc becomes weaker. Furthermore, growing policy rifts on questions like currency between BRICS countries has weakened this point already, allowing for a de-facto return to the G-7 status quo, albeit with more countries at the table. In a study done by Martinez-Diaz (2007), G-7, G-24 and G-20 official summit communiqués from 1999 to 2007 are contrasted to determine to what extent the G-24, developing country agenda was incorporated into the G-20. The result revealed an almost complete dominance by the G-7 within the G-20 up until that point, which was reflected in the G-20 agenda nearly twice as often as the G-24 was. While many predicted that the Financial Crisis and the ascent of the G-20 would change that, Brazil’s middle ground approach has demonstrated a type of pragmatism that has allowed for only modest gains for developing countries. Despite Brazil’s expression over certain areas of concern (many of which have gone unheeded), it has been aligned to the overall agenda of the G-20, a reflection of the country’s commitment to the forum as the premier global governance institution.

The modesty of Brazil’s policy goals and its conciliatory tone suggests a more pragmatic and liberal realist policy, whereby Brazil seems much more willing to work with the countries of the North than earlier rhetoric would have led one to believe. This position echoes Lula’s strategy of integrating a conciliatory policy toward the IMF into his government, despite a history of torrent criticism toward the Fund. Seeking to reconcile these different views, Lula sought to take on a “transformist”

position in regards to Bretton Woods institutions (ALMEIDA, 2008) that would find consensus and uphold stability while bringing about reforms from the inside-out in order to cause foundational changes to the international order. In the April 2009 meeting of the G-20, the group made a \$750 billion dollar pledge to revitalize the IMF, \$250 billion of which came from developing countries for short-term relief. Such a commitment by Lula was particularly telling. His candidacy in 2002 and his first administration were marked by a hostile relationship with the IMF; this was replaced by a pragmatic conciliation justified in his 2002 “Letter to the Brazilian people,” in which he promised to make good on the Brazilian debt to the organization. The complete repayment of Brazilian debt to the IMF in 2005 was heralded by the Lula government as a major liberation from the control of the international economic regime run out of Washington.⁷² Lula’s willingness, then, to produce \$10 billion to guarantee the survival of the IMF represents a huge turnaround. This commitment (more than 5% of the country’s international reserves) was explained to the Brazilian people as a way to increase Brazil’s weight within the organization and increase pressure for democratic voting reform. Yet Lula’s dedication to the Fund was questioned in light of the country’s problems of inequality, infrastructure and persistent poverty, while the IMF itself was struggling to retain legitimacy and relevance as a principal global governance mechanism. As Gonçalves (2009) points out, calls for the closing of the IMF have not been relegated to the periphery – Edward Prescott, a Nobel Prize winner, has urged a transfer of the IMF funds away

⁷² In 2005, Minister Palocci said: “É com grande satisfação, que em nome do Presidente Lula, comunico nesse momento ao povo brasileiro um fato da maior relevância. Depois de tantos e tantos anos dependendo dos empréstimos do Fundo Monetário Internacional, nosso País, finalmente, tem conseguido equilibrar as suas contas e sua balança de pagamentos, colocando a sua economia em ordem, e não mais precisando da ajuda do FMI. Nessa próxima quinta-feira, dia 31 de março, se encerra o nosso último compromisso. E já informamos ao Fundo que ele não será renovado. Não poderíamos, entretanto, jamais deixar de reconhecer a grande importância da ajuda do FMI em momentos muito difíceis da história do nosso País. Mas era fundamental, para o crescimento do Brasil, fortalecer a nossa economia, superando esse longo ciclo de dependência financeira, para seguir o nosso destino, que é o de ser uma grande e forte nação” (MILANI, TUDE 2012, p.10).

from governmental control and to the World Development Fund, and there have been widespread calls within the economic mainstream for major reform or a complete rupture with the IMF system. Brazil's long and often painful relationship with the IMF entered a new phase with Lula's support and financial commitment to upholding and strengthening the institution.⁷³

Taken together, the policy reforms that have resulted from the G-20 summits since 2008 have been modest. There exists a growing belief that that the changes agreed upon are too weak to cause any real changes in the international financial regime. Dailami and Masson (2009) conclude that the new institutions that came out of the G-20, particularly the Financial Stability Board, do not have the governance capabilities to make any lasting or effective reform to international financial policy. Moreover, the adoption of Basel-III has yet to produce any major changes in banking regulations (VESTERGAARD, 2011).⁷⁴ Brazil's role in the G-20 policy reforms has revealed a strategic pragmatism that stresses consensus and cooperation with the great powers, a foreign policy that draws from Rio Branco's playbook in which a strategic alliance with privileged countries and within existing power structures are preferred to a position of criticism of the system as a whole. In the G-20, Brazil has put aside much of the divisive North-South discourse of its outsider, universalist and autonomist stance. Following the 2008 crisis, Brazil found itself an insider, in a strategic position of power, as a member of the same exclusive club of power it had long criticized.

⁷³ According to Gonçalves (2009), Brazil paid \$7.6 billion to the IMF from 1985 to 2010; Lula was responsible for almost half of those payments.

⁷⁴ The new international banking stipulations under Basel-III are slated to go into a phased effect between 2015 and 2019. Many fear that interest and public attention will have been diverted at that point, allowing for lax enforcement and loose adherence. Moreover, before the Seoul Summit that produced the agreement, twenty top financial professors sent a memorandum to the governmental leaders, urging them against the new regulations for failing to "eliminate key structural flaws in the system." See ADMATI et. al, 2010.

4.5 Is Brazil a Global Player?

To what degree, then, does Brazil's inclusion and position within the G-20 signal a projection of a new national role conception for the country? Do potential role conflicts signal a transition to a new international identity based on recognition of Brazil as a global player? Does the country's policy goals within the G-20 portray a country that has entered the global elite? Global player status integrates the concept of middle and great powers,⁷⁵ and thus encompasses, but does not necessarily stand as an umbrella concept for, the qualities involved with regional power or leadership.⁷⁶ For purposes of this research, being a global player means "formal recognition" plus "observable repercussions on the operation of the international system" (NOLTE, p. 887). Global player status seeks to go beyond the conceptual hierarchy of "superpower," "great power," "middle powers" and "small powers." Great powers are usually defined by natural conditions and material capability, which encompass large populations, large territories and natural resources as well as a sizeable GDP, military capacity and technological potential (GRATIUS, 2007). Great powers have traditionally demonstrated strong hard power capacities, while middle powers may hold many of the same characteristics but with a dramatic reduction in hard power capabilities. Brazil, with its population of over 190 million, its enormous land mass and its abundance in natural commodities, possesses many great power qualities, but has historically opted for shoring up its soft power capabilities rather than flexing

⁷⁵ Nolte distinguishes between traditional middle powers and new middle powers. New middle powers are "first and foremost, regional powers (or regional leaders), and, in addition, middle powers (with regard to their power resources) on the global scale" (2010, p. 890). Middle powers, then, do not necessarily hold the regional responsibilities that regional powers do. Nolte, here, cites Canada and the Netherlands as examples of these "traditional middle powers." While the distinction between the two types of powers is certainly quite important in creating an IR typology, this article concerns itself with the transition between regional powers and global player status.

⁷⁶ This does not necessarily mean that there is only one global player per region or one regional leader – as can be easily seen in the case of Europe, which, with its particular characteristics and high regional integration, is usually exempt from analyses of regional hierarchies.

its muscles through the military. Global player status, unlike the difference between middle and great powers, does not put as heavy an emphasis on the distinction between soft and hard power, preferring to understand international order through the influencing capabilities – be they political, diplomatic, economic, cultural or military.⁷⁷

While Brazil has not gained hegemonic regional power status, its “power sharing” capabilities with Argentina within the region have allowed the country to avoid regional tensions and identity conflicts within the G-20. Much more interrole tension can be found in Brazil’s intention to defend Global South interests and the developing/emerging country agenda. While Brazil’s position on financial policy has sought common ground with fellow BRICS, rifts among the bloc are more apparent once rhetoric and discourse are parsed. At the G-20 table, Brazil is increasingly a representative of its own national interests, rather than those of other historically peripheral countries, including Russia, China, India and South Africa. Has the G-20 offered a setting for socialization processes to take place, effectively initiating Brazil as a major global player at the negotiating table with “insider” interests and policy preferences? Valladão seems to think so: The G-20’s

main utility today (and maybe it was the underlying intention all along) is to transmute the new unruly emerging players into willing stakeholders of the present global liberal order, by progressively integrating their leaderships into its canons and preventing disruptive go-it-alone initiatives. A kind of Western-led initiatory apprenticeship for the newcomers (2012, p. 4).

This is a precise description of the processes of norm transfer analyzed in the preceding chapter’s examination of socialization-led identity transformation. In this view, the shift from the G-8 to the G-20 as the premier global governance forum was

⁷⁷ In many ways, the concepts of middle and great powers is distinct from the earlier discussion of regional powers. For example, India is considered a great power in global affairs, but regionally, it is overshadowed by China as a regional power. Canada is considered a middle power, but does not hold regional leadership.

a strategic move to draw emerging countries to the negotiating table in a way that would not result in any underlying tectonic shifts of global power. While the number of global stakeholders may be increasing, the focal points of power, agenda-setting and policy decisions remain relatively stable. In this way, the G-20 has provided a forum for altercasting, in which Brazil, as a novice member, is given a prescribed role that involves behavior expectations. The degree to which these expectations are made explicit is unclear, but as Thies (2009) points out, socialization and altercasting leave little room for doubt about prescribed roles and behaviors.

Global player status indicates this insider role. While it is plausible that Brazil gains recognition as a global player in a way that sets into course – or results from – a dramatic decline in the traditional soft and hard power of the G-8 members (and particularly the United States), the modest reforms that have emerged from the G-20 indicate that this is not the case, for now. Brazil's pragmatism and middle ground within the G-20 indicate a revitalization of the Rio Branco model of international insertion within this forum of global governance. This strategic positioning – which seems to contradict much of Brazilian rhetoric as a member of the BRICS and much of its foreign policy of the past decade – may be a result of a tacit acknowledgment of Brazil's need to draw on its soft-power. While Brazil is the world's sixth largest economy, its share of commerce and global trade is still relatively low. Moreover, Brazil is not a military power and its decision to adhere to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty makes it the only non-nuclear BRICS member. As the concept of smart power becomes increasingly relevant, however, Brazil's lack of military might is increasingly unproblematic. Smart power, which underscores where, how, through what means and through which symbols of power are transmitted, is highly compatible with Brazil's vision of world politics; economic and military power are

important, but only as far as their normative and ideational aspects are accepted by the international community. While this does not necessarily settle the policy disputes of the status quo that are disadvantageous to Brazil, it indicates that the country understands that traditional manifestations of power may be susceptible to long-term change. Brazil stands ready to take advantage of such changes.

Andrew Hurrell states,

Understanding the role of status concerns is extremely important in terms of emerging powers – in terms of motivation and the potential drivers of foreign policy, in terms of the priorities given to particular aspects of foreign policy (especially the balance between seeking membership and recognition on the one hand as against immediate material interest on the other); and in terms of the strategies chosen and the sorts of power resources deployed. Status matters not primarily in terms of power rankings but in terms of membership (2010, p. 4).

Brazil has gained membership in the post-Crisis club of global governance. And while the reforms made to the global financial system have been modest, Brazil has been more aggressive in asserting its national interests, rather than acting as a representative and/or leader for regional or Global South interests. This certainly signals a rise in status and influence, where global scale insertion strategy no longer finds itself completely on other-scale power-leveraging – instead of speaking for others, its own voice is loud enough. And while Brazil has not been a non-status quo leader within the club, the hypothesis that this is a failing of the G-20 itself must be addressed. Several scholars have argued that the G-20 – and the G model of global governance itself – is not equipped to confront the crises and instabilities of the financial system, let alone other daunting global challenges like climate change.

Regardless of the G-20's potential shortcomings in effectively addressing the most pressing global issues, the group remains the foremost global governance structure, at least for the time being. Within the G-20, Brazil is a major participant but the country may still be deciding whether its role expectations via socialization and

altercasting in the G-20 process are ascribed or achieved. If ascribed, the temporality and passing relevance of the G-20 may allow for the country to continue balancing its various roles, regionally, globally and among developing countries. If the G-20 role becomes achieved, it will hold strong influence within all scales of foreign policy behavior, prompting a role adjustment, especially within the country's traditional role as a spokesperson for the Global South. The "achieved role" of a global player, as embodied by the G-20 process, then, may result in a gradual diminishment of the autonomous, universalist paradigm within Itamaraty that has stressed regional integration and ties with the developing world as central to international insertion. "Achieving" the role put forth through the socialization processes of the G-20 may signal a steady reincorporation of Rio Branco's model of greatness.

Thus, Brazil's entrance in the G-20 is not sufficient to signal achievement of global player status as an insider within contemporary international relations as a whole. Brazil has not yet "achieved" such a role outside of the G-20 forum, as it continues to pursue a policy agenda that, in part, promotes its role as a leader of the Global South without taking too aggressive a position regionally or internationally. Brazil has continued to follow a strategic, cautious middle path of normative and soft power that stresses cooperation, partnerships and negotiation, choosing to avoid alienating the great powers but risking jeopardizing its potential for global player status. Yet, if the idea of smart power continues to gain traction within international relations, Brazil may find that its current strategy for international insertion – the stress on liberal pragmatism in certain forums like the G-20 and a more autonomist focus in other institutions, like the G-77 – more valued than it appears to be now. In today's globalized world, where a poor, isolated country like North Korea has the capability

for developing nuclear weapons, traditional military hard power is becoming increasingly subservient to the way that the power is deployed. Normative and civil power, whereby states are able to gain influence through their ideational roles and international identity, may prove to be more important than sheer military and economic capacity in the 21st century. Brazil seems posed for such a possibility, but until then, it remains a step away from global player status.

CONCLUSION

This research began with the hypothesis that Brazil's international identity projections include some degree of interrole conflict; put more colloquially, that the country is ripe for an international identity crisis. In many ways, Brazil seems more fit for an ascension in global politics now than it has ever had in the history of the country, and such optimism can be felt in a sense of inevitability of change in world power dynamics. President Obama himself echoed such a feeling in March 2012 when he announced, while speaking in Rio de Janeiro, that, "this is a country of the future no more" (Bloomberg, 2011). Brazil's strong economic performance since 2002, its stable macro-political outlook and democratic institutions, its successful social programs that have lifted 20 million out of poverty and into the "C" class,⁷⁸ and its growing international clout – best represented by the awarding of the 2014 World Cup and 2016 Olympic Games to Brazil – beg the question whether Brazil has finally achieved the recognition for being a global player that it has strove for since Rio Branco. The country's strong tradition of multilateralism and active participation in global institutions were reaffirmed by the country's entrance in the G-20;⁷⁹ as the leading forum of global governance, the G-20 can be understood as a social institution where international identity and roles are projected and shaped. The status of global player, then, can be examined from within the workings of the G-20.

⁷⁸ In Brazil, class is quantifiably measured by income; class ranges from A (upper) to E (lower) class. The "C" class designates what is termed the "middle class" in the United States. Recently, the office of the Secretary of Strategic Issues to the President (SAE/PR) determined that the term middle class be used to speak to those whose per capita income fall within the 34 to 82 percentile, or R\$291 to R\$1,1019 family per capita income per month. In this formulation, those belonging to Class "C" were termed to be either "vulnerable" or "lower middle class." See Secretária de Assuntos Estratégicos da Presidência da República, 2012.

⁷⁹ Brazil is currently awaiting the results of the selection process for the next Director General of the World Trade Organization. Nine candidates were nominated in January; Brazil's candidate, Roberto Carvalho de Azevêdo, has reached the last round of the process, competing against only Herminio Blanco from Mexico. If elected, Azevêdo will serve a four-year term and effectively magnify Brazil's position within the WTO.

The second chapter of this research presented Brazil's historical foreign policy background, giving preference to the salience of the search for recognition on the global stage during the past century. Two main currents of foreign policy were examined, the liberal pragmatism of Rio Branco and the universalist-autonomist current. Both these paradigms have sought to increase Brazil's role in international affairs, but each has stressed a different strategy for international insertion. Generally speaking, liberal pragmatism has been much more receptive to status quo power dynamics and has focused on tactical alliances with major powers. The universalist camp has tended to understand the world system through a North-South prism, taking on a reformist, critical stance of the international system. An oscillation between these two currents has shaped Itamaraty up until the present day, but both currents understand multilateralism as central to any Brazilian foreign policy and both see an elevated position for regional integration efforts. The chapter concludes with an appraisal of Brazilian foreign policy since Lula and concludes that, although Lula and Dilma have followed many policy agenda guidelines associated with the autonomist camp, both have proven to be receptive to the liberal, pragmatist model of foreign policy. This has been especially true within the G-20.

Chapter 3 of this research examined the theoretical underpinnings of constructivism and theory of recognition, role theory, status, respect and identity in international relations, giving special attention to the potential for interrole conflict and the process of socialization within social environments. These theories derive from a basic starting point of social interactionism, whereby identity is the result of a co-constitutive, dialectic and dynamic process between actors. This is a conceptualization of the theory of recognition as a central, but little-understood, mechanism of international relations. Interrole conflict, whereby the potential for

gaps or contradictions in actor's multiple roles in different social environments, is described. Socialization processes, whereby newcomers to a given environment are assigned a role which is then either ascribed (assumed temporarily and only in the given environment) or achieved (integrated into the agent's identity), is understood to be an important aspect of how states interact with each other in institutions. Respect, status and identity derive from these theories and are explained to be extremely influential on states' foreign policy behavior. The final section of the chapter applies these concepts to the club model of international affairs, where roles, recognition, respect, status and identity are all major components of a global governance structure that is founded on exclusivity.

Chapter 4 applies these theories to a scaled-approach analysis of Brazil's current foreign policy with its entrance in the G-20 as a focal point. The country's roles regionally and within the Global South are analyzed for the potential of interrole conflict vis-à-vis its position in the G-20. It is concluded that Brazil has managed to avoid conflict between its regional role and its G-20 role through a delicate maintenance of a strong partnership with Argentina that stresses co-action and cooperation, a strategy made possible because of Argentina's own membership in the G-20. There is much more potential for an eruption of interrole conflict between the country's role in the Global South and the G-20, however. Outside of the G-20, Brazil continues to act as a leader of the Global South, calling for greater representation in global governance structures and applying a North-South rhetorical framework to its agenda in Africa, within the BRICS and IBSA forums and the G-77, to name a few examples.

Within the G-20, it is clear that socialization processes have taken place that have

informed and influenced Brazil's role in the institution. Brazil has shown itself to be, in general, a non-aggressive negotiating partner at the G-20 table, more willing to adhere to the status quo power dynamics within the forum than outside of it. This signifies a consistency of Brazil's historical reliance on negotiation capacities that frame "demands in terms of justice" (NARLIKAR, 2010, p. 123). These demands continue to be based on "well-entrenched roots in mediatory, bridge-building diplomacy" (p. 134), despite Brazil's growing assertiveness,. Here, it is concluded that, within the G-20, Brazil has taken on the ascribed role of global player. This role, however, has not yet been achieved – Brazil has not reached global player status in international affairs in general.

This understanding of global player status, then, is implicitly based on an acceptance of the status quo power dynamics. It is a conception of power based on the club model, whereby states value their seat at the exclusive negotiation table to take advantage of the special privileges to address national interests. This prerequisite of belonging to the exclusive club of global governance implicitly recognizes that, despite much attention given to the rise of emerging powers, there have been no tectonic power shifts since the ascension of the G-20 as the leading global governance forum. This conception of global players then, may have the same theoretical disadvantages as great powers: it is a tacit discarding of revisionist powers as major actors in international system. The role of China in contemporary foreign affairs, for example, would provide both parallels and disparities in the Brazilian experience of power, status quo, revisionism and reform of the international system. It is also possible that Brazil's current strategy for international insertion and global player status is seeking to go beyond the pragmatism/universalist dichotomy within Itamaraty. The rhetorical and policy emphasis on regional integration,

magnified as a political project rather than an economic accord in past years, may signify the rise of a new foreign policy paradigm that understands global player status as a goal best achieved through regional cooperation. Yet, while Brazil is very much a leader in South America, its emphasis on understating that role, along with its neighbors' disdain for its previous claims as a "representative" of the continent, may weaken the potential for Brazil to reach global player status through regionalism. As discussed in Chapter 4, Brazil has managed to avoid regional conflict thus far in the G-20, mainly through its consistent attention to upholding a close and cooperative relationship with Argentina, but a third paradigm based on regionalism (one that contrasts itself with pragmatism and universalism) would be endangered by Brazil's delicate, and potentially paradoxical, regional role.

Within the G-20, Brazil has followed a policy marked by pragmatism, a "wait and see" approach and a commitment to ambivalence. As De Castro Neves (2012) points out, ambivalence is a valid foreign policy strategy: "a ambivalência internacional é entendida como uma adaptação com ressalvas à ordem global" (p. 265). Ambivalence allows countries to continue to hold their cards and is often a dominant tactic for emerging countries. By remaining ambivalent about where its loyalties lie, Brazil thus far successfully avoided any major interrole conflicts. Yet the country's continued allegiance to the Global South rhetoric has in part impeded Brazil from acting more aggressively on the international stage and "achieving" its G-20 role as global player.

As discussed at the closing of the final chapter, this strategy has precluded Brazil's current assumption of global player strategy, but it remains possible that as emphasis on power sources shifts Brazil will find itself in a privileged international position. The

country seems to have anticipated the current discussion on smart power, whereby hard power capacities are subordinated to the image and identity of the country purporting them. In this way, smart power may look something like ambivalence: rhetoric of cooperation, calls for transparency, democratic global governance and fair representation along with a desired projection of an international identity based on respect for human rights, sovereignty and peace. These are elements of Brazilian foreign policy that date back to the Rio Branco era (with varying degrees of emphasis); they stand in sharp conflict to the other BRICS' strategies for international insertion. The BRICS bloc is first and foremost held together by the "emerging" qualities of each member country, but few other qualitative characteristics (historical, cultural, linguistic, ethnic) unite the group. Disparities in each member's role towards the status quo therefore are important enough to potentially discredit the commitment to the bloc. Roles, identities and status are important elements to this commitment; as was done within the G-20 forum in this research, these concepts could be applied to understand social mechanisms within the BRICS summits.

This is an area that could benefit from further scholarship. What is clear from the examination of Brazil's role in the G-20 and the social processes that accompany it is that Brazil's century-old search for recognition in international affairs continues to affect its posture, attitude and image projection in various international institutions. In many ways, it is a part of an ingrained conception of national interests to be seen as cooperative and an upholder of international norms. This has meant that in its pursuit of an increase of (hard and soft) power internationally, regionally and in the Global South, Brazil continues to employ rhetoric that stresses partnership (regionally), fairness and inclusion (in the Global South) and cooperation (in the G-20). The internal contradictions that these roles contain have not yet caused major

problems for Brazil; the country has thus far managed adroitly its different roles and avoided something akin to an international “identity crisis.” If Brazil continues to accumulate the types of power associated with the status quo (insider global governance power, hard power capabilities) it may prove to be more difficult to manage conflicting roles; yet if the types of power associated with the status quo are themselves subject to change, Brazil may find itself rewarded for its policy of ambivalence.

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